Scapegoating in the New Order<\/p>\n
By Tjipta Lesmana<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The origin of the term scapegoat, according to
\nGordon W. Allport, might be found in the Book of Leviticus
\n(16:20-22). On the Day of Atonement a live goat was chosen to be
\nsacrificed. An Israeli high priest laid his hands on the goat's
\nhead and confessed over it the sins of the children of Israel. In
\ndoing so these sins were symbolically transferred to the goat; it
\nwas then taken out into the wilderness and set free. The people
\nfelt purified, and for the time being, free of guilt.<\/p>\n
This ritual act follows a simple rationale: guilt and
\nmisfortune can be shifted from men to animals. According to
\nAllport, this ritual developed from animistic thinking which
\nconfused what is mental with what is physical. If a pile of wood
\ncan be shifted from one place to another, why then shouldn't
\nsorrow, guilt or frustration?<\/p>\n
This mental process is termed \"projection\" or \"scapegoating\".
\nIt is not only ourselves who are responsible for our own
\nmisfortunes, but other people as well. Sorrow, guilt and
\nfrustration are misfortunes which individuals frequently
\nexperience in their lives.<\/p>\n
Those who always blame others for their wrong doing are termed
\nextra-punitive while those who blame themselves are termed intro-
\npunitive. Intro-punitive and extra-punitive types of
\npersonalities are partly attributed to culture.<\/p>\n
Leaders in low-power distance cultures tend to be intro-
\npunitive. Not being fond of using any pretexts while interacting,
\nthey are more honest. Power is regarded as something unworthy of
\nworship.<\/p>\n
Consequently, losing power is deemed something natural that
\nshould not be seen as too embarrassing. In Japan (a low-power
\nculture society), a transportation minister held himself
\naccountable for a plane crash when submitting his letter of
\nresignation. Similarly in India a railroad minister announced his
\nresignation because of a fatal train crash that claimed hundreds
\nof lives.<\/p>\n
However, people in a high-power distance culture tend to be
\ncontext-centered. \"Playing with words\", especially among leaders,
\nis an everyday phenomena. Every thing they say is dependent on
\nits context which must be grasped before its meaning can be
\nunderstood clearly. In these cultures, power is deemed
\nextraordinarily. In terms of accountability, the leaders in these
\ncultures are extra-punitive in type.<\/p>\n
President B.J. Habibie, for example, unsubstantially accused a
\nsection of society of planning to topple his regime last
\nNovember, when thousands of students battled with police in an
\nincident which is popularly known as the \"Semanggi Tragedy I\".<\/p>\n
Chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council A. Arnold Baramuli
\nquickly blamed economist Kwik Kian Gie and his colleagues at the
\nIndonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) for
\n\"blowing-up\" the Bank Bali scandal, even after he had been
\nofficially implicated in the scandal.<\/p>\n
During the New Order, any citizen challenging Soeharto's rule
\nwas quickly labeled as a \"subversive\" or a \"communist\".<\/p>\n
A senior army general said that any act which could harm the
\npositive image of the armed forces was not only unacceptable, but
\nalso that its perpetrators were liable for a heavy punishment.
\nThose who committed these acts were accused of intentionally
\ndestroying the harmonious bond between the people and the armed
\nforces. Scapegoating, blaming others for one's misfortune, was a
\ncommon practice during the New Order.<\/p>\n
Above all, it is our military (including the police) who are
\nmost willing to use the \"scapegoat argument\" when facing a
\nproblem.<\/p>\n
A general or a commander never acknowledges responsibility
\nwhen his subordinate's action inflicts casualties upon citizens.
\nThe statement by the Jakarta Police Chief that the death of Yun
\nHap, a student at the University of Indonesia, in recent rioting
\nwas caused by bullets originating from \"another car\" was typical
\nscapegoating.<\/p>\n
It proved very easy for the general to blame other agencies
\nwithout any prior investigation. His statement was,
\nunfortunately, nullified by the Military's spokesman Maj. Gen.
\nSudradjat who said that Yun Hap was shot by a heavily depressed
\nsoldier. He also stated to the press that the soldiers were from
\nthe Jakarta garrison.<\/p>\n
At least seven people were shot dead in the recent rioting.
\nArmed Forces Commander Gen. Wiranto has at no time expressed
\nguilt or responsibility. He has even accused \"destructive forces\"
\nof being behind the demonstrations.<\/p>\n
\"And I want to know who you are. Show your faces, please.
\nDon't hide yourselves under the pretext of belonging to the
\nstudents,\" he said.<\/p>\n
The recent rioting in Semanggi reflects and reconfirms<\/p>\n
* the familiar repressive ways used by the army and police to
\nforcibly put down any student movement;<\/p>\n
* the military's stance of refusing to admit to any wrong doing,
\nand<\/p>\n
* instead, to project this wrong doing on others.<\/p>\n
We are reminded of the inter-ethnic violence in Maluku in
\nwhich hundreds of people died. Gen. Wiranto accused provocateurs
\nfrom outside of Maluku. He never once took seriously allegations
\nthat some elements of the military took sides when attempting to
\nstop the violence. Unfortunately, efforts to reveal and bring to
\njustice those provocateurs were never made, leaving us pondering
\nwhat really went on and is indeed going on in Maluku.<\/p>\n
In Aceh, the military persistently blames the \"Aceh
\nIndependence Movement\" (GAM) as the main culprit in the recent
\nviolence. The more soldiers Wiranto dispatches to Aceh, the more
\nblood is shed. Caught in a delicate situation with much
\ncondemnation, Wiranto then accuses the national media of igniting
\nthe hatred of the Acehnese.<\/p>\n
Interviews with GAM leaders in the press particularly upset
\nWiranto, which he regards as opportunities for GAM to publicize
\ntheir arguments in their fight for independence.<\/p>\n
The military's use of scapegoating is reminiscent of the New
\nOrder political system. The establishment in those days was
\nbeyond control. It consisted of an elite who deemed themselves
\ninfallible. Even if they did wrong, they quickly projected the
\nevil onto others. The president, above all, was beyond criticism.
\nAny act of eliciting hatred toward the president was tantamount
\nto subversion.<\/p>\n
As the president's henchmen, the military followed the
\nautocratic-extra-punitive culture. And it is apparently very
\ndifficult for the military to abandon this culture, even though
\nthe New Order itself has collapsed. Gen. Wiranto has no appetite
\nto research the bloody incidents which have characterized
\nHabibie's regime. This is not too surprising if one remembers
\nthat Wiranto was handpicked by former president Soeharto for his
\npresent position.<\/p>\n
But how can a man plagued by so many controversies, with so
\nmuch \"blood on his hands\" and so many examples of scapegoating to
\nhis name be placed as vice president, or even president, in the
\nupcoming Peoples Consultative Assembly? Chairman of the National
\nAwakening Party Matori Abdul Djalil was right when he said
\nrecently that if the Habibie-Wiranto platform wins the
\npresidential election on Oct. 20, then the New Order Chapter III
\nwill have begun.<\/p>\n
The writer, a social scientist and graduate of the University
\nof Chicago, is currently lecturing at the University of
\nIndonesia.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/scapegoating-in-the-new-order-1447893297",
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