Satish Mishra<\/p>\n
Head\/Chief Adviser of UNSFIR
\n(UNSFIR is a joint project of the Indonesian government and UNDP)<\/p>\n
Countries, like individuals, it would seem, need acclaim and
\nrecognition. When the front cover of the Economist magazine, just
\nafter July 5, 2004, the first round of presidential elections,
\ncarried the caption \"shining example\", it was taken to signify
\nthat Indonesia had turned the corner in its transition to
\ndemocracy.<\/p>\n
Since then other achievements have followed: the peaceful
\ncompletion of direct presidential elections, establishment of a
\nsecond chamber of the legislature, reduced sectarian violence, a
\nstock market boom, higher investment grades, and continuing
\npraise by international agencies for Indonesia's fiscal
\nmanagement. By the end of 2004 Indonesia has good reason to be
\nfeeling proud of itself.<\/p>\n
But acclaim is a fickle companion. It can vanish as suddenly
\nas it appears. Remember those heady precrisis days, as late as
\nthe middle of 1997. External observers, and equally observant
\nagencies, continued to celebrate the glories of the Indonesian
\nmiracle as a homegrown combination of political stability, record
\neconomic growth and low levels of economic inequality.<\/p>\n
This was the best of all worlds. It was widely interpreted as
\na testimony to the vigor of the Asian spirit and the genius of
\nits age-old, consensus promoting ethical values.<\/p>\n
What if the New Order was a little authoritarian, a little
\nintolerant of dissent and open discourse, a little harsh on
\nsocialists and communists and of other such \"isms\", what if
\nworkers could not strike and newspapers were censored, what if
\nthe military gave up fighting external wars for internal
\nrepression, what if the ruling family treated the state as its
\nprivate domain and personal property. How did all this matter?<\/p>\n
The Chinese had been through such dilemmas. What mattered,
\nlike Deng Xiaoping's China was that the Soeharto regime was good
\nat catching mice. Illiberal democracies, Zakaria argues, have
\nbeen much maligned.<\/p>\n
They might be better at promoting liberal values than
\ncountries whose democratic systems have been captured by the
\nruling elite. The great Huntington himself might be tempted to
\nagree.<\/p>\n
What matters most, is not how societies are governed but that
\nthey are governed. Anarchy is the worst human condition. Witness
\nthe failed states of Somalia or the Congo.<\/p>\n
But all this acclaim and recognition for the Asian genius did
\nnot help. Authoritarianism was rejected not in the political
\ndebating circles of foreign parliaments or in the boardrooms of
\ninternational companies but in the streets and homes of
\nIndonesian cities and villages.<\/p>\n
In the end, the mighty Soeharto was ousted by the shifting
\nsands of political legitimacy, by the feeling that the time for
\ndictatorships was over.<\/p>\n
Acclaim vanished. Indonesia moved from miracle to basket case,
\nfrom a stable autocracy to a confused democracy, from a high
\nperforming economy to one of the four most corrupt countries in
\nthe world, from a united country to one in imminent danger of
\nfragmentation. Those who cared about external acclaim went
\nthrough an enormous loss of confidence and self worth.<\/p>\n
Indonesia suddenly vanished from the international radar
\nscreen. From being a country to watch and emulate, it had become
\na country to avoid, a country marked by economic recklessness and
\npolitical drift.<\/p>\n
Yet the question posed by the Economist is relevant even for
\nthose who do not have to put a particular spin on their stories.
\nIs Indonesia really shining? How far has Indonesia's transition
\nto democracy come and where is it going? That question is in the
\nminds of people in those very homes which put an end to the
\npolitics of dictatorship and control. It is especially in their
\nminds as the popularity of the new, directly elected President
\nseems to be on the decline.<\/p>\n
Have free and fair elections simply resulted in the capture of
\nstate power by the old elite, the same unholy trinity of big
\nbusiness, senior bureaucrats and remnants of the old military and
\npolice? Has this capture of the state become even easier by the
\nrapid deconcentration of political power and by the continuing
\nconcentration of large businesses? Within such a quagmire of
\nIndonesian politics, what is a decent, popular, directly elected
\npresident supposed to do?<\/p>\n
These are all rather searching questions. Those who argue in
\nfavor of primacy of economics over politics miss the point that
\nthe crisis unleashed by the collapse of the rupiah in late 1997
\nwas fundamentally one of political legitimacy rather than of
\nforeign debt or exchange rates.<\/p>\n
Three decades of high economic growth could not save the New
\nOrder system from collapse. They might have, if you believe the
\nanalysis of the democracy's Third Wave in Huntington's
\njustifiably famous book, actually created the conditions for an
\nexit from authoritarianism.<\/p>\n
To stabilize Indonesia, to create the conditions to enable a
\nnew round of economic growth, what needs to be fixed is not so
\nmuch the economics but the politics. That means that the task of
\nconsolidating the democratic transition must remain the first
\ncall on public policy.<\/p>\n
In fact, we all know that Indonesia's journey to a
\nconsolidated, stable democracy is far from over. The Economist's
\npraise should be taken with a pinch of salt. International
\nexperience, while confirming the general trend toward democratic
\npolities, provides ample example of retreats in various forms of
\ndictatorships.<\/p>\n
This reversal of the democratic transitions is more likely in
\nlow income countries with ethnic fragmentation and\/or with weak
\nand divided pro-democracy movements. A large number of countries
\nhave been unable to achieve democratic stability, Indonesia
\nincluded, on the first attempt.<\/p>\n
Some countries in Latin America and Asia have experienced the
\nworst of all worlds, of a repeated political dance between
\ndictatorships. The important point is that a move away from
\nauthoritarianism does not by itself lead to a stable democracy.
\nAll kinds of outcomes are possible; from fascism to a failed
\nstate.<\/p>\n
Indonesia has indeed come a long way in its road to
\nconsolidated democracy. Constitutional and judicial reform is
\nproof of that. Yet a number of key tasks remain. If unskillfully
\nhandled, these might still lead to an unraveling of the
\nIndonesian democratic transition.<\/p>\n
First, as has often been pointed out, Indonesia's political
\nreforms while numerous lack a sound structure and road map. They
\nhave been done on the hoof, in the rough and tumble of inter-
\ninstitutional struggles and adjustment. The most obvious case is
\nthe changing relationship between the executive and the
\nlegislature, and between one level of government and the other.
\nAt a lower level, we have the examples of the separation of the
\npolice and the military, the shifting jurisdiction of the
\nministry of finance and of the national development planning
\nagency and so on.<\/p>\n
At yet another there is the famous instance of no effective
\narrangements regarding the transfer of power from one elected
\npresident to another. Indonesia's constitutional and political
\nreform map is full of marks and holes. It is time to identify the
\ngaps and detail a democratic consolidation program, perhaps
\nthrough a task force headed by the Constitutional Court.<\/p>\n
Second, Indonesia's policy processes are in need of a major
\noverhaul. Such reform needs to be centered around the three
\npillars of democratic policy making: a strong and closely
\ncoordinated government, an informed legislature, and the
\nparticipation of non-governmental agencies and professional
\nassociations early in the policy making process. In addition,
\nthere is the critical role of public dialog to win public support
\nfor government policy initiatives.<\/p>\n
More effective and transparent use of consultative processes,
\nsuch as White Papers, interministerial working groups and
\ncommissions, independent research groups and commissions of
\ninquiry, need to be developed as practical conventions and
\nprocesses in policy making. Endless attrition between a badly
\ninformed legislature and an arrogant bureaucracy can only promote
\ndisillusionment with democratic politics.<\/p>\n
Third, no democracy can be sustained without due attention to
\nwhat has aptly been called the \"economics of democracy\".
\nIndonesia's 2004 National Human Development Report (NHDR) makes
\nthe point that democracy is not just a matter of organizing
\nelections. It must also reflect core human values and rights,
\nincluding a range of civic rights relating to health, education,
\nfood and physical security for all Indonesian citizens.<\/p>\n
Economic policy cannot just be judged in terms of its success
\nin promoting economic growth and macroeconomic stability. It must
\nalso address public concerns with respect to the supply of these
\ncore public goods. As the new President has himself argued
\nrepeatedly in the course of his election campaign, Indonesian
\ndemocracy needs a revised social contract.<\/p>\n
Ultimately such a social contract cannot just be legislated
\ninto effect. It must be the outcome of the battle of hearts and
\nminds which lies at the center of a new political legitimacy. The
\nNHDR recommends a national summit to broker such a widely agreed
\nsocial accord.<\/p>\n
Indonesia today has its first directly elected President. He
\nis the people's president. What better way for him to promote
\nIndonesia's quest for a consolidated democracy than to lead such
\na national summit. If that happens, Indonesia will indeed set a
\nshining example of how to resist the subtle temptations of a
\nretreat into a future dictatorship.<\/p>\n
The views expressed in this article are totally those of the
\nauthor's and do not in any way reflect those of the
\ninstitution's.<\/p>",
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