Rum-Royen agreement<\/p>\n
May 7, 1999 marks the 50th anniversary of a great event in the
\nhistory of Indonesian diplomacy, the Rum-Van Royen Agreement. So
\nfar, the peculiar fact discernible is that three episodes are
\nwell appraised, judging from monographs on them. These are the
\nLinggarjati Agreement (March 25, 1947), the Renville Agreement
\n(Jan. 17 to Jan 19, 1948) and the Round Table Conference (RTC)
\nAgreement of The Hague (Aug. 23 to Nov.2, 1949). However, the
\nhistoric importance of the Rum-Van Royen Agreement is commonly
\nignored.<\/p>\n
Officially the agreement is called the \"Van Royen-Rum
\nStatements\" after a suggestion the U.S. member in the United
\nNations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI), emanating in the closing
\nceremony on May 7, 1949.<\/p>\n
When the Rum-Van Royen Agreement is scrupulously examined, it
\nis revealed that an exceptional feature characterizing its
\nhistoric value is missing in the Linggarjati and Renville
\nAgreements.<\/p>\n
The instrument cannot be called \"agreement\", for the fact that
\nin the eyes of the Dutch government the authority proper of the
\nIndonesian government did not exist. The objective of the Dutch
\nsecond military action against Yogyakarta on Dec. 19, 1948 was
\nexactly to crush the republic. The emergency government of the
\nrepublic under Syafruddin Prawiranegara, with a mandate from
\npresident Sukarno and vice president Mohammad Hatta, was not
\nrecognized by the Dutch.<\/p>\n
At that time, the members of the Cabinet, along with president
\nSukarno and vice president Hatta, were held captive on Bangka
\n(president Sukarno had been transferred to Bangka from Prapat on
\nLake Toba, North Sumatra.<\/p>\n
However, although the title adopts the term \"Statements\", the
\nintent of creating a mutual binding obligation is evident from
\nthe word \"agreed\" in the text. This denotes the nature of
\nagreement.<\/p>\n
The other outstanding feature is that the president and the
\nvice president, as captives on Bangka, missed the governing
\nauthority of the republic. Thus they gave only \"personal
\nassurances\" that they favored the agreement, and this sufficed as
\ncredentials provided to Rum, as head of the Indonesian
\ndelegation. Notably, this was recognized by the Dutch.<\/p>\n
The Rum Statement sets out only three points, whereas the Van
\nRoyen Statement seven points, but the gist is that on the
\nrepublican side the cessation of guerrilla warfare was pledged
\nand on the Dutch side the return of the republican government and
\nits reinstatement in the residency of Yogyakarta were agreed to.<\/p>\n
The withdrawal of the Dutch forces from Yogyakarta was
\ncompleted on June 30, 1949, and on July 6 president Sukarno, vice
\npresident Hatta and the ministers by UNCI plane returned to
\nYogyakarta.<\/p>\n
The historical significance of the Rum-Van Royen Agreement
\nlies in the fact that in effect it paved the way toward speeding
\nup the convening and realization of the objectives of the RTC. It
\nwas the fruit of the RTC agreements that on Dec. 27, 1949, the
\nNetherlands transferred sovereignty over Indonesia (except West
\nIrian) to a then federal state, the United States of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Now, when all is said of the official account, one may revert
\nto the unofficial aspect of the story. One is reminded that the
\nnegotiations, involving official talks from April 14 to April 21,
\nfollowed by 16 days of unofficial discussions, and the
\nculminating announcement of the Rum-Van Royen Statements took
\nplace at Hotel des Indes. But now the historic building exists no
\nmore. It was demolished some time in the 1970s.<\/p>\n
A monument in the history of Indonesian diplomacy disappeared.
\nIt's a great pity.<\/p>\n
S. SUHAEDI<\/p>\n
Jakarta<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/rum-royen-agreement-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }