RI's views on verifying disarmament<\/p>\n
By Agus Tarmidzi and Imron Cotan<\/p>\n
GENEVA (JP): The United Nations Headquarters' conference last
\nweek was vital in determining the course of the international
\ncommunity in its constant endeavors to contain the proliferation
\nof nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass-destruction in the
\nfuture.<\/p>\n
From Nov. 26 to Dec. 6, the states parties to the Biological
\nWeapons convention which regulate the development, production and
\nstockpiling of biological and toxin weapons and their destruction
\nreviewed the implementation of the convention for the last five
\nyears.<\/p>\n
The conference was held after some important developments in
\nthe field of non-proliferation have taken place, such as the
\nimminent entry into force of the Chemical Weapons convention
\n(CWC) and the signing of the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
\n(CTBT). The provision of these two legal instruments will
\ncertainly serve as the guiding principles in all disarmament
\nnegotiations, especially those affecting weapons of mass-
\ndestruction, such as biological weapons.<\/p>\n
Words of caution, however, need to be flagged for they might
\nor might not fit to function as such. As one may recall, the CWC
\ncomprehensively ban all chemical weapons, including their use,
\nwhile the CTBT has, unfortunately, failed to address the issue of
\nqualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, which has certainly
\nhelped shape the nature of their verification regimes.<\/p>\n
It is therefore fair to remind the states parties to the
\nconvention to take these facts into consideration when they
\nfurther consider the elements of the verification regime of the
\nconvention, as requested by its special conference held in 1994.<\/p>\n
Touching upon this very important issue, it is advisable to
\noutline the position Indonesia has long been advocating on the
\nverification regime of the convention.<\/p>\n
First, Indonesia is of the view that the provision contained
\ntherein should not hinder the use or research and development of
\nbiological\/toxin agents for peaceful purposes or the need to
\ndevelop bio-technology to improve the well-being of its
\npopulation.<\/p>\n
Secondly, the verification regime should be reliable and
\ntrustworthy as to enable it to fully deter non-compliance and
\nappropriately protect sensitive information not relevant to the
\nimplementation of the convention.<\/p>\n
Thirdly, as a matter of principle, the verification regime
\nshould not make it difficult for the states parties to engage in
\ntechnical cooperation among themselves or denying developing
\ncountries access to technology and equipment and biological\/toxin
\nagents to suit their developmental requirements and needs, as
\nrequired by the Convention.<\/p>\n
This is particularly important, since Indonesia's National
\nDevelopment Guidelines clearly determined that it should develop
\nagriculture-based industries in order to further improve the
\nwell-being of its people<\/p>\n
Another important issue which needs to be fully dwelled upon
\nis the criteria on which a request for an on-site inspection
\nshould be based. During the course of deliberations in the Adhoc
\nGroup which was set up by the special Conference in 1994 in order
\nto study the possibility of establishing a verification regime,
\nsome developed countries proposed that \"unusual outbreak of
\ndisease\" could be a triggering factor for launching such an
\ninspection.<\/p>\n
To avoid any misunderstandings, however, there is a need to
\nstress that Indonesia has nothing against the use of such a
\ncriteria for launching an on-site inspection. It should, however,
\nbe borne in mind that the developing countries, including
\nIndonesia, do not have as yet adequate measures and
\ninfrastructures pertaining to health and sanitary conditions.<\/p>\n
Recent unusual outbreak of disease in India is a case in
\npoint, reminding the international community of such the
\nvulnerability of the developing countries to such a case.<\/p>\n
Therefore, these developing countries see a need to conduct an
\nin-depth analysis based on scientific data and parameters set by
\nthe competent international authority, such as the World Health
\nOrganization, to firstly determine whether or not a case of an
\nunusual outbreak of disease is indeed proven as a natural-rooted
\ncalamity before hastily resorting to on-site inspection measures.<\/p>\n
Indonesia is, naturally, sensitive to the opinions which have
\nbeen expressed regarding the need to conduct an on-site
\ninspection in the speediest possible manner in order to avoid
\ndata-tampering by the suspected state or suspected violator. A
\nbalance between these two elements therefore needs to be struck.
\nbut taking into account that the international community is
\ndealing with living biological\/toxin agents which can quickly
\nmultiply themselves, a data-tampering or a cover-up operation
\nis hardly conceivable.<\/p>\n
Another matter of concern to the developing countries is the
\nquestion of determining the deadline for the completion of the
\nverification system of the convention. Some developed countries
\nhave already stated that they wish to see the states parties
\ncomplete the verification protocol in 1998.<\/p>\n
While fully sharing their concern that the absence of a
\nverification regime would render the Convention ineffective and,
\nhave, encourage ill-motivated States parties to break their
\nobligations, Indonesia sees a danger in imposing an artificial
\ndeadline. Recent developments that the Conference on Disarmament
\nhave gone through teach us a very valuable lesson during which
\nIndia disassociated itself with the conclusion of the CTBT,
\nanother important non-proliferation regime.<\/p>\n
A pre-determined deadline, particularly one which has not been
\nagreed to by all participating states, would only prevent us from
\nachieving the universality of the verification regime in the
\nfuture. Indonesia would certainly be more than happy to complete
\nthe existing work as some delegations wish. However, careful
\nconsideration is really warranted in this case in order not to
\ncommit the same mistake.<\/p>\n
It is indeed encouraging to note that some countries, such as
\nFrance and South Africa, have used this conference to divulge the
\nwithdrawals of their reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and
\nthereby revoke their rights to use biological\/toxin weapons as
\nretaliatory measure.<\/p>\n
As one may recall, Indonesia has been a state party to the
\n1925 Geneva Protocol since 1971 and has lodged no reservations
\nwhatsoever to its provisions. It is against this backdrop that
\nIndonesia welcomes the statement by the European Union countries
\nand other states associated thereto which called on those states
\nwhich have not done so to also promptly withdraw all their
\nreservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol.<\/p>\n
Only then will the international community be able to
\ndefinitely fill in the lacuna of the Biological Weapons
\nConvention which in its present form fails to ban outright the
\nuse of these inhuman weapons.<\/p>\n
The world has indeed undergone fundamental and radical changes
\nrequiring it to adapt to the new realities of the post-Cold War
\nera. In such a world, biological and toxin weapons have no place
\nand should be considered a thing of the past. The Gulf War has
\ntaught the international community a priceless lesson. If the
\nstates parties to the convention are to save their future
\ngenerations, they shall not fail to prevent it from rekindling.<\/p>\n
Agus Tarmidzi is Indonesia's Permanent Representative to the
\nUnited Nations Office and Other International Organizations.
\nImron Cotan is an expert on international peace and security,
\nincluding multilateral negotiations on disarmament. Both are
\nstationed in Geneva.<\/p>\n
Window A: Another important issue which needs to be fully dwelled
\nupon is the criteria on which a request for an on-site inspection
\nshould be based.<\/p>\n
Window B: Recent unusual outbreak of disease in India is a case
\nin point, reminding the international community of such the
\nvulnerability of the developing countries to such a case.<\/p>",
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