RI faces dissolution threat<\/p>\n
It's a long way from Berlin to Aceh, but as The Jakarta Post's
\nAsia correspondent Harvey Stockwin made that mental journey
\nrecently, some provocative parallels came to mind.<\/p>\n
HONG KONG (JP): As the 10th anniversary of the destruction of
\nthe Berlin Wall by People Power was commemorated recently, the
\ncrucial role of one key personality was completely forgotten.<\/p>\n
Of course, the then U.S. President George Bush was honored --
\neven though at one stage he made that famous \"Chicken Kiev\"
\nspeech in which he advised the soon-to-be-independent Ukrainians
\nthat they should stay part of the collapsing Soviet Union.<\/p>\n
Of course, the then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was
\nwarmly remembered for agreeing to a reunited Germany, even though
\nhis glasnost and perestroika reforms were intended to save the
\nSoviet Union, rather than create a democratic Russia shorn of its
\nEmpires.<\/p>\n
But amidst all the celebrations no one recalled the leader
\nwho, more than any other, brought the Cold War to a conclusion
\nand the Soviet Union to its knees: Leonid Brezhnev.<\/p>\n
Nikita Khrushchev had at least tried to politically reform the
\nSoviet Union, notably with his revelation of Stalinist excesses.
\nBrezhnev saw reform as being too risky. Avoidance of risk plus
\nthe endless pursuit of stability were the name of the game in
\nBrezhnev's Kremlin.<\/p>\n
It remained the name of the game for nearly two decades as
\nBrezhnev and his surrounding gerontocracy stayed in power far too
\nlong. Checkpoint Charlie, the Berlin Wall, the Cold War, the
\nSoviet Union itself, all seemed to be permanent and immutable.
\nBut it was only a facade, concealing an illusion.<\/p>\n
As the Brezhnev Era endured, the internal Soviet problems
\nsimply accrued faster than any ability to solve them. The speedy
\ndissolution of both the Russian Empire (which comprised the
\nsocialists republics of the Soviet Union) and of the Soviet
\nEmpire (which comprised the so-called captive nations of Eastern
\nEurope) became more, rather than less, inevitable.<\/p>\n
By the time Gorbachev had a chance to take charge over the
\nmess that had been created, Brezhnev's endless pursuit of the
\nstatus quo had created a wholly intractable problem. Whatever
\nGorbachev did it was bound to be too little, too late. So, with
\npreviously unimaginable speed, first the captive nations became
\nfree, and then the captive republics within the Soviet Union
\nasserted their independence, too. Today even the parts of the
\nRussian Federation are proving troublesome, as in Chechnya.<\/p>\n
The Brezhnev Era illustrated with devastating clarity that
\nthere is nothing so destabilizing as leaders who stay in power
\ntoo long, pursuing stability.<\/p>\n
The changes brought about by People Power in Berlin in 1989
\ncame to mind this week as People Power in Asia flowered in Aceh,
\nthe province of 4.3 million people in the northernmost part of
\nthe Indonesian island of Sumatra.<\/p>\n
As a huge crowd gathered in Banda Aceh on Nov. 7-8, one old
\ntechnique of people power movements was much in evidence: playing
\na numbers game, so that there is exaggeration of the number of
\npeople demonstrating.<\/p>\n
The organizers of the General Session of the Council for the
\nFight for the Referendum, as the rally was called, at first
\nsuggested that half a million Acehnese were attending.<\/p>\n
Reporters, some of whom never left Jakarta, quickly escalated
\nthis number to a million, some Hong Kong newspapers headlined 1.5
\nmillion, and local Aceh papers ended up asserting two million, or
\nhalf the local population.<\/p>\n
Two level-headed reporters who were in the thick of it
\nmaintained that the crowd was between one and two hundred
\nthousand. Still pictures and video back up this conclusion. Their
\ncareful reporting was drowned out as the would-be secessionists
\nplayed the numbers game with the media, and clearly won.<\/p>\n
Yet the precise numbers matter less than the reality of a
\nmassive outpouring of popular Acehnese feeling sending a very
\nplain message: The people were utterly fed up with Jakarta's
\npromises and performance. Any Javanese government in Jakarta was
\nsuspect. Time and again, in response to reporters' questions,
\nordinary Acehnese said they didn't care if Indonesia broke up.
\nCompromise was pointless. They wanted a referendum in order to
\nvote for independence.<\/p>\n
The basic political message for President Abdurrahman Wahid is
\nequally plain. He will not enjoy the usual political honeymoon
\nfor newly installed leaders. He is face to face with Aceh's
\nlongstanding historical urge for separation, for being its own
\nindependent self. He has very little time to play with. If he
\ntalks about the principle of an Aceh referendum -- and does not
\ndeliver, then that will be one more Javanese broken promise,
\nmaking the Acehnese even more intransigent.<\/p>\n
This means that the future of Indonesia is on the line.
\nGiving in to the Acehnese demands, let alone allowing them to
\nbecome independent, conjures up the very real threat that other
\nparts of the archipelago will insist upon equal treatment -- and
\nthat Indonesia might break apart. Already there is restiveness in
\nRiau and west Irian.<\/p>\n
Yet for Jakarta to attempt another militarily-imposed solution
\nis simply not an option. It is precisely the use and abuse of
\nmilitary attempts at imposing a solution upon Aceh, over the last
\ntwo decades particularly, that has created the present impasse.
\nLike Mikhail Gorbachev and former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
\nShevardnadze faced with the dissolution of the Soviet Empire,
\nAbdurrahman can only take the extremely difficult, but essential,
\ndecision that military force is not an answer.<\/p>\n
Also like Gorbachev, Abdurrahman faces an utterly intractable
\nproblem born of the fact that two Empires are in dissolution. On
\nthe one hand, there is the dissolution of the Soeharto family's
\nbusiness empire -- the tentacles of which extended to, and
\ninfuriated, the Acehnese, just as they had offended the East
\nTimorese.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, there is the vision, beloved of former
\npresident Soeharto, of Indonesia as essentially a Javanese
\nEmpire. Seen from Aceh, President Abdurrahman and Vice President
\nMegawati Soekarnoputri initially sustain this image because they
\nare both Javanese -- replacing B.J. Habibie, the first Indonesian
\nPresident to come from the outlying islands. While the eventual
\nAbdurrahman-Megawati combination was a dream ticket in many ways,
\nit was not so in relation to Indonesia's many centrifugal
\npressures.<\/p>\n
Indonesia faces the danger of dissolution because Soeharto,
\nwho came to see himself as a Javanese King, was to Indonesia what
\nBrezhnev was to Russia. He stayed in power far too long.<\/p>\n
The longer Soeharto stayed in power, the more easily he
\nbelieved that he was beginning a Javanese dynasty. And the more
\nfrequently he ordered violence as the natural military means for
\nkeeping the Javanese Empire stable. It is that longstanding
\npattern of violence and brutality which makes Aceh so unwilling
\nto compromise today. Other parts of Indonesia feel the same way.<\/p>\n
There is nothing so destabilizing as leaders who stay in power
\ntoo long, pursuing stability.<\/p>\n
So will President Abdurrahman come to be seen, like Gorbachev,
\nas a man who climbed to the top of the greasy political pole too
\nlate, who tried to reform things but was fatally handicapped by
\nthe long years in which there had been absolutely no reform?<\/p>\n
Not necessarily. While the current situation in Indonesia is
\nvery definitely precarious, it remains relevant to expect the
\nunexpected.<\/p>\n
Abdurrahman might yet manage to re-arouse faith in a New
\nIndonesia, to persuade the Acehnese, and others, that his
\npromises of real autonomy and real revenue sharing will be kept.
\nHe can articulate a strategy of reform which enhances national
\nunity. In the longer run he could usher in a federal, instead of
\na unitary state on the valid grounds that it is more rational for
\na far-flung archipelago.<\/p>\n
Vice President Megawati might yet generate some renewed
\npassion, in the manner of her father Sukarno in the struggle
\nagainst the Dutch, for a nation that stretches from Sabang to
\nMerauke (Ironically that former Sukarnoist slogan extended from
\nAceh to west Irian, the two areas now most prone to depart.)<\/p>\n
Perhaps Indonesia's shift towards democracy has not come too
\nlate but just in the nick of time to release the Indonesian
\npolitical imagination in an atmosphere of freedom, and to bring
\nabout overdue change. Jakarta must quickly acquire a heightened
\nsense of national urgency before it is too late.<\/p>\n
Window: Indonesia faces the danger of dissolution because Soeharto,
\nwho came to see himself as a Javanese King, was to Indonesia what
\nBrezhnev was to Russia. He stayed in power far too long.<\/p>\n
So will President Abdurrahman come to be seen, like Gorbachev,
\nas a man who climbed to the top of the greasy political pole too
\nlate, who tried to reform things but was fatally handicapped by
\nthe long years in which there had been absolutely no reform?<\/p>",
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