{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1040788,
        "msgid": "ri-confused-over-nobel-choices-1447893297",
        "date": "1996-12-07 00:00:00",
        "title": "RI confused over Nobel choices",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "RI confused over Nobel choices By Dino Patti Djalal LONDON (JP): On Dec. 10 in snowy Oslo, Norway, the Nobel Peace Prize will go to two men who have been involved in the events of East Timor: Bishop Ximenes Belo and Jose Ramos Horta. The Nobel Committee got it half right. Bishop Belo is widely recognized as a significant force in reconciliation -- a process we all want to see develop. He is also an accepted figure among East Timorese of different political persuasions.",
        "content": "<p>RI confused over Nobel choices<\/p>\n<p>By Dino Patti Djalal<\/p>\n<p>LONDON (JP): On Dec. 10 in snowy Oslo, Norway, the Nobel Peace<br>\nPrize will go to two men who have been involved in the events of<br>\nEast Timor: Bishop Ximenes Belo and Jose Ramos Horta.<\/p>\n<p>The Nobel Committee got it half right. Bishop Belo is widely<br>\nrecognized as a significant force in reconciliation -- a process<br>\nwe all want to see develop. He is also an accepted figure among<br>\nEast Timorese of different political persuasions.<\/p>\n<p>But most Indonesians find it perplexing that the Nobel<br>\nCommittee paired these two opposite personalities for such a<br>\nprestigious prize. Indeed, their apparent confusion over the<br>\nhistory of East Timor may, in the long run, cause more harm than<br>\ngood.<\/p>\n<p>There are several reasons why Indonesians feel bewildered that<br>\nthis year's Nobel Peace Prize is being shared by Jose Ramos<br>\nHorta.<\/p>\n<p>The first reason is that they see Ramos Horta's passionate<br>\ncall for referendum, democracy and human rights as being<br>\ninconsistent with his past, for these were precisely things that<br>\nwere associated with the brief rule of Fretilin in 1975. On Nov.<br>\n28, 1975, Ramos Horta and his gun-totting Fretilin colleagues<br>\nunilaterally declared East Timor's \"independence\" and formed the<br>\nso-called Democratic Republic of East Timor. Apparently, Ramos<br>\nHorta and the elite members of the Fretilin central committee<br>\nthought they had the exclusive right, more so than the people of<br>\nEast Timor, to determine what was to become of East Timor. They<br>\ndid not bother to wait for a referendum or elections, nor did<br>\nthey make the slightest effort to verify whether this was what<br>\nthe East Timorese wanted. East Timorese of other political<br>\npersuasions -- Apodeti (Popular Democratic Association of<br>\nTimorese) and the Timorese Democratic Union -- surely wanted<br>\ndifferent things. But Fretilin, blinded by power, offered them<br>\nnot a ballot box but blazing guns: thousands of East Timorese,<br>\nincluding Apodeti and Timorese Democratic Union members, were<br>\nmassacred as Fretilin forces waged a campaign of terror against<br>\ntheir political opponents. Given this, is it any wonder that<br>\nwhatever Ramos Horta has to say today about democracy, human<br>\nrights and referendum is dismissed by his East Timorese political<br>\nopponents as hypocrisy?<\/p>\n<p>Ramos Horta now claims he was away during the civil war. It is<br>\ntrue he spent a few weeks in Australia (mostly in Darwin) during<br>\nthe few months of Fretilin rule, but the fact is that for much of<br>\nthe time (until he left for good on Dec. 4, 1975) he was in East<br>\nTimor: he knew of the atrocities, and he was very much in command<br>\nof Fretilin. In fact, in many of his speaking tours throughout<br>\nthat period, he continued to praise and justify Fretilin<br>\npolicies.<\/p>\n<p>As a key leader of Fretilin at the time, Horta is morally and<br>\npolitically responsible for Fretilin's brutal policies. Until<br>\nnow, 20 years after the Fretilin massacres, Horta has not<br>\napologized or expressed regret over these atrocities.<\/p>\n<p>Indonesians also feel the Nobel Committee was seriously<br>\nmisinformed when it praised Horta's \"significant contribution<br>\nthrough the reconciliation talks\". For the sheer irony is that<br>\nthe concept of \"reconciliation\" was not known as Horta's<br>\nintellectual brainchild or political trademark.<\/p>\n<p>The reconciliation process was initiated in early 1993 by two<br>\nEast Timorese, former Fretilin president Dr. Abilio Araujo and<br>\nIndonesian ambassador Lopes da Cruz. They both gathered scores of<br>\nEast Timorese who once sought their mutual annihilation (during<br>\nthe 1975 civil war) and who they have not met since. These East<br>\nTimorese -- coming from East Timor, Jakarta, Portugal, Macao and<br>\nAustralia -- met twice in the UK: first in December 1993 and<br>\nlater in October 1994. Ramos Horta was never part of these<br>\nmeetings. In fact, to the dismay of the reconciliation group,<br>\nHorta opposed this process and repeatedly besmirched their effort<br>\nto reconcile, calling it \"a gimmick\" and \"a farce\".<\/p>\n<p>In 1995, the UN took over the idea and launched the All East<br>\nTimorese Dialogue (AIETD), which Horta and his group joined. The<br>\nreconciliation group at first tried to mold the AIETD into an<br>\nextension of their London-based reconciliation talks. Horta<br>\nflatly rejected this idea. The reconciliation group insisted the<br>\nAIETD be conceived as an event for reconciliation. This was also<br>\nopposed by Horta.<\/p>\n<p>Hence, the East Timorese from the reconciliation group<br>\nrightfully feel stunned that credit for their most prized effort<br>\nshould be given away freely by the Nobel Committee to the very<br>\nman who has opposed reconciliation every step of the way. The<br>\nfact that the Nobel Committee referred to the AIETD as<br>\n\"reconciliation talks\" (which is definitely not the way Horta<br>\nsees it) while praising Ramos Horta's \"significant contribution\"<br>\nto this process, does raise questions of the extent to which the<br>\nNobel Committee has misunderstood the whole picture. Dr. Abilio<br>\nAraujo, the co-promoter of reconciliation, stated that the Nobel<br>\nCommittee \"committed an error\" in inviting Horta to share the<br>\nNobel prize with Bishop Belo, and stated that \"far from deepening<br>\ndialog, (the Nobel prize to Horta) will contribute to the<br>\npolarization of the Timorese leaders and open up old wounds that<br>\nwe all had thought healed\".<\/p>\n<p>Indonesians also question what the Nobel Committee describes<br>\nas Ramos Horta's \"significant contribution\" through \"his peace<br>\nplan for the region\". The East Timor conflict is 20 years old,<br>\nand there have been plenty of proposed schemes from many quarters<br>\nfor a political solution. Horta too has come up with a \"peace<br>\nplan\". This, however, is not the same as having \"contributed to<br>\npeace\" in a politically tangible way.<\/p>\n<p>For comparison's sake, take Richard Holbrooke, one of this<br>\nyear's candidates for the Nobel Peace Prize. Holbrooke worked out<br>\nan imaginative peace plan for Bosnia which finally met the hard-<br>\nwon consent of the warring parties, and ended one of the most<br>\nviolent human catastrophes in recent years. In contrast, Horta's<br>\n\"peace plan\" has not been supported by any government or the UN,<br>\nand no East Timorese political groups outside his faction have<br>\nendorsed it. Horta's \"peace plan\" is also not on the agenda of<br>\nthe tripartite negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal under<br>\nthe auspices of the UN Security Council, which is internationally<br>\nrecognized as the sole forum to settle the East Timor question.<br>\nAs things stand, it is extremely unlikely that Indonesia would<br>\nsuccumb to Horta's long-standing demand that he be included in<br>\nthe formal negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal, nor is it<br>\nconceivable that Indonesia would be receptive to Ramos Horta's<br>\n\"peace plan\". To think, for instance, that Indonesia would ever<br>\naccept Horta's \"plan\" for the installment of UN administration in<br>\nEast Timor (similar to what United Nations Transitional Authority<br>\nin Cambodia did) and agree to eject the current provincial<br>\ngovernment and regional House of Representatives is, to put it<br>\nmildly, quite unrealistic.<\/p>\n<p>Will the Nobel prize contribute to the resolution of the<br>\nconflict, as the Nobel Committee hoped?<\/p>\n<p>The Nobel event will likely stimulate an aggressive publicity<br>\noffensive against Indonesia on the East Timor issue, and Ramos<br>\nHorta, with his Nobel badge, will be at the center of it.<\/p>\n<p>But no amount of publicity will solve the East Timor question.<br>\nThe New Order diplomatic history shows that conflicts are best<br>\ndealt with by cool heads who incrementally develop confidence and<br>\ncommon understanding on the basis of mutual commitment to working<br>\nout a rational solution. There is the worrying possibility that<br>\nthe Nobel event might switch the mode of dialog from solution<br>\nfinding to a propaganda war. In the process, confidence will be<br>\nbattered, confrontation intensified and positions harden. At the<br>\nend of the day, the East Timor issue will see a thousand<br>\nheadlines but not an inch of substantive progress.<\/p>\n<p>Francis Sejersted, the Nobel Committee's chairman, is right in<br>\npointing out that East Timor should not be \"a forgotten<br>\nconflict\". Now, the more important question is whether all of us<br>\ncan remember it properly.<\/p>\n<p>The writer is an Indonesian diplomat currently based in<br>\nLondon. The views expressed here are strictly personal.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/ri-confused-over-nobel-choices-1447893297",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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