{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1203859,
        "msgid": "ri-australia-relations-ties-solidifying-1447893297",
        "date": "1995-01-04 00:00:00",
        "title": "RI-Australia relations ties solidifying",
        "author": null,
        "source": "",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "RI-Australia relations ties solidifying Following is an excerpt from a paper presented by former minister of defense and security Gen. (ret.) L.B. Moerdani at a conference hosted by the Australian Defense Studies Center last month in Canberra. This is the first of two installments. CANBERRA: The broadening and deepening of the defense relationship between Indonesia and Australia is perhaps a foregone conclusion, certain to happen within the next fifteen years.",
        "content": "<p>RI-Australia relations ties solidifying<\/p>\n<p>Following is an excerpt from a paper presented by former<br>\nminister of defense and security Gen. (ret.) L.B. Moerdani<br>\nat a conference hosted by the Australian Defense Studies Center<br>\nlast month in Canberra. This is the first of two installments.<\/p>\n<p>CANBERRA: The broadening and deepening of the defense<br>\nrelationship between Indonesia and Australia is perhaps a<br>\nforegone conclusion, certain to happen within the next fifteen<br>\nyears. The speed and modality by which this will occur will be<br>\naffected by a number of factors and developments.<\/p>\n<p>I will discuss some of these factors by specifically<br>\naddressing myself to the questions that have been given to me by<br>\nthe Australian Defense Studies Center.<\/p>\n<p>On the question of the appropriate speed for implementing<br>\ncloser defense cooperation between Indonesia and Australia, I am<br>\nof the opinion that by necessity this will be gradual. There is<br>\nno need to hasten the process. It will involve both the<br>\nbroadening and deepening of cooperation, with preference on the<br>\nIndonesian side to first focusing on the latter task.<\/p>\n<p>As suggested above, the prospects for closer Indonesia-<br>\nAustralia defense cooperation are good. As our strategic outlooks<br>\nconverge we may soon realize that our capabilities also have<br>\nbecome more complementary. This enhances the scope for<br>\ncooperation. As suggested in the Defense White Paper, this<br>\nalready has led to a more diversified relationship; one that goes<br>\nbeyond the traditional defense cooperation programs to involve<br>\nstrategic exchanges, combined exercises, logistics agreements,<br>\nscience and industry cooperation, cooperative equipment<br>\nacquisition and training cooperation. Intelligence cooperation is<br>\nalso an important aspect of our relationship.<\/p>\n<p>Essentially, the bilateral defense relationship between<br>\nIndonesia and Australia should be seen as an integral part of the<br>\noverall, wider bilateral relationship between Australia and<br>\nIndonesia. Close defense cooperation will strengthen the<br>\nrelationship, and a stronger overall bilateral relationship will<br>\nfurther promote defense links.<\/p>\n<p>It has been said that Indonesia and Australia are &quot;strange<br>\nneighbors&quot;. Their geographic proximity makes them very much<br>\nvisible and actions taken by the one immediately affect the<br>\nother. Since each side knows relatively little about the other, a<br>\ngreat deal of irritations have burdened this relationship.<\/p>\n<p>Some years ago there was a determination on both sides to<br>\nchange this. We both agreed to do something to overcome those<br>\nproblems and to strengthen our relations. Although Indonesia-<br>\nAustralia relations cannot be taken for granted, I believe that<br>\nwe have come a long way.<\/p>\n<p>I would rather leave it to historians or other researchers to<br>\nidentify the main factors that led our two governments to agree<br>\nto end that volatile relationship. As someone who was in the<br>\nIndonesian government at that time I have my own interpretation<br>\nof this episode. I believe that a number of factors were<br>\nimportant.<\/p>\n<p>Back in the mid-1980s we did not know that the Cold War was<br>\napproaching its final days. However, there was a strong<br>\nrecognition that Indonesia and other ASEAN countries needed to<br>\nseriously begin laying down the foundation for the establishment<br>\nof a regional order in Southeast Asia. There was the uncertainty<br>\nabout future U.S. security commitments to the region and there<br>\nwas also concern with the future roles of Japan and China in the<br>\nregion.<\/p>\n<p>The concept of a regional order in Southeast Asia is a very<br>\nsimple, straightforward concept. Its objective is regional peace<br>\nand stability, whose maintenance is the responsibility of the<br>\nregional countries themselves. However, since outside powers have<br>\na legitimate interest and role in the region, it is in the<br>\ninterest of the regional countries to develop relations with them<br>\nthat further strengthen the regional order.<\/p>\n<p>It is definitely not an &quot;inward-looking&quot; concept. It is very<br>\nwell recognized, however, that the main prerequisite to the<br>\ncreation of this regional order is the ability of the regional<br>\ncountries to keep their own houses in order.<\/p>\n<p>ASEAN&apos;s active involvement in resolving the Cambodian conflict<br>\nthrough peaceful means is based on this determination. Its<br>\nefforts are &quot;outward oriented&quot; and it actively has sought the<br>\nparticipation of the international community. Australia was among<br>\nthe few countries that showed a sustained interest in helping<br>\nresolve the conflict.<\/p>\n<p>Regional order is also not a concept that ignores developments<br>\noutside its own region. In fact, it is interested in developing<br>\nhealthy and strong relations also with countries in its immediate<br>\nneighborhood. This is dictated by the requirements to maintain<br>\nregional peace and stability. The wisdom is that your neighbors<br>\nare important. Australia is important to Indonesia because<br>\nAustralia is Indonesia&apos;s immediate neighbor to the south.<\/p>\n<p>It is interesting to note that with regard to many regional<br>\neconomic, political and security issues and assessments, the<br>\nviews from Jakarta and Canberra are often closer than between<br>\nJakarta and Tokyo or between Canberra and Washington. It appears<br>\nto me that in our efforts to organize the Asia- Pacific region we<br>\nshare a common philosophy or strategy. Indonesia and Australia<br>\ncan further promote and strengthen their relations through the<br>\nvarious newly emerging regional forums. However, they are not a<br>\nsubstitute for a healthy and strong bilateral relationship,<br>\nincluding in the field of defense.<\/p>\n<p>The question of whether Australia tends to be pushing too fast<br>\nin implementing closer defense cooperation does not appear to be<br>\nof relevance here as no timetable has been set. What is important<br>\nhere is the development of a meaningful mechanism for regular<br>\nconsultations through which various cooperation programs are<br>\nthoughtfully submitted, discussed and agreed upon. The annual<br>\nmeetings of the respective Defense Ministers is one such<br>\nimportant mechanism.<\/p>\n<p>As described above, Australia-Indonesia bilateral defense<br>\ncooperation should also be seen in the wider regional context as<br>\nit will be influenced by ASEAN&apos;s defense cooperation and<br>\nAustralia&apos;s relations with ASEAN. On the question of how close<br>\nAustralia can get to ASEAN, the answer is &quot;quite close&quot;.<\/p>\n<p>As an ASEAN dialog partner and a member of the ASEAN Regional<br>\nForum (ARF), and because of its geographic location, Australia<br>\ncan become a member of one of ASEAN&apos;s inner circle of cooperation<br>\nif it accepts ASEAN&apos;s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)<br>\nthrough a declaration or protocol, even without acceding to it.<br>\nHowever, as Australia is not a member of the Southeast Asian<br>\ncommunity of nations it may not become a member of ASEAN&apos;s most<br>\ninner circle. It is also not obvious why this should be desirable<br>\nfor Australia.<\/p>\n<p>There are two aspects of the issue of perceived threats<br>\nbetween Australia and ASEAN. First, it is perhaps no longer<br>\nrelevant to talk about threat and the need to have a common<br>\nperception of threat as a basis for defense cooperation.<\/p>\n<p>The 1994 Defense White Paper also is not derived from a<br>\ndefined threat -- &quot;the potential enemy&quot;. Equally, ASEAN defense<br>\ncooperation is not based on a common perception of threat.<\/p>\n<p>Second, the major aim of defense cooperation today, as<br>\nimplicitly contained in the concepts of comprehensive security,<br>\ncooperative security and collective security, is confidence<br>\nbuilding and developing a sense of community. The ASEAN strategy<br>\nof concentric circles proposes the need to include the very<br>\nsources of uncertainty to one&apos;s own security within the extended<br>\ncircle of cooperation. This distinguishes defense cooperation<br>\ntoday from the formation of military pacts and alliances during<br>\nthe Cold War.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/ri-australia-relations-ties-solidifying-1447893297",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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