Reviving Kodam mars reform<\/p>\n
M. Riefqi Muna, Executive Director, The RIDEP Institute, Jakarta<\/p>\n
The military's commitment to continuing with its reform
\nagenda, particularly regarding the concept of its territorial
\ncommands, is now being questioned following the unpopular
\nproposal to reinstate the Aceh military command. To some extent,
\nit indicates that any humanitarian effort to solve problems in
\nAceh will remain non-existent. The dominant paradigm of
\nrealpolitik is still clearly popular among decision makers, as
\nthe state reveals its need to conduct military operations to
\nmaintain its legitimacy.<\/p>\n
Human costs will thus be inevitable. Apparently, the state
\nranks human security second behind issues of securing its
\nsovereignty. Reinstating the military command would disrupt many
\naspects of the reform movement, particularly that of the
\nIndonesian Military (TNI).<\/p>\n
The military's seriousness in reforming itself has been
\nquestioned because of unabated human rights abuses resulting from
\nmilitary atrocities. Its command, control, communications and
\nintelligence functions will remain ineffective as long as the gap
\nbetween the guidelines released by the military headquarters and
\nwhat happens on the ground remains. The murder of Papuan (Irian
\nJaya) leader Theys Hiyo Eluay, which suggests the involvement of
\ncertain groups in the military, is a case in point.<\/p>\n
Atrocities by the military place Indonesia in a difficult
\nposition as the military consistently implements a security
\napproach to deal with opposition groups. Their term oknum,
\nreferring to unscrupulous members of the military involved in
\nhuman rights abuses, is repeatedly stated to deny the involvement
\nof the military as an institution.<\/p>\n
Previous military operations have traumatized the Acehnese,
\nbut they are also facing further potential violence. To date,
\nthere have been no positive signs that a just and peaceful
\nresolution to the conflict will be found. No perpetrators, either
\ncivilian or military, have been put on trial.<\/p>\n
So despite strong opposition from the Acehnese people, their
\ngovernor has decided to reestablish the military command, saying
\nthat the decision was made to meet the people's demands. It
\nimplies that the military headquarters have legitimate reasons to
\ncurb separatist activists, by any means.<\/p>\n
A close look at the plan to reinstate the military command
\n(Kodam) in Aceh clearly reveals that it was prepared well in
\nadvance, during the B.J. Habibie administration, with the
\ninvolvement of certain generals. Several Acehnese leaders met
\nwith the president to convey their opposition to the idea of
\nestablishing the Kodam in Aceh.<\/p>\n
To avoid further human suffering, it is important to structure
\nthe territorial function of Indonesia's defense policy in
\naccordance with \"normal\" strategic calculations. A territorial
\ncommand is basically a chain-of-command structure, a political
\norganization of the armed forces, arranged geographically ranging
\nfrom the capital of the state to remote village units.<\/p>\n
This territorial command has been used as the backbone of the
\nmilitary's \"dual function\" doctrine, which the TNI says has
\nofficially been abolished. Yet this function still largely
\ndominates the military mindset.<\/p>\n
Therefore the recent downgrading of the position of Chief of
\nTerritorial Staff (Kaster) into an assistant's post under the TNI
\nchief of general affairs, in practice, does not carry with it any
\nconsequences. Instead, the military has become more assertive.<\/p>\n
It is important to note the growing role of hardliners within
\nthe TNI headquarters in terms of defense policy arrangements.
\nHence the continuance of the territorial command function.<\/p>\n
Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, when in office as Kaster, proposed a
\nplan to reduce the territorial function from the village level,
\nor Babinsa, to the level of regional commands, or Kodim, which
\nwould take 10 years, in line with the retirement periods of many
\ncurrent officers.<\/p>\n
The plan to shift the local function of Binter (territorial
\nguidance, pembinaan teritorial) to the local administrative
\ninstitution seems to contain a hidden agenda: That the military
\nis only preserving its political interests. But the reformists in
\nTNI believe that reducing the territorial command function is
\nimportant to reduce their involvement in politics.<\/p>\n
From here, the problematic issue emerges. The defense system
\nis based on the territorial\/spatial aspect. But principles of
\nterritorial command in other countries are not as political in
\nnature as in Indonesia, except in repressive regimes such as
\nBurma (Myanmar) or socialist and communist countries.<\/p>\n
Therefore, the future defense structure should consider two
\nimportant aspects: Scenarios of threat assessments and the nature
\nof the Indonesian archipelago as a unit of territorial defense
\nthat serves as a base for a unified military command from the
\narmy, navy and air force units.<\/p>\n
On the contrary, the territorial function is detrimental to
\nthe defense posture since it only focuses on the army, in line
\nwith the concept of the \"Large Islands Defense System\" of TNI's
\nstrategy. This concept is of no relevance to the actual
\ngeographic situation of the state as an archipelagic country.<\/p>\n
This strategy was inherited from the revolutionary period for
\nguerrilla warfare, when our geographical boundaries did not yet
\nexist.<\/p>\n
Indonesia must adjust its defense system to suit actual
\nconditions, and to consider issues such as technological changes,
\nand the development of non-traditional threats such as
\ninformation warfare. The defense system from the revolutionary
\ndays must be replaced with the \"Layered Defense System\", with
\ngreater involvement by the navy and air force, to defend state
\nboundaries largely located in the middle of the sea.<\/p>\n
The new Defense Bill passed by the legislature (which has yet
\nto be signed by the President) has obviously indicated the need
\nto review old approaches, strategies, doctrines, and the
\norganization of the armed forces -- that is, to establish a
\nprofessional military that is free from politics.<\/p>\n
Yet the debate on the territorial command function points even
\nmore to whether TNI is really serious about its reform. We all
\nhope for the emergence of courageous soldiers committed to making
\nthe country's future secure, instead of only fighting for power
\nand wealth. Such a commitment would befit the TNI's own rhetoric
\nof defending national interests and the unity of the state.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/reviving-kodam-mars-reform-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}