Revisiting Indonesia-U.S. relations<\/p>\n
Tony Agus Ardie, President of KIKAS<\/p>\n
Recent times have seen a profusion of developments
\nwhich could substantially influence the state of relationships
\nbetween Indonesia and the United States.
\nSome were originated at the Indonesian side: the so-
\ncalled 'sweeping' of American hotel guests in Solo, anti-U.S
\ndemonstrations, call for boycott of American branded products,
\nthe Bali bombing, abolishment of free visa facility for U.S.
\ncitizens.
\nSome others came from the U.S. side: warnings for American
\ncitizens not to visit Indonesia, new limitations for imports of
\nIndonesian products, the war in Iraq. Directly or indirectly,
\nmost have the potentials to constrain or even worsen relations.
\nRegardless of the developments, however, the fundamentals
\nof Indonesia-U.S. relations have remained largely unchanged.
\nIndonesia, the world's fourth most populous country with
\nmore than 210 million people, is geopolitically pivotal to peace
\nand stability in Southeast Asia. As the nation with the largest
\nMoslem population, its position has become even more crucial in
\nthe present global constellation.
\nIt has the potential either to become a bridge between
\nthe U.S. and other Islamic peoples, or an obstruction towards
\nbetter relations. Indonesia is also richly endowed with a vast
\nvariety of natural resources for American industries.
\nThe United States, as the world's largest economy, the
\nbiggest source of technology and the greatest influence on the
\nglobal financial market, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
\nand the World Bank, plays an important role in supporting
\nIndonesia's efforts to solve its economic crisis.
\nAs the most powerful democracy it could also assist
\nIndonesia in coping with the painful process of transition from
\nan authoritarian, centralized government into a more democratic
\nand decentralized state.
\nThese fundamentals are strong reasons for both sides to
\nwork for closer relations. However, this is not reflected in the
\nchanging reality. The gap is widening-not closing-for various
\nreasons, e.g. domestic politics, differences in national
\ninterests and priorities.
\nActually, the very same reasons are also arguments for
\nstriving toward good, sustainable relations. A stronger, more
\nstable Indonesia-in political as well as economic terms-would be
\nmore beneficial for U.S. interests in many aspects, including in
\nimplementing its war on terrorism.
\nA more basic reason for this gap is information
\ndisparity: the lack of knowledge, thus of understanding and
\nempathy, on each side about the other.
\nBasic knowledge about Indonesia is negligible in the U.S.
\nMost Americans have very little idea about Indonesia,
\ngeographically and otherwise. Bali is still more known than the
\nwhole country. American text and reference books still put the
\nwrong date about Indonesia's independence day and disregard its
\nrevolution. Yet an incident in any small Indonesian town would be
\ninterpreted as if the whole country is unsafe.
\nDistortion could bring dire consequences when it comes to
\ncomplex analyses of the country. Complications in the reforms
\nundertaken by Indonesia since 1998 are to be expected considering
\nits enormous dimensions and speed. But it often prompts many U.S.
\npoliticians and analysts to be fixated with the daily turmoil of
\nevents, raucous demonstrations, corruption cases or security
\nproblems, neglecting substantial progress.
\nThis often results in overly pessimistic assessment of
\nIndonesia's future, overlooking the medium and long term
\nperspectives after all this agonizing learning process.
\nTrue, structural impediments such as the lack of trust in
\nthe judicial system, excesses in the initial process of
\ntransferring power to district-level administrations, virtually
\nbankrupt big corporations and low investor confidence have been a
\nturnoff to new investment.
\nHowever, these problems are being tackled with great
\nassistance from the World Bank, the IMF and the international
\ncreditor consortium, the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI),
\nof which the United States has been a loyal donor member since
\n1967.<\/p>\n
Progress has been made, as can be noted from the strengthening
\nmacroeconomic and political stability.<\/p>\n
The most positive development is that Indonesian national
\nresilience has passed the toughest test over the past five years
\nof political turbulence and economic debacle. Such progress,
\nhowever, is seldom reported by the media and hardly known in the
\nU.S.<\/p>\n
To be fair, similar distortions concerning the U.S. also occur
\nin Indonesia. Despite admiration for American products, popular
\nculture and lifestyles, Indonesian public understanding of the
\nU.S. is superficial at best. Their image is filled with negative
\nstereotypes, prejudices and skepticism. The U.S. is in variably
\ndescribed by the country's media as an arrogant power whose
\nactions bring far-reaching consequences unfair to Indonesia.
\nWhen the U.S. issues travel notices to dissuade Americans from
\ncoming to Indonesia, it is also discouraging visitors from other
\nlands and thus affecting the tourism industry extensively.
\nU.S. trade pressure to import and consume American products is
\ncontrasted to its tight control of Indonesian imports. New rules,
\nsuch as anti- bio-terrorism inspection, add burdens to Indonesian
\nexporters at US$250 per container box.
\nThe widespread image is its own self-interest, shown in the
\ndecline in purchase contracts for Indonesian's manufactured
\ngoods, the withdrawal of investments and the relocation of
\nactivities to other countries, while simultaneously expecting
\nIndonesian support for U.S. interests.
\nThese actions are neither unusual nor unreasonable in
\ninternational practice of doing business. Nevertheless, they do
\nnot contribute to the accomplishment of understanding and trust
\nwith the wider population.
\n It does not matter that such sanctions may in fact be directed
\nat big economic players. But the ultimate impact will be felt by
\nthe grassroots who may arrive at simplified conclusions, e.g.
\nthat U.S. actions are the cause of their tough lot, declining job
\nopportunities and increasing the already high rate of
\nunemployment.
\nIn the public perception, such acts show a lack of compassion for
\nthe already tough lot of the general public. As the majority is
\ncomposed of the same Moslems that the U.S. supposedly like to
\nbefriend, this is also viewed as a lack of sensitivity and
\ncomprehension regarding Indonesia's Moslems' social situation.
\nClearly, relationship between any two countries can only be
\nimproved if it is based on sufficient knowledge and mutually
\nfavorable attitudes. These include adequate regard and respect,
\nhigh credibility, and trust between each other.
\nWith current advancing distrust, communications efforts should be
\nshifted to nonverbal, practical actions-which could speak much
\nlouder than words and statement, as the saying goes. Such action
\nshould begin in an area of mutual concerns to both peoples. This
\nis employment opportunity.
\nIndonesia's unemployment and underemployment today are estimated
\nat a total of 40 million, and the number keeps rising by 2.5
\nmillion annually, particularly in the lower classes in the Moslem
\ncommunity.
\nNotwithstanding the contributions of American giants in
\nIndonesia's development, the action should change to a broader
\nand bigger American role in empowering Indonesian small and
\nmedium-size enterprises (SMEs) to enter the global market,
\nincluding the U.S.
\nAfter all, the American small business development scheme under
\nthe Small Business Act is one of the best-managed programs in
\npromoting business incubation.
\nThe choice of SMEs is even more appropriate as it is the business
\nsector that is closest to the general community and has
\naccomplished a lot to overcome unemployment since the crisis.
\nWhen many big national companies collapsed, more than 95 percent
\nof the SMEs were able to survive. Of this figure, 31 percent
\nsucceeded in restructuring their organizations while 64 percent
\nothers expanded operations and passed the crisis with flying
\ncolors, thus capable of providing jobs for 64.3 million people.
\nThe U.S. model has been tested by pioneering SME empowerment
\nefforts in Yogyakarta, involving the community's three pillars -
\nthe local administration, committed private entrepreneurs and
\nGadjah Mada University - which are now attracting support of the
\nVienna-based United Nations Industrial Development Organization.
\nWith its long experience in community-based development projects
\nin various provinces in Indonesia, the United States Agency for
\nInternational Development could play a role in SME empowerment as
\nwell.
\nSuch action programs will extend and upgrade the present
\nrelations between the United States and Indonesia into a new,
\npeople-to-people based diplomacy, which facilitates and improves
\nthe official relationship that in the past was hampered by people
\nvs. people misunderstanding and prejudice.<\/p>\n
*KIKAS is the U.S. Committee of the Indonesian Chamber of
\nCommerce and Industry (Kadin).<\/p>\n
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