The Electoral Law is the rule governing the contest for power. When\nits drafters are electoral participants themselves, conflict of interest\nbecomes inherent and democracy is vulnerable to being steered by\nshort-term electoral interests.<\/p>\n
Rarely does a single bill become contested by two institutions. The\nrevision of the Electoral Law is an exception. Some time ago, the DPR\nand the government appeared equally insistent on becoming its initiator.\nThis phenomenon raises a public question: what interests lie behind\nit?<\/p>\n
This is not merely an administrative dispute. Behind the tussle over\nthe initiator\u2019s position lies a deeper calculation: whoever holds the\npen first has the greatest freedom to determine where the electoral\nrules are taken.<\/p>\n
The majority of DPR members are party cadres who will fight again in\nthe 2029 general election. They have a direct stake: the rules born of\nthis revision will determine their parties\u2019 survival. The government has\na different calculation \u2014 oriented towards stability and continuity of\npower \u2014 but it is by no means a neutral party either. Both are players,\nnot referees.<\/p>\n
Looked at more closely, the fight over the initiator\u2019s position is\nnot really about who drafts first, but about who wields greater\ninfluence in designing the political \u201crules of the game\u201d. Whoever helps\nset the rules of the game has a greater chance of influencing the\noutcome of the game itself.<\/p>\n
Endogenous Rule-Making<\/p>\n
In football, FIFA, as the governing body, does not hand over the\ndrafting of the laws of the game to the teams that will compete. In the\ncapital market, regulation is not entrusted to the companies that trade.\nYet in Indonesian democracy, the rules of political competition are\ndesigned by the competitors themselves.<\/p>\n
This analogy fits precisely the mechanism by which our Electoral Law\nhas long been made: the actors who will later become election\nparticipants dominate the making of the very rules of the game. The\nresult is that electoral legislation is frequently problematic.<\/p>\n
It cannot be denied that the Electoral Law is the statute most often\nchallenged before the Constitutional Court \u2014 and this is no coincidence.\nThe root problem is the structural conflict of interest that permeates\nthe drafting process: the DPR and the government, themselves election\nparticipants, design the rules that are supposed to regulate them.<\/p>\n
In political and legal theory this is known as endogenous\nrule-making, which naturally tends to favour the position of the\nrule-makers and makes competition harder. The outcomes are predictable:\nrules perpetually challenged for lacking legitimacy, a system that\nfavours established parties, and democracy trapped in a cycle of\npolitical entrenchment. This is the root of why the Electoral Law is the\nmost problematic legal product and the one most frequently tested before\nthe Constitutional Court.<\/p>\n
As an election organiser, the writer has witnessed firsthand how\ndefects in the Electoral Law do not stop at legal debates in the\ncourtroom. When an article is challenged before the Constitutional\nCourt, the electoral timetable cannot wait for a ruling. The stages must\nkeep moving \u2014 executing rules that are under challenge, amid uncertainty\nover whether those rules will survive or be struck down. That burden is\nnot carried by those who design the rules. It falls entirely on the\nshoulders of the organisers \u2014 and ultimately, on the voters who hope the\nprocess runs properly.<\/p>\n
Not an Ordinary Law<\/p>\n
The Electoral Law is no ordinary statute. The Health Law regulates\npublic services, but does not determine who holds power. The Electoral\nLaw determines both: who may compete, how winners are decided, and how\npower changes hands. It is the rules of the game for the entire\npolitical system. And those rules are now being designed by the players\nthemselves.<\/p>\n
The incentives are clear. Electoral district rules determine whether\nsmall parties have any room at all. A parliamentary threshold can become\na selection tool favouring established parties. Nomination requirements\ncan be tightened or loosened depending on who benefits. Neutrality can\nhardly be expected from players designing their own game.<\/p>\n
A Democracy That Protects Itself<\/p>\n
Unlike in Indonesia, other democratic countries involve independent\nmediators, special nonpartisan commissions, or broad participation from\ncivil society and election organisers in electoral regulation. Indonesia\nallows political actors with a direct stake to dominate the legislative\nprocess.<\/p>\n
In Canada, important aspects of elections \u2014 such as electoral\ndistricting, election administration and reform recommendations \u2014 are\nlargely handled by nonpartisan bodies. New Zealand went even further,\nestablishing a Royal Commission, conducting expert reviews and public\nconsultations, and even holding a national referendum when deciding to\nchange its electoral system from First-Past-The-Post to Mixed Member\nProportional (MMP).<\/p>\n
The experiences of Canada and New Zealand teach one lesson we have\nyet to adopt as a principle: the Electoral Law is far too important to\nbe left to those with the greatest stake in its outcome. Letting\ncompetitors design the rules of their own competition is not only an\nethical defect but a structural one \u2014 and a structural defect cannot be\nfixed by good intentions alone.<\/p>\n
When electoral rule-making rests entirely in the hands of\ncompetitors, the door to constitutional engineering swings wide open.\nNot always in crude or visible ways. Quite the opposite: the shifts are\nsubtle \u2014 a threshold raised slightly, electoral districts redrawn,\nnomination requirements tightened at particular points.<\/p>\n
The result is not rules that are blatantly unfair, but rules that\nfeel neutral on the surface while working systematically to narrow the\nalternatives available to voters and secure the interests of those\nalready in power. Here, the line between legislation and power\nconsolidation becomes very thin \u2014 and very hard to prove.<\/p>\n
An honest election begins long before polling day. It begins with\nhonesty in designing its rules. And that honesty can hardly emerge from\nthe hands of those with the greatest stake in the outcome. Has our\nElectoral Law been freed from those hands yet?<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/revising-the-election-law-when-participants-write-their-own-rules-1784285602", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }