Reshaping the military: An observer's perspective<\/p>\n
Imanuddin Razak, Jakarta<\/p>\n
Since the fall of the New Order regime, numerous articles and
\nanalyses have been published about the reform of the Indonesian
\nMilitary (TNI), with many good suggestions aired about how to
\nprofessionalize the institution.<\/p>\n
However, in practice these ideas have not been easy to
\nimplement. While many writers discuss generalities, many have
\nfailed to break down their reforms into concrete steps; reforms
\nthat face resistance from the military, which has employed its
\nown propagandists in a concerted campaign to argue against them.<\/p>\n
The best approach toward reform should be to find a compromise
\nthat would accommodate the \"ideal\" civilian solution and the
\ngeneral military position.<\/p>\n
If there is no compromise on the issue, the sides will remain
\ndivided, however much to-ing and fro-ing there is on the surface
\n-- like mixed water and oil inevitably find their positions in a
\nglass.<\/p>\n
The idea to restructure the TNI -- mainly to quit its
\ninvolvement in business and politics -- has long been on the main
\nagenda of the post-1998 reform movement. A 2000 decree from the
\nPeople's Consultative Assembly (MPR) clearly divided the TNI and
\nthe National Police (Polri), focussing the military on national
\ndefense matters and the police on homeland security and gradually
\nreduced the military's role in politics. It also outlined the
\ntimetable for further military reforms its businesses and overall
\nmove toward complete civilian control.<\/p>\n
Like most writers on the subject, this one agrees that the
\nmost effective way to ensure the TNI reforms would be through
\neffective administrative control, in this case through control of
\nits budget. But to reach that level of control there are a lot of
\nsteps that must be taken.<\/p>\n
The excuse that the TNI has never been given an adequate
\nbudget to finance its activities from the government has long
\nbeen the justification for its involvement in businesses, both
\nlegal and illegal, that are completely outside of what most
\nstates recognize as legitimate military activities.<\/p>\n
While there is no guarantee that attempting to control the
\nmilitary under a civilian budget would stop the proliferation of
\nmilitary businesses, at least there would be real pressure put on
\nthe TNI from the government and the public for it to focus on its
\ndefense role.<\/p>\n
Members of the TNI, of course, have also expressed their
\ncommitment to quitting TNI businesses, with the Ministry of
\nDefense scheduled to submit a list of TNI concerns that must be
\nrelinquished to the government early next month.<\/p>\n
However, many people remain dubious of the TNI's seriousness
\nin quitting its businesses. It doesn't help that this list will
\nonly consist of legal or registered TNI businesses and not
\nunregistered and unreported activities with financial volumes
\nthought by many to exceed those of the legal ones.<\/p>\n
Another effective control on the military would be through the
\nempowerment of the House of Representatives (DPR) -- a
\nconstitutional entity with the authority to draft and question
\ngovernment policies, including those on the TNI.<\/p>\n
Currently, the House only uses its powers during the
\ndeliberation of the military's upcoming draft budget. It has
\nnever exercised its ability to audit military spending and
\notherwise question its activities.<\/p>\n
Besides these legislative controls, there has been extensive
\ndiscussions about exercising control of the military, by putting
\nit completely under the supervision of the defense ministry.
\nCurrently the TNI is partially under the supervision of the
\nMinistry of Defense, administratively at least, but remains
\nindependent from the ministry regarding waging war and other non-
\nwar security activities about which it directly reports to the
\nPresident.<\/p>\n
The idea of putting the TNI completely under the defense
\nministry -- which is also meant to get the TNI out of politics --
\nwill be difficult, because the TNI's history is so closely
\nentwined with the development of a politically sovereign
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
Most Indonesians recognize that while civilian politicians may
\nhave created the concept of an independent Indonesia, it was the
\nmilitary that did the actual job of kicking the colonials out,
\nwith the Indonesian armed forces working to expel the Japanese
\nand the Dutch in the 1940s.<\/p>\n
And even when Indonesia declared its independence on Aug. 17,
\n1945, and the country appointed a civilian, the high-profile
\nSukarno, as president, the military, essentially a guerrilla
\nforce, was still fighting the colonials in the countryside.<\/p>\n
Later, the heightening tension between capitalism and
\ncommunism influenced Indonesia's domestic political affairs and
\nled to a serious military involvement in politics, which
\nculminated with the downfall of Sukarno and the appointment of
\ngeneral Soeharto.<\/p>\n
The military's dwi fungsi (dual function) doctrine, which was
\nintroduced during Sukarno's presidency and developed during
\nSoeharto's further deepened the military's involvement in
\npolitics. The abolition of dwi fungsi later on did not help much
\nto strip the military of its by-this-time entrenched political
\npowers.<\/p>\n
There, however, has been a gradual decrease in the military's
\npolitical involvement here, with the obvious evidence the
\nConstitutional requirement of all military officers to quit all
\nactive duties prior to running for positions as high-ranking
\nstate officials.<\/p>\n
However, the decision to put the TNI under the defense
\nministry should not be made too hastily otherwise there is likely
\nbe civilian-military tension and conflict, possibly even the
\ndisintegration of the entire nation.<\/p>\n
Though many may consider it out-of-date, Soeharto's policy to
\nmake a high-ranking official both a military and defense ministry
\nchief could be worth reevaluating. There was never any mention of
\na conflict of interest between these roles in the past.<\/p>\n
And while we await the government to come up with an adequate
\nmilitary budget, we should not forget that cooperation with ASEAN
\nmember countries is a good way to improve the professionalism of
\nour soldiers and to create a solid regional defense framework.<\/p>\n
Indonesia and ASEAN could follow the footsteps of the European
\nUnion (EU), whose member countries contribute to regional
\nsecurity according to each member country's financial and
\nmilitary capabilities. Despite these differences, the EU
\ncountries have pledged to fight if one of their members is
\nattacked.<\/p>\n
The author is a staff writer for The Jakarta Post.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/reshaping-the-military-an-observers-perspective-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }