Regional security pact queried<\/p>\n
By Hilman Adil<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The signing of the Agreement on Maintaining
\nSecurity by the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Australia in
\nDecember 1995, before the Labor government was defeated in the
\ngeneral election early this year, was hailed at that time as
\neffectively removing one element of concern in Australia about an
\nIndonesia military threat to its security.<\/p>\n
Since then, nearly a year has passed and lingering doubts
\noutside the government and defense bureaucracy in both countries
\nabout the effectiveness of the agreement still remain. Additional
\ninformation that could clarify some unanswered questions has so
\nfar not been forthcoming.<\/p>\n
There are calls now in Australia for a public debate, which
\ncould not have taken place at that time, given the secret
\nnegotiations prior to the signing of the agreement. Former prime
\nminister Paul Keating frankly admitted at the time that the 18
\nmonths of secrecy surrounding the agreement's negotiations were
\nspecifically designed to avoid public debate.<\/p>\n
Concern outside government and defense establishment circles
\nare focused on its possible use as a vehicle for operational
\nscenarios, which leads to speculation about future directions,
\nbecause Australia's security policy has recently shown a more
\nactive and high profile role. The signing of the agreement has
\nalso caught the Indonesian general public by surprise, given the
\nsecrecy surrounding the negotiations, leading to speculations
\nwhether the Indonesian government has given up its non-aligned
\nstance.<\/p>\n
By signing this agreement after a rethinking of security
\npriorities, both governments see it as one of the results of
\nconfidence-building measures developed between the two countries
\nover the years to meet their broader objectives of enhancing both
\nglobal and regional security and promoting a sense of strategic
\ncommunity between Australia and its most immediate neighbor.
\nFormer prime minister Keating, on the occasion of the signing,
\ndeclared the agreement to be Australia's \"key defense link to
\nAsia\", with no need to establish additional bilateral security
\npacts with other countries because the Five-Power Defense
\nAgreement (between Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Malaysia and
\nSingapore) and ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, the U.S.) in
\naddition, would be more than adequate to guarantee Australia's
\nsecurity.<\/p>\n
The agreement should be considered the linchpin of Australia's
\nregional security strategy, because for the first time, both
\ncountries have agreed to consult each other on regional
\nchallenges and possibly deploy forces together. The question
\nshould be raised, however, whether it could provide some
\nguarantee for a smooth relationship between the two countries for
\nthe coming years. This remains to be seen, because the agreement
\nappears to have some disturbing implications for both countries.<\/p>\n
The military establishment in Australia has been arguing for a
\nthree-stage implementation of the strategic partnership, i.e.
\n\"increased defense contacts, followed by the establishment of a
\nformal security dialogue and culminating in the formulation of a
\ncollective regional force\". Although these have not yet been
\nimplemented, it shows some indication of an increasing
\nmilitarization of Australia's foreign policy, which could have
\nsome effects on broader foreign policy objectives, particularly
\non what former foreign minister Gareth Evans termed \"good
\ninternational citizenship\", and on the public and parliamentary
\noversight of Australia's foreign policy dealing with security.<\/p>\n
Both countries realize that the common interest between the
\ntwo countries is preventing hegemony in Southeast Asia and Asia
\nin general. This is why Indonesia and Australia remain on
\nfriendly terms, despite ups and downs in the past. Disputes
\nbetween the two countries in the last few years have centered on
\ndomestic issues like democracy and the violation of human rights,
\nbut both have managed to balance other interests against those
\nissues.<\/p>\n
Canberra so far has tried to understand Indonesia's
\nsensitivities about being told how to conduct its domestic
\naffairs, despite pressure from the press and the general public.
\nPrevious Australian governments, at least under former prime
\nminister Keating, on various occasions have tried to make clear
\nthat although Australia is prepared to defend fundamental
\ninternational principles, it should not be forced to engage in
\nevery dispute, which could harm relations between the two
\ncountries.<\/p>\n
In terms of human rights, Canberra also believes that the best
\nway to guarantee the preservation of good relations is to view
\nthe issue as an Indonesian problem. The attempt to mobilize
\ninternational pressure is going to run into the same difficulties
\nas it did when Australia used this approach to condemn Indonesia
\non the integration of East Timor, which is bound to provoke the
\nmost intense resistance by Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Although some circles in Australia believe that in some cases,
\ninternational pressure may do some good in cases like human
\nrights violations, previous Australian governments were
\nsufficiently aware of the danger of a deliberate strategy, as
\nproposed by non-governmental organizations, to create certain
\ninstitutions and then rely on international pressure to maintain
\nthem. Therefore, any attempt to internationalize certain issues
\nwill only elicit anti-Australian sentiments in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
The Agreement on Maintaining Security has, in fact, focused on
\none dimension of the threat factor: its nature and the dangers it
\nposed. Therefore, the effort on both sides to reach such an
\nagreement does not sufficiently reflect a common awareness of a
\nmuch wider set of pressing problems, apart from a possible
\nmilitary attack on each other or by a third party.<\/p>\n
Already in his report a few years ago, Paul Dibb has noted
\nthat Indonesia's \"principal security concerns are internal
\nstability and potential threats from its north\", and any change
\nin attitude which identified Australia as a potential threat
\nwould still leave it without the required military capabilities
\nto sustain \"intensive joint operations against Australia\". In
\n1991, then defense minister Robert Ray still foresaw no threats
\nto Australia, and foreign minister Gareth Evans described
\nAustralia's regional security environment as \"relatively
\nfavorable\".<\/p>\n
Despite some suggestions that the end of the Cold War rendered
\nAustralia's security environment less certain and potentially
\nhostile, with the possibility that regional powers such as Japan,
\nChina and India might fill the void left by the reduced presence
\nof the United States and Russia, no subsequent analysis has
\ndeparted from these assessments.<\/p>\n
It therefore now seems puzzling that, despite an awareness by
\nboth governments about the many dimensions of the concept of
\nsecurity -- such as economic security, environmental security and
\npolitical security -- the military dimension has been given a
\nprominent part in the agreement.<\/p>\n
Especially, in the post-Cold War era, one could argue that
\neconomic security would benefit Indonesia as well as Australia.
\nFor Australia, it can be achieved in integrating 'win-win' ways
\nwith other states, where all parties share in the gains, and
\nenter into transactions with an expectation of mutual opportunity
\nand advantage.<\/p>\n
In addition, Australia's economic connection with Southeast
\nAsia is having profound cultural consequences within Australia.
\nRegional economic integration will be far more fundamental for
\nAustralia's future identity and security than the regional
\nprojection of Australia's military power or \"joint responses\" if
\nIndonesia or Australia -- or both of them -- is attacked by a
\nthird party, as stated in the agreement.<\/p>\n
Furthermore, the question becomes problematic if \"joint
\nresponses\" mean joint military operations by the two countries in
\nresponding to such an eventuality. This is question is
\nparticularly relevant, given the ambiguous wording of the
\nagreement, which may contribute to a situation where, in an
\noperational context, the line between external and internal
\n\"challenges\" becomes extremely blurred.<\/p>\n
In 1986, Harold Crouch, an observer on the role of the
\nmilitary in Indonesia, pointed out that because of their internal
\nsecurity role, the Indonesian Armed Forces are poorly equipped to
\nfight an external war. Therefore, if large numbers were
\ntransferred to a conventional role, \"the (Indonesian) government
\nwould run the risk of not being able to deal with local political
\nupheavals\".<\/p>\n
In view of the ambiguous wording of the agreement,
\nparticularly on where to draw a clear line between external and
\ninternal challenges, both countries could be facing a
\nhypothetical situation in the future where Australian Defense
\nForce could be employed alongside the Indonesian Armed Forces,
\nthereby indirectly reinforcing Indonesia's internal security
\ncapabilities.<\/p>\n
For example, the wording of Article 2 of the agreement, which
\nneeds some clarification, refers to \"adverse challenges\" rather
\nthan \"external threats\", which is the standard term in defense
\nagreements. Similarly, an interpretation of Article 3, which says
\nthat \"mutually beneficial cooperative activities in the security
\nfield in areas to be identified by the two parties,\" could be
\nextended to areas facing an internal threat.<\/p>\n
If this is the case, then the agreement has breached a
\nsignificant threshold, as it clearly contradicts Indonesia's
\n\"non-aligned\" foreign policy. On the other hand, however, it also
\nshould be stated from the outset that the Australian government
\nso far has given some assurances that Australian forces would
\nnever be used in direct or indirect support of other countries
\nwhich are facing internal security threats.<\/p>\n
No one can deny that the possibility of a military threat
\nremains, even in the post-Cold War era. Yet the new threats in
\nthe era of global interdependency would take many non-military
\nforms that have no military solutions. Therefore, to equate the
\nproblem of security with the problem of armed conflict is to
\noversimplify the nature of the threat.<\/p>\n
In short, to seek military solutions in conflict management as
\nthe only option can be regarded as a counter-productive response
\nto most security challenges. It seems that contrary to such a
\nview, both governments consider the agreement as the culmination
\nof a defense relationship now forming a second (and possibly
\nprimary) diplomatic track.<\/p>\n
The increase in defense links in the context of a lack of
\nconsideration of other foreign policy objectives could have some
\nconsequences for the relationship between the two countries in
\nthe future. It could threaten to unbalance their broad diplomacy
\nobjectives and remove them from the purview of those responsible
\nfor the implementation of foreign policy in general.<\/p>\n
Dr. Hilman Adil is Director at the Center of Social and
\nCultural Studies of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences.<\/p>",
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