Reforming TNI<\/p>\n
The way the Indonesian Military (TNI) is going on about
\ndefending its territorial function shows that it, or more
\nprecisely the Army, is reluctant to give up the power and
\nprivileges it has enjoyed all these years. Yet, its argument to
\nkeep the elaborate Army command structures, which provided it
\nwith power and comprehensive control over the country all the way
\nfrom the top down to villages, contradicts its own promise of
\npursuing internal reform and keeping out of politics.<\/p>\n
It also exposes an attitude which raises serious questions
\nwhether TNI is genuine about leaving politics, or whether it is
\nsimply buying time, retreating a little bit, and scheming to make
\na comeback some day soon. Time will tell which way it is going,
\nbut this episode serves as a warning to those behind the movement
\nfor a civil society that they must maintain pressure to ensure
\nthat the military is fully phased out from politics by the 2004
\ndeadline.<\/p>\n
As part of the national reform drive to move toward a civil
\nsociety, the nation has agreed to assign a smaller, still vital,
\nrole to TNI. Its main and only job now is to defend the country
\nagainst foreign aggression. Internal security is fully the domain
\nof the National Police, which, since April 1, has been a separate
\nentity from the military. Even the onetime defense and security
\nministry has been renamed the Ministry of Defense.<\/p>\n
TNI has also dropped its "dual function" concept which in the
\npast allowed it to play politics that led to abuses of power and
\nhuman rights atrocities. One of the major lessons the nation has
\nlearned after more than three decades of this dualism is that we
\nshould never give political power to anyone who carries a gun.<\/p>\n
With TNI's wings clipped and its job clearly defined, there is
\nreally little justification for keeping the Army's elaborate
\nterritorial command structures, from the regional level (Kodam),
\nregency (Korem), district (Kodim), to subdistrict (Koramil), and
\nnoncommissioned officers assigned to villages (Babinsa).<\/p>\n
With the nation at peace with its neighbors these last 30
\nyears, and with the military fully sanctioned to play politics,
\nthe chiefs of these commands have spent most, if not all of their
\ntime, discharging the second of their dual function, the
\nsociopolitical role. And with weapons and troops at their
\ndisposal, they essentially became omnipotent local rulers, far
\nmore powerful than governors, mayors, regency, district and
\nvillage chiefs, many of whom were themselves recruited from the
\nmilitary. These commands made militarization of the entire
\ncountry complete in the past 30 years. It is through these
\ncommands that many of the abuses of power by the military were
\ncommitted in the past.<\/p>\n
If TNI now professes to have a new paradigm and promises to
\nkeep out of politics, then why is it so insistent on keeping the
\ncommand system which has been part and parcel of the now defunct
\ndual-function concept? This irony, thankfully, was pinpointed by
\nArmy Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, a vocal but almost lone
\nreformist voice within the TNI leadership who started off the
\npresent debate about TNI's territorial function.<\/p>\n
Agus, who was recently moved from Army Headquarters in Jakarta
\nto serve as chief of the Wirabuana Regional Command in Sulawesi,
\nhas called for the abolition of the lower command structures
\n(Koramil and Babinsa), and the streamlining of the top
\nstructures, cutting the number of Kodam from the current 11 to
\neight. It was in response to Agus' call that the public became
\nprivy to a TNI plan to expand the number of Kodam to 17, as
\ndisclosed by TNI spokesman Maj. Gen. Sudrajat. The plan, which
\nhas been confirmed by TNI chief Navy Adm. Widodo A.S., bucks the
\ntrend to phase the military out of the political arena and from
\ninternal security affairs.<\/p>\n
Given that its portfolio now is limited solely to defense, TNI
\ndoes not need such elaborate command structures, especially
\nbearing in mind that external threats are almost nonexistent. A
\nfew of these commands are probably needed to mobilize the
\npopulation should war break out, but five layers of command are
\nexcessive for such a job. There may be a case for Indonesia to
\nbuild a few more bases for its Navy and Air Force fleets to
\nprotect far-flung regions. If that is the case, then TNI should
\nreallocate resources, including personnel if necessary, from the
\nArmy command structures to these bases. If TNI still cannot
\naccept the demands to abolish or revamp the Army's command
\nstructures simply because it is an emotionally loaded issue, then
\nthere is a strong case to abolish them in the name of efficiency.<\/p>\n
Ultimately, changes within TNI would be better off if they
\nwere initiated from inside. That is why it is imperative that
\nmore reform-minded officers like Agus Wirahadikusumah emerge to
\npush for the changes which the military must take to keep up with
\nthe times. TNI knows it faces a 2004 deadline to leave the
\npolitical arena. But if the present leadership continues to
\nstall, then the changes would simply have to be imposed from the
\noutside, by force if necessary. The civil society movement will
\nmake sure of that.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/reforming-tni-1447899208",
"image": ""
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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