{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1110050,
        "msgid": "reforming-indonesia-1447899208",
        "date": "2001-08-21 00:00:00",
        "title": "Reforming Indonesia ",
        "author": null,
        "source": "",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Reforming Indonesia Indonesia's President Megawati Soekarnoputri is exceeding expectations left and right. Last week she awarded the most important positions in her cabinet to well-respected technocrats, doling out lesser posts to her coalition partners, and the markets gave their nod of approval.",
        "content": "<p>Reforming Indonesia<\/p>\n<p>Indonesia's President Megawati Soekarnoputri is exceeding <br>\nexpectations left and right. Last week she awarded the most <br>\nimportant positions in her cabinet to well-respected technocrats, <br>\ndoling out lesser posts to her coalition partners, and the <br>\nmarkets gave their nod of approval. Earlier she expanded the <br>\nscope of a human rights tribunal, sending a strong signal to the <br>\nmilitary that efforts to hold it accountable for abuses in Timor <br>\nand elsewhere will continue under her administration. Yesterday <br>\nshe was back for more applause, giving reformist State <br>\nEnterprises Minister Laksamana Sukardi oversight responsibility <br>\nfor the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency.<\/p>\n<p>It's not an exaggeration to say that Indonesia's economic <br>\nrecovery depends on the management of IBRA. The agency <br>\nrecapitalized the country's banks in 1998 by taking over 600 <br>\ntrillion rupiah ($66 billion at today's exchange rate) in bad <br>\nloans, and demanded collateral from the country's debt-strapped <br>\ncompanies. Those assets were supposed to be sold off quickly in <br>\norder to plug the hole in the central government's finances. But <br>\nduring the 21-month tenure of President Abdurrahman Wahid, IBRA <br>\nmade limited progress on this assignment. As a result much of the <br>\neconomy is still in a kind of limbo.<\/p>\n<p>Part of the problem was that some companies used every means, <br>\nlegal and otherwise, to drag out the process. But right from the <br>\nbeginning there was also political interference in IBRA's work, <br>\nand that allowed some companies to get better deals than others. <br>\nMr. Wahid bore ultimate responsibility for this state of affairs, <br>\nand it was one of the many reasons Indonesians lost respect for <br>\nhis leadership. It's imperative that Ms. Megawati start out on <br>\nthe right foot with IBRA.<\/p>\n<p>Choosing Mr. Laksamana is a good way to do so. He was once <br>\naptly described in a U.S. Embassy report as \"the champion of <br>\nIndonesia's efforts to craft reforms needed to restore investor <br>\nconfidence.\" As part of President Wahid's coalition government, <br>\nhe started out serving as minister of investment and state <br>\nenterprises, so he has the benefit of hindsight as he takes up <br>\nthe job for a second time. More importantly, he has long been one <br>\nof Ms. Megawati's most trusted economic advisers, and strong <br>\npolitical backing is exactly what IBRA needs if it is to crack <br>\nthe whip on Indonesia's deadbeat tycoons.<\/p>\n<p>And it's Mr. Laksamana's track record of doing just that which <br>\nmakes his appointment an important signal to the debtors. His <br>\ncareer has been a good indicator of the state of Indonesia's <br>\nreforms. In late 1999 he argued that \"shock therapy\" was needed <br>\nto change the country's culture of corruption, and showed his <br>\nmettle by accusing the Indonesian conglomerate Texmaco of <br>\ncorruption during the Suharto era, an allegation the company <br>\ndenies.<\/p>\n<p>However, after just six months Mr. Laksamana lost his cabinet <br>\npost, and Texmaco's founder, Marimutu Sinivasan, lobbied <br>\nPresident Wahid and other politicians for support. The attorney <br>\ngeneral dropped an investigation of the company, and President <br>\nWahid defended Texmaco. Last September, IBRA cut a deal that <br>\nallowed the conglomerate to stay intact. The company has become <br>\none of several notable cases which typify IBRA's failure to put <br>\npotentially productive companies into the hands of those who are <br>\nwilling to bid the most for them, rather than those who ran them <br>\ninto the ground.<\/p>\n<p>Using his parliament seat as a pulpit, Mr. Laksamana kept up a <br>\nsteady stream of criticism of the government for failing to make <br>\nheadway in forcing out Mr. Sinivasan, whom IBRA's chairman called <br>\nthe \"soul of the company.\" Mr. Laksamana condemned last year's <br>\ndebt workout deal, which gave Texmaco's founder a role in <br>\nmanagement and 12 years to pay back $2.7 billion in order to <br>\nregain majority control, as \"daylight robbery.\"<\/p>\n<p>How strictly the new administration holds Texmaco and other <br>\ncompanies like it to their commitments will be an important early <br>\ntest of the new administration, and by giving Mr. Laksamana power <br>\nover the process there can be no doubt what President Megawati's <br>\nintentions are. While it's too soon to say that she is going to <br>\nsucceed where Mr. Wahid failed, there have been some encouraging <br>\nsigns that have many Indonesia observers pleasantly surprised.<\/p>\n<p>-- The Asian Wall Street Journal, Hong Kong<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/reforming-indonesia-1447899208",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}