Reform security, disband paramilitary groups<\/p>\n
M. Riefqi Muna, Defense Analyst, The RIDEP Institute,riefqi@gmx.net,
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
On Feb. 5, 2002, Indonesian Military (TNI) Commander Gen.
\nEndriartono Sutarto reiterated his call for all extremist and
\nmilitia groups, including those affiliated to political parties
\nand religious organizations, to disband. The call received
\npositive support from society given that such groups have incited
\nfear due to their violent acts.<\/p>\n
However, some who defend the existence of the groups say that
\nthey help security as pamswakarsa (voluntary security force).
\nBut, the term pamswakarsa is highly politicized and is related to
\nthe interests of the political elite and private security
\nbusiness.<\/p>\n
Pamswakarsa are very much like a hired group, thugs that could
\nbe deployed based on the interests of the group or person that
\npays them. Unfortunately, the growth of such militia groups is
\nalso in line with the biggest political parties. These parties
\nhave betrayed basic democratic ideals by having semi-military
\ntask forces (satgas), saying they must have their own semi-
\nmilitary groups given the weakness of the state security
\napparatus.<\/p>\n
In a democracy, it is generally agreed that the state is the
\nonly entity that has the right to develop and use force, hence
\nthe state has its soldiers, police and other security apparatus.
\nStill, the security forces must be accountable to the public
\naccording to the principle of civilian control of the armed
\nforces. This means that macro strategic policies relating to
\ndefense must take the form of democratic political decisions.<\/p>\n
The state's monopoly of force is a basic principle of a
\ndemocratic state, and with it comes the obligation to provide
\nsecurity for the people, encompassing also territorial integrity.
\nConsequently the armed forces have to be prepared professionally
\nwith a specific structure and organization, and no other civilian
\norganization has the right to duplicate it.<\/p>\n
On the civilian side, the police force is set up to provide
\nlaw enforcement and public order, or internal security. Other
\nsecurity apparatus such as the secret services, immigration as
\nwell as customs support broader security aspects.<\/p>\n
Private civilians have no right to develop their own model of
\na paramilitary force or models that resemble the military system
\nin their behavior, regardless of whether or not their uniforms
\ndiffer from the military.<\/p>\n
Violence is innate to the security apparatus. In this regard,
\nthe state has the monopoly over the right to use violence, but it
\nstill has to be accountable to its people.<\/p>\n
And while some in the political elite will defend the need for
\nthe satgas, people know that like those called the laskar, these
\ngroups are models of militarism. In many cases across the country
\nthe satgas have not merely provided internal security for
\npolitical parties, but have functioned more as a deterrent vis-a-
\nvis the community or perceived opponents.<\/p>\n
Among the causes of growing militarism is the culture of
\nviolence. Consequently, people accept such violence-prone groups.
\nMeanwhile the leaders of political, ideological or even regular
\ncriminal groups have often used militaristic groups to maximize
\ntheir political gain or power, taking advantage of potential
\nrecruits amid high unemployment.<\/p>\n
The previous concept of a \"total peoples' defense\"
\n(hankamrata) which assumes that anyone can voluntarily join in
\nnational defense, is a problematic concept, especially regarding
\nthe distinction between \"combatant\" and \"non-combatant\" in
\ninternational humanitarian law.<\/p>\n
In international humanitarian law during war, only combatants
\nare allowed to shoot; meaning that the deployment of civilians is
\nnot permitted. This also applies to the police since the decree
\nof the People's Consultative Assembly of 2000 rightly separated
\nthe police from the armed forces.<\/p>\n
However, the concept of \"total peoples' defense\" has been
\nrevised to \"total defense\" or sistem pertahanan semesta as stated
\nin Law No. 3\/2002 on national defense, thus correcting the above
\nmistake of failing to differentiate combatants and non-
\ncombatants; and adopting the total defense system adopted in most
\ncountries.<\/p>\n
In times of war, combat would remain the main duty of the
\nmilitary; while civilians would only be able to be deployed for
\nwar through mobilization -- this would mean legally integrating
\nthem into the military structure, with or without military
\ntraining. Hence during deployment they are combatants and no
\nlonger categorized as civilians until demobilization.<\/p>\n
Integration of civilians into direct military operation must
\nbe based on a specific legal umbrella such as a law on
\nmobilization and demobilization, which we do not have. Civilian
\ninvolvement in war is only allowed after being mobilized by the
\nlaw and demobilized afterward.<\/p>\n
In this regard, the understanding, even on the part of some
\nmilitary officers that laskar, satgas, or whatever the
\nparamilitary group, should be sustained as a type of reserve
\nforce for national defense, is misleading.<\/p>\n
No matter what the circumstances, only the military (TNI) and
\nNational Police (POLRI) have the right to use a symbol and the
\nuse of force. Military training can only be conducted under
\nmobilization. Only the state has the right to give the mandate to
\nthe TNI to give military training for civilians after they are
\nmobilized or recruited based on the above law.<\/p>\n
Therefore the state must decide to disband paramilitary
\norganizations or groups. Despite the lack of the above mentioned
\nlaw, the state decision to disband the respective groups could
\ntake the form of an executive order that would help reduce the
\nproliferation of violence in society.<\/p>\n
President Megawati Soekarnoputri's courage to disband the
\ngroups would thus contribute to peace, and would help the future
\nIndonesia against falling into a warlord model of a community or
\ngrowing mercenary forces. It is a democratic commitment to
\ncontrol paramilitary groups.<\/p>\n
The disbanding of task forces of satgas of political parties
\nis also necessary because their existence contradicts the
\ndemocratic values of a political party as a vehicle for peaceful
\npolitical channels.<\/p>\n
Consequently, the state must have a plan to develop the
\ncapacity and professionalism of the security apparatus. This
\nwould reflect the government's commitment to reform the security
\nsector in a broader sense.<\/p>\n
The writer is also affiliated to the Center for Political
\nResearch, National Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta.<\/p>",
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