Reconciling quixotic reforms<\/p>\n
By Kusnanto Anggoro<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): What is now the legitimate and justified reform
\nquestion under the leadership of President Megawati
\nSoekarnoputri? No sensible person would be capable of giving a
\nsatisfactory answer. Three years ago, in the immediate aftermath
\nof the downfall of Soeharto, many could have answered the
\nquestion with much greater certainty. However, developments and
\nevents during the reign of Abdurrahman Wahid have had a dazzling
\neffect on us regarding our view of our ongoing struggle for
\ndemocracy.<\/p>\n
Abdurrahman, or Gus Dur, is a great man, for sure. He remains
\nthe doyen of democracy, justice, and humanity, with his strong
\ncommitment toward pluralism, tolerance, peaceful resolution of
\nconflict and respect of human rights. More than any other
\npresident of Indonesia, he desacralized some of the state's
\nsymbols, including the State Palace and government bureaucracy.
\nHowever, he was incapable of managing an effective government.
\nHis style of leadership was too erratic, setting the tone to his
\nown orchestra, making it difficult for others to follow his
\nrhythm.<\/p>\n
Megawati has now taken up the presidency. The way she selected
\nher Cabinet appears to have negated earlier accusations that she
\nwas unable to decide things on her own. Many would consider her
\nas more capable than she appears, uncertain though her capability
\nmay be to rein in her coalition partners. For sure, the success
\nof Megawati's government will depend on dynamics in the
\nlegislature and the support of the state bureaucracy, both of
\nwhich were pretty well dominated by reluctant reformers, if not
\nconservatives.<\/p>\n
To purist democracy and human rights activists, Megawati's
\nascendancy will lead to the return of Soeharto-era forces into
\npolitical life, which could end Indonesia's road to democracy.
\nHer fervent nationalist patina may jeopardize regional autonomy.
\nThe creation of a state minister for communications and
\ninformation and the presence of a lieutenant-general at the helm
\nof the Ministry of Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy have
\nrevived fears of a return to an authoritarian past.<\/p>\n
These are all indeed legitimate worries. Soeharto's rule has
\nbecome a serious cause of distress and infringement of human
\nrights. A victim of the 1965 massacre is not able to turn a new
\npage before the previous page has even been read. The relatives
\nof students who were shot dead in the Trisakti and Semanggi
\nincidents in 1998 are hearing the new, before they have heard the
\ntruth of history. Victims of incidents in Lampung, Aceh, and East
\nTimor will not expect that the hurt in their hearts can be
\nforgotten before it is healed.<\/p>\n
Undoubtedly, the urgent need to restore peace and stability,
\nnational as well as regional, is the prerequisite for an economic
\nrecovery that will stimulate foreign as well as domestic
\ninvestment. This urgency may bring a more statist approach of
\ngovernance back to the fore.<\/p>\n
Megawati will be more determined to resort to military
\nsolutions than Abdurrahman; she will also be more cautious in
\nimplementing regional autonomy. She is a constitutionalist with a
\nmarked streak of legalism. Her close relations with the military
\nmay hinder trials of human rights abuses in East Timor, Aceh and
\nelsewhere.<\/p>\n
To a certain extent, this could create serious problems
\nbetween the Megawati government and civil society. Human rights
\nactivists may well be disappointed by the world discussing the
\nnew, before talking about resolving old problems. Their fears
\nhave been expressed in recent statements by rights activists in
\nNew York and Canberra and environmentalists in London; their
\nvoicing of opposition against closer military relations with
\nIndonesia's military has indicated such worries.<\/p>\n
Indeed, one cannot expect too much from transitional regimes.
\nAs the scholar Samuel Huntington suggests, the building of
\ndemocracy requires a balance between excessive participation and
\npolitical institutionalization. Nick Kirtz presupposed the
\npersistence of transitional justice, in which laws could well be
\ninsufficient instruments to seek justice.<\/p>\n
Mohammed Ayoob has even suggested that \"adequate stateness\"
\n(of democracies) allows the use of coercive forces, including the
\nnational police and the military, so long as such decisions are
\nreached through democratic processes by institutions in
\nauthority.<\/p>\n
The tranquility of transition, especially a transition that
\nfailed to completely break with the past, would have to
\naccommodate the more pervasive aspects of the old regime.<\/p>\n
The psyche of transition pragmatically assumes obectives that
\nare more practical than idealistic. Democratic mechanisms such as
\ntransparency and accountability could well be more important than
\npurist democratic norms, values, and virtues. Megawati's
\ngovernment is hardly an exception. It may be nothing wrong, at
\nleast until 2004, to use extra-constitutional measures so long as
\nthey are morally legitimate and politically justifiable.<\/p>\n
After all, the struggle for reform, democracy and human rights
\nwill not stand still because Megawati tells it to. Those who want
\nto be part of the future must keep pace with changes in the
\ncourse of history. We must not be woven so intricately into the
\npast that we are unable calmly to turn our attention to the new.
\nPerhaps, the present struggle is for us to be more confident and
\nrealistic.<\/p>\n
There is simply no place now for a \"Don Quixote\", a man who
\nabsurdly tilted at windmills that he thought were monstrous
\ngiants.<\/p>\n
Dr. Kusnanto Anggoro is a senior researcher at the Centre for
\nStrategic and International Studies and a lecturer in Strategic
\nStudies at the postgraduate studies program at the University of
\nIndonesia.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/reconciling-quixotic-reforms-1447893297",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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