Reconciling civilian-military gap<\/p>\n
By Kusnanto Anggoro<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): In developed democracies, scholars of civil-
\nmilitary relations have reached a consensus on how civilian elite
\nand military officers should engage in working relations.<\/p>\n
Wide use of the term \"civil supremacy\" in the West, or \"civil
\ncontrol\" in the post-Soviet states, applies to political behavior
\n-- a democratic process, norm and institutions.<\/p>\n
\"Civilian supremacy\" or \"civilian control\" largely concern the
\nextent to, and the way in, which democratic civilian government
\nregulates the role of the armed forces.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately we do not have such a luxury. In Indonesian,
\nsupremasi sipil refers to both civil and civilian supremacy. They
\nare rarely defined with any precision -- implying that they are
\nthe same thing.<\/p>\n
Worse, little endeavor has ever been made with regard to
\npolitics as procedures consisting of the formulation, approval
\nand implementation of particular policies. This often produces
\nconfusion or ambiguity in debates on how, and to what extent, the
\nstate of democracy can be established.<\/p>\n
Civil-military relations has become a zero-sum game. \"Civil
\nsupremacy\" has turned into non-involvement of the armed forces in
\npolitics. Academics and activists strongly advocate the \"down
\nwith the military\" argument and that soldiers should go \"back to
\nthe barracks\", seemingly unaware that Indonesia has not adopted
\nconscription.<\/p>\n
Priority has been given to scrapping the 38 seats allocated to
\nmilitary delegates in the legislature, which in fact could have
\nbeen a non-issue if we had a proper voting system.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, military officers defend themselves with
\nmystification of history and continue to claim historical facts,
\nhowever disputed they may be, as political rights.<\/p>\n
They prefer to use the term supremacy of law, which is too
\nlegalistic, and deny the fact that laws are no more than products
\nof political processes that are not necessarily democratic, and
\ninclude the use of intimidation and money politics.<\/p>\n
Most of them argue that civilians have no capacity or
\ncredentials to discuss security and defense affairs.<\/p>\n
Such mutual denial may arise from two issues: semantics and
\nthe conceptual void of the \"down with the military\" argument. Few
\nwould pay attention to the fact that the terms \"civil\" and
\n\"military\" do not denote a job but a way of life.<\/p>\n
The former refers, not to individuals or groups, but to a way
\nof life relying on politics, negotiation and tolerance. The
\nlatter, of course, represents the use of force, intimidation and
\neven coercion.<\/p>\n
In fact, civil supremacy or civilian supremacy is no more than
\nthe supremacy of the elected, not appointed authorities. For
\nsure, such supremacy applies not only to the armed forces, but
\nalso to other social and political entities, including political
\nparties. Needless to say, using civilian defense groups, or so-
\ncalled task forces (satgas), and violent means to induce
\npolitical process are all against the principles of civil
\nsupremacy.<\/p>\n
The \"down with the military\" arguments have led us to focus on
\ninappropriate and incongruous priorities. Demilitarization, for
\nexample, should primarily concern the conversion of unnecessary
\nmilitary resources, weaponry and industrial capacity to civilian
\nuse.<\/p>\n
It is the term used in developed countries, including those in
\nthe former Soviet states of Eastern Europe, following the end of
\nthe Cold War. Such an approach would hardly be relevant to
\nIndonesia whose regular army needs modern weaponry and better
\norganization to be able to defend the country against
\nconventional and non-conventional threats.<\/p>\n
Demobilization is another case in point.<\/p>\n
This term applies to most African states after a series of
\nliberation wars ravaged the nation for almost four decades. After
\nthe wars ended, many soldiers were simply released from their
\nmilitary duties and told to go home, and, without any real
\ncivilian skills, turned into roving bandits who preyed on people
\nin the countryside. Again, this has little relevance to
\nIndonesia, except in the case of paramilitaries, militias and
\narmed insurgents.<\/p>\n
All of this has widened the gap between civilians and the
\nmilitary, leading to mutual suspicion that entangles the already
\nperilous transition to consolidated democracy.<\/p>\n
As the scholar Clausewitzian suggested, \"war is the
\ncontinuation of politics by other means\", and thus, military
\naffairs are too dangerous to be left only to the soldier.<\/p>\n
Confidence and trust-building measures are badly needed to
\navoid the worsening situation. In democracy, it is one thing to
\ngive a legitimate role to the armed forces; and it is another to
\nseek to control them against abusing their powers.<\/p>\n
Bridging the civilian-military gap and constructing democratic
\ncivil-military relations has always been complicated, especially
\nin post-military dominated regimes.<\/p>\n
Nonetheless, the guiding principles are crystal clear. The
\ncivilian must realize the need for technically competent,
\nprofessionally organized and politically accountable armed
\nforces.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, the military must accede to a somewhat unequal
\ncontract that they must only defend democracy, not define it.<\/p>\n
The writer is a senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic
\nand International Studies and a lecturer for the postgraduate
\nstudies program at the School of International Relations,
\nUniversity of Indonesia.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/reconciling-civilian-military-gap-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}