Reconciliation: Not just ending the violence<\/p>\n
Ignas Kleden, Sociologist, The Center for East Indonesian Affairs,
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
Conflict and conflict resolution used to be seen as very
\nclosely related. However, between the two things there is a great
\ndistance, in which different problems emerge and where some
\nintermediate initiatives can be taken.<\/p>\n
First, most of the horizontal conflicts since the end of the
\nNew Order have been accompanied by violence. People are murdered,
\ninjured or harassed, houses are burnt, hospitals and school
\nbuildings are destroyed, streets are closed, and waste disposal
\ndoes not function.<\/p>\n
The conflicts might still go on for some time until the most
\nimportant factors leading to its occurrence have been
\nsatisfactorily settled. However, it does mean that no action can
\nbe taken to stop violence in the meantime.<\/p>\n
One should never look at the termination of violence as
\nidentical with conflict resolution or reconciliation. People must
\nwait for some time until real conflict resolution can take place,
\nbut the government can and should take direct and quick action to
\nstop the escalation of violence.<\/p>\n
Secondly, most of the conflicts originate in casus belli which
\noften turns out to be trivial affairs. If this casus belli can be
\nidentified, clarified and contained at the earliest possible
\nstage, many conflicts could have been prevented from escalating.
\nYet the original cause is usually left in the dark though there
\nis enough evidence to make it publicly clear. This takes place so
\nfrequently that the question is whether it has been done so
\nintentionally. This uncertainty has brought about many rumors,
\ndisinformation, action and reaction resulting in increasing
\ninsecurity which is very liable to explode in violent conflict.<\/p>\n
The role of the security apparatus, and the role of police in
\nparticular, is instrumental in clarifying the casus belli and
\nconsequently in preventing people from getting trapped in
\nunnecessary disorientation, confusion and destruction.<\/p>\n
Thirdly, given the fact that many horizontal conflicts could
\nnot be solved yet, some rescue action should be taken to
\nalleviate the sufferings and the hardships of those who are
\nvictimized by the ongoing conflicts. These actions can also
\nfunction to reduce the destruction of infrastructure such as
\nhospitals, schools, market places and buildings for religious
\nservice. Therefore any rescue initiative should be taken right
\naway despite the fact that conflicts are still going on, this
\nbeing necessary because of two main reasons.<\/p>\n
On the one hand, people affected by the violence have the
\nright to relief and security. Those injured not because of their
\nown mistakes deserve help and relief service though (or rather
\nbecause) they are not in the position to pay for it.<\/p>\n
Also, the destruction of physical infrastructures should be
\nreduced gradually and should be terminated eventually to prevent
\npeople living in conflict from believing that they are trapped in
\nan insurmountable abnormality. This impression is instrumental to
\nreduce the feeling of insecurity which becomes the very first
\nprerequisite for being ready and prepared for reconciliation.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, rescue actions and rehabilitation
\ninitiatives can distract the attention of the people concerned
\nfrom being preoccupied with fighting one another. In various
\nplaces a great part of their time and energy is already used for
\nthis purpose and they are less prepared to fight and to kill
\nthough they want to do so.<\/p>\n
Of course there is a heated debate as to whether
\nrehabilitation initiatives are of any avail if conflict
\nresolution has not yet been attained. What if all the energy has
\nbeen spent on rebuilding schools or restoring a demolished
\nhospital, and right after that another conflict explodes and the
\nnew building is destroyed?<\/p>\n
Conflict resolution and rehabilitation cannot be treated as an
\neither\/or choice but rather as a complementary package --
\nrehabilitation should be treated as a means for conflict
\nresolution.<\/p>\n
The third problem regarding conflict and its resolutions is
\nthat people in many communities are fairly familiar with conflict
\nand have had their own conflict resolution methods ever since
\ntime immemorial. There have always been conflicts pertaining to
\nland, marriage systems, or customary law. However, most of these
\nconflicts could have been solved through traditional conflict-
\nresolution institutions.<\/p>\n
Given the importance of these institutions, we must remember
\nthe different situation between regions whose culture is fairly
\nhomogeneous and those where a great variety of cultural systems
\nexist. In the former case it is easier to rely on traditional
\ninstitutions because people refer and orient themselves to the
\nsame institutions.<\/p>\n
In the latter case however, the institutions may be different
\nfrom one place to another, or the immigrants might stand aloof
\nfrom their own traditional institutions. In this case the role of
\nthe state law might be more important than the customary law.<\/p>\n
However many of the traditional conflict-resolution
\ninstitutions have been destroyed during today's conflicts. The
\ndestruction of these peace-making institutions is conducted not
\nby the people in those communities, but rather by "external
\nforces".<\/p>\n
Why is it so difficult to identify and to capture these
\ntrouble-makers, who paralyze the life of local communities by
\ndestroying their traditional institutions?<\/p>\n
Fourth, the discussion about the top-down and bottom-up
\napproaches in management can never become more significant than
\nin matters pertaining to conflict resolution. The experiences
\nwith local and communal conflicts have given us a good lesson
\nthat people's participation is essential to any effort for
\nreconciliation.<\/p>\n
This does not necessarily mean that the government should only
\nwait and see. The point is that the government can and should
\ntake initiatives to restore peace and security, but these
\ninitiatives can be done if these can motivate and persuade people
\nto engage in the preparation and implementation of conflict
\nresolution. It is no use to see and to treat people living in
\nconflicts as an objective of conflict management engineered from
\noutside or from up above. They are by no means a mere target but
\nthe very agents of conflict resolution and reconciliation, whose
\ninvolvement and participation can never be done away with.<\/p>\n
The failure of Malino II, the peace pact for the Maluku
\nconflict, is to be attributed to the conflict management bias of
\nthe initiators, in this case Coordinating Minister for People's
\nWelfare Jusuf Kalla, despite the government's good intention and
\nserious effort. The physical and psychological conditions which
\nare to be restored are so destroyed that any effort which tries
\nto force a quick recovery would produce new vulnerability,
\nresentment and restiveness.<\/p>\n
The only possible way is long, or lengthy, boring, and
\nprotracted dialog, in which the facilitators should be prepared
\nto listen to much anger, blame and misgivings before they can win
\ntrust of those involved in conflicts, namely people who are more
\nliable to suspect than to believe, to discard than to listen, to
\ntake something seriously or to look at it as nonsense.<\/p>\n
In such conditions a real dialog is not necessary -- yet
\nalmost impossible because every party tends to speak of their own
\ncase and are ignorant or indifferent towards the affairs of the
\nother party.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/reconciliation-not-just-ending-the-violence-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}