Reciprocal efforts needed to revive peace in Aceh<\/p>\n
P. Ramasamy, National University of Malaysia, Selangor, Malaysia<\/p>\n
For durable peace to take shape in Aceh, there is need for
\nthe both the parties, the Indonesian government and the Gerakan
\nAceh Merdeka (GAM) to practice some kind of give and take.
\nHowever, recent events indicate that the positions of the both
\nthe sides are becoming very polarized, paving the way for renewed
\narmed conflict in the province.<\/p>\n
There are sections within the government that are putting new
\nand difficult demands for the GAM to fulfill. For example,
\nCoordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Gen.
\n(ret.) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono along with those in the
\nIndonesian Military (TNI) and the National Police are now telling
\nGAM to accept the provision of special autonomy and the framework
\nof a united Indonesia before any further talks could be planned.<\/p>\n
Strange enough, following the acceptance of the Cessation of
\nHostilities Agreement (COHA) on Dec. 9, these conditions were not
\nthere. It was assumed by both the parties that peace negotiations
\nwould proceed by the way of building mutual trust and confidence.
\nIn the COHA, the surrender of the weapons by GAM was very much
\ntied with the Indonesian armed forces retreating and slowly
\nreducing its military presence in the province.<\/p>\n
However, without these two simultaneous processes in motion,
\nit would be difficult for Indonesian authorities to merely accept
\nGAM to surrender its weapons. GAM would not surrender its weapons
\nunless there is simultaneous reciprocation on the party of the
\nauthorities reduce the overwhelming presence of the TNI, the
\npolice and other units that have posed major security problems
\nfor the people.<\/p>\n
Close reading of the spirit of the COHA would indicate that
\nthe whole process of building confidence leading to a durable
\npeace requires commitment and honesty on both parts.<\/p>\n
Further, the authorities or GAM cannot expect miracles from
\nthe Henry Dunant Centre (HDC); the agency is a mere facilitator
\nof the peace process on the basis of the jointly signed COHA.<\/p>\n
The HDC would not really be able to do much if the Indonesian
\ngovernment starts taking unilateral actions that might
\npotentially undermine the peace process. Demanding GAM to
\nsurrender its weapons and asking it to accept the concept of
\nspecial autonomy within the larger political framework of
\nIndonesia, is potentially dangerous. Such demands might please
\nthe hardliners in the government especially the armed forces, but
\nare not going to anything for the peace process.<\/p>\n
GAM doesn't really seem to have projected the quest for
\nindependence in a bold and unilateral manner. Its representative
\nin the JSC, Ibrahim Sofyan Tiba, has said that whatever the
\ndecision taken by the committee would be agreeable to GAM. Yet if
\nthe Indonesian authorities do not rescind the above demands,
\nthere is great likelihood that GAM might indeed come out with its
\nbold proposals of outright independence through armed struggle or
\nthrough a general referendum.<\/p>\n
COHA document is not a blue-print for peace; it is a document
\nthat provides general guidelines as to how peace could be
\nobtained on the basis of building trust, confidence and
\nunderstanding. It is going to be more than four months since the
\nsigning of the COHA, and during this period, the people of Aceh
\nhave benefited from the general absence of civil war.<\/p>\n
The good thing about an uninterrupted peace process is that it
\nallows the return of normalcy and people affected by more than
\ntwo decades of war will start developing a stake in the system.
\nThese developments will have the tendency to influence the peace
\nprocess and ultimately determine the nature of peace settlement
\nin the province.<\/p>\n
Thus, for peace to proceed, both the parties must go back to
\nthe contents and spirit of the COHA. Most importantly, the peace
\nprocess should not re-start without the imposition of difficult
\nconditions by either the government or GAM.<\/p>\n
Both parties need to adopt a functional perspective; put aside
\ndifficult political questions aside for some time and try to
\nfocus on issues that might elicit cooperation from both sides.<\/p>\n
Once cooperation and understanding is developed, then the
\nprocess itself would have its own logic to tackle more difficult
\npolitical and ideological questions.<\/p>\n
As it is, asking GAM to surrender its weapons and making a
\ncommitment to special autonomy would not advance the cause of
\npeace in Aceh. These demands might beget other forms of radical
\npolitical demands from GAM.<\/p>\n
It is not that the entire peace process is lost. The HDC is
\ntrying its best to organize another JC meeting soon. GAM has
\nagreed and chances are the government would also agree to this
\nmeeting. The proposed meeting will be essential to revive the
\nfledging peace process in Aceh and give importance to COHA.<\/p>\n
COHA is not a perfect document; there will be always
\ntendencies for the both parties to misinterpret and misjudge its
\ncontents, but under the watchful eyes of HDC, it has the
\npotential to bring about durable peace in Aceh, a province that
\nonly knew conflict and suffering for more than two decades.<\/p>\n
Perhaps it is about time that the parties to conflict also
\nexamine the peace process in Sri Lanka, currently mediated by the
\nNorwegian government. The Sri Lankan Government and the
\nLiberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) signed the Cessation of
\nHostilities Agreement in February 2001.<\/p>\n
The peace process is nevertheless holding fast in the country
\nand normalcy is slowly returning to affected parts of the
\ncountry, especially in the north and east. Although the LTTE
\nwithdrew from the peace negotiations as a protest, the ceasefire
\nagreement is very much in force. There seem to be good chances
\nthat the LTTE will get back to the negotiating table very soon.<\/p>\n
The case of Sri Lanka illustrates that temporary withdrawals
\nfrom peace negotiations need not undermine ceasefire agreements.
\nTemporary withdrawals and suspensions might actually rejuvenate
\nthe peace process without undermining initial agreement.<\/p>\n
The LTTE, by temporarily disengaging from negotiations, has
\nreportedly succeeded in forcing the Sri Lanka government to
\nwithdraw some of its troop from occupying civilian areas in the
\ndistrict of Jaffna, in northern Sri Lanka.<\/p>\n
P. Ramasamy is a professor of political science at the Centre
\nfor History, Political Science and Strategic Studies of the above
\nuniversity.<\/p>",
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