Questioning the regulation on houses of worship<\/p>\n
Hairus Salim, Jakarta<\/p>\n
A number of houses of worship in West Java were reported to
\nhave been forcibly closed several weeks ago by a group of hard-
\nliners. This incident promptly triggered protests by those whose
\nreligious freedoms had been infringed. They blamed the government
\nfor allowing -- and thus apparently justifying -- the pressure
\nagainst and eventual shutdown of their temporary churches.<\/p>\n
The group of people who enforced the shutdowns argued that the
\nhouses of worship had been built and were being used without
\nfollowing the proper licensing procedures. They referred to the
\nJoint Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the
\nMinister of Home Affairs (SKB) No.1\/1969, regulating the building
\nof houses of worship. To get a church, temple or mosque built one
\nrequires government licenses, the consent of locals and the
\nrequisite congregation base.<\/p>\n
Hard-line Muslim groups acting to shut down temporary
\nChristian churches; it is an act we have seen a lot of recently.<\/p>\n
Residents' demands for Christians to end their praying is
\nusually \"gently\" expressed, but occasionally it is accompanied by
\nviolence like acts of vandalism and arson. The starting point of
\ntension over places of worship is again the regulation SKB
\nNo.1\/1969. One side strongly demands that the rule is
\nconsistently applied and used as a reference. The other argues
\nthat it is their constitutional right to worship, and there are
\ngrowing demands, especially from non-Muslims, to revoke the law.<\/p>\n
So far, the government has been seemingly ambivalent about
\nthis issue. While apparently striving to enforce the regulation,
\nit also has acknowledged the seeds of anger and frustration its
\nenforcement is sowing among the members of minority religions
\naffected by the rule. For a critical analysis of the decree, it
\nis important to review the history leading to its creation.<\/p>\n
With the collapse of the New Order, a series of sectarian
\nincidents took place in Indonesia. Strained relations began with
\nthe circulation of religious pamphlets and books full of
\nmissionary zeal; and physical clashes, including attacks on and
\nthe destruction of churches and mosques were widespread.<\/p>\n
However, in the early period of the New Order, particularly
\nfrom 1967 to the early 1970s, religious frictions in the country
\nwere just as frequent.<\/p>\n
Five religions were officially recognized at the beginning of
\nthe New Order. This in part was a reaction to the role of the
\nIndonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the previous order, which
\nexplicitly ignored religion. As a consequence of this
\nrecognition, religious propagation and study were intensified,
\naffecting interfaith ties.<\/p>\n
A contest between religions for new followers was inevitable.
\nTargets of such recruitment were nominal believers and non-
\nJavanese ethnic groups. Problems arose if those targeted were
\nseen as already \"professing\" a religion.<\/p>\n
This happened at the same time as religion was becoming more
\nglobal than it ever had before; the internationalization of
\nfaiths and missionary movements.<\/p>\n
All major religions in Indonesia are indeed of foreign
\norigins. However, during the period of parliamentary democracy,
\nand especially during the period of guided democracy, religious
\npropagation with foreign assistance was considerably restricted.
\nStarting 1966, in line with the re-incorporation of Indonesia
\ninto the world, there was an influx of aid for the development of
\nall faiths.<\/p>\n
Following the ban on communism, the process of religious
\npropagation got even more intense. Embracing a religion was often
\nas much motivated by \"political security\", so that one would not
\nbe branded as a communist and killed, as it was about real faith.
\nThis was reflected by a rapid expansion in the building of houses
\nof worship. These new buildings were often erected in places
\nwhere the new creed was a minority and had never been seen
\nbefore, which often sparked envy or anger among other groups.<\/p>\n
Several violent incidents involving different regions were
\nconnected with this development; which of course worried our
\nleaders. The government was then in dire need of stability to
\nensure its development programs would work -- and this meant
\ninterfaith stability and harmony. For the prevention of further
\nsectarian conflict, the government finally created some rules,
\nincluding the one on houses of worship.<\/p>\n
This background is important when one reexamines the relevance
\nof the decree. From this historical scrutiny, it is obvious that
\nthe regulation was made first of all to prevent conflicts that
\nhad begun to heat up between the faiths because of allegations of
\nreligious conversions and church building. The regulation was, in
\nfact, a provisional move meant to calm the tensions between the
\ngroups over the short term.<\/p>\n
The situation was an emergency in political and religious
\nterms and it is interesting to note that the rule remains valid
\nand has never been revoked, making it one of the standards with
\nwhich we now appraise interfaith relations.<\/p>\n
Unsurprisingly, then, the rule's continued interpretation has
\nmeant that religious groups have been attacked because their
\nchurches are considered to be unlicensed. While in the short term
\nthe regulation might have prevented conflicts, over the longer
\nperiod it is actually helping to provoke the clashes it was
\noriginally designed to stifle.<\/p>\n
Naturally, the regulation's provisions are not applied in all
\nareas in Indonesia. In certain regions, many communities are not
\nbothered at all about the building of mosques, churches or
\ntemples of different faiths. But it is clear that after such a
\nlong time, this decree -- along with many other rules governing
\nreligions here -- has constructed the ways believers of different
\nfaiths communicate with each other. It has become the main source
\nof reference instead of ideas like mutual respect and tolerance.<\/p>\n
What the history shows is that it is indeed necessary to
\nreview or even annul this regulation. The political situation
\nthat emphasized public and private security at the time of its
\ncreation has significantly changed. The basic reason, of course,
\nis that the decree goes against notions of human rights, which
\nprotect religious freedoms. In practice, forcing compliance with
\nthe rule is often only directed at the minority in a region and
\nis more or less ignored by the majority.<\/p>\n
Perhaps we no longer need this kind of regulation. The rules
\nabout building of houses of worship could be made identical to
\nthose governing general construction -- licenses and requirements
\nfor building height, safety, the environment and so forth. If any
\ndevelopment of a house of worship is considered a \"nuisance\", it
\nshould be dealt with according to the existing laws.<\/p>\n
The writer is from the Institute for Islamic and Social
\nStudies (LKiS).<\/p>",
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