Profiting from violence in eastern Indonesia<\/p>\n
Santi W.E. Soekanto, Contributor, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta<\/p>\n
The deaths of at least five Muslims and three Christians in
\nthe Central Sulawesi district of Poso on Tuesday were absolutely
\nneedless and abhorrent, but probably came as no surprise to some
\npeople. Chief political minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has in
\nfact warned of an impending, even deadlier violence in Poso and
\nareas of Maluku in the coming days.<\/p>\n
He should be aware, as should others who have been watching,
\nof the pattern of ongoing violence between Christians and Muslims
\nin the country that has developed over the past several years.
\nThe coming days, leading up to the Idul Fitri and Christmas
\ncelebrations, are promising as much peace as that found in a
\npowder keg.<\/p>\n
More than 2,500 people have been killed in Poso over the past
\nthree years while thousands of others have been left with both
\nphysical and psychological scars. More than 9,000 have lost their
\nlives in the butchery in both provinces of Maluku since the first
\neruption of violence on Jan. 19, 1999, while hundreds of
\nthousands of others are still languishing in refugee camps.<\/p>\n
Yet both sides have promised that more ugliness is to come.
\nDo they realize that they could very well be putty in someone's
\ndirty hand?<\/p>\n
Let's set out some of the reasons for Yudhoyono's, and our,
\nfears of more violence. First, both Poso and the Malukus are
\nentering their third anniversary of ongoing violence in December
\nand January. Unbelievable though it may sound, there are actually
\npeople who want to celebrate with more violence.<\/p>\n
Secondly, there have been reports of both sides trading
\nthreats of expulsion. For instance, the Christians have
\nreportedly planned to celebrate Christmas in the Muslim-
\ncontrolled city of Poso, the capital of Poso district, some 1,600
\nkilometers northeast of Jakarta. The Muslims in turn declared
\ntheir wish to hold Idul Fitri prayers in Tentena, the stronghold
\nof the Central Sulawesi Christians.<\/p>\n
The third reason for an impending, larger-scale violence is
\nthe presence of people intentionally taking part in the violence.
\nThese could include the Laskar Jihad, which has indeed moved some
\nof its men from Maluku to Poso recently, and who have been
\ninvolved in the violence since their arrival.<\/p>\n
On the other side, evidence and testimonies presented during
\nthe court trial of Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva and Marinus
\nRiwu -- the three men sentenced to death for leading the killing
\nof hundreds of Muslims in the Walisongo Boarding School in mid-
\nMay, 2000 -- have revealed the existence of similarly brutal
\nfighting forces on the Christian side.<\/p>\n
\"I counted more than 170 bodies from seven a.m. to five p.m.,\"
\none witness said, referring to the mutilated corpses found
\nfloating in the Poso River after the attack.<\/p>\n
Humanitarian workers recorded not only the discovery of the
\nbodies but also survivors' accounts of the attack at the
\nWalisongo School. The mosque in the vicinity was splattered with
\nblood. One retired district attorney, who now works as an
\nintelligence officer at the provincial military headquarters,
\nsaid the victims were tortured before being killed.<\/p>\n
Women reported not only having to witness the slaughter of
\ntheir husbands and sons, but also being stripped and sexually
\nassaulted. \"I wept when I found evidence that young girls were
\nalso raped,\" the retired district attorney said.<\/p>\n
The depth of hatred felt for the other side is simply
\nsaddening and scary -- and this is the fourth reason.<\/p>\n
When in July 2001 13 Muslims were tortured and killed in the
\nBuyung Katedo hamlet, inside the Christian enclave of Sepe-
\nSilanca, the Christian Crisis Center of Central Sulawesi said the
\nbutchery was an offensive launched against a \"Muslim base camp\".
\nThe 13 victims included children as young as one-year-old, women
\nand elderly men, up against hundreds of black-clad assailants.<\/p>\n
The fifth -- which must be by far the most compelling reason
\nfor the protracted violence in the region -- is the presence of
\nthose profiting from the violence. They want to keep the violence
\naflame so as to ensure continued profits.<\/p>\n
This is not to name names, because there would simply be too
\nmany, but let us divide them into at least two groups -- those
\nbenefiting indirectly, and those profiting immediately from the
\nviolence.<\/p>\n
The first group consists of those who are happy to see the
\nviolence chipping away at Indonesia's edges. These are the ones
\nwho might gain a political and economical advantage over
\nIndonesia -- the way some parties are enjoying the results of the
\nseparation of East Timor -- if the country were to be torn apart
\nby violence in Aceh, Poso, Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, Sampit,
\nPontianak and elsewhere.<\/p>\n
Most people can sense a \"grand design\" to bring Indonesia to
\nits knees by fomenting violence and unrest across the
\narchipelago. President Megawati Soekarnoputri's fears of a
\ndisintegrating Indonesia are not without basis.<\/p>\n
What benefit is to be gained from a divided Indonesia?<\/p>\n
Despite decades of plundering and abuse at the hands of its
\nformer rulers, the country's wealth of resources is still simply
\nawe-inspiring. Poso is an example of that wealth. The National
\nMaritime Council reveals that in 1998 there were 32 sites of
\nlarge untapped oil deposits in the northern Tomini Bay -- which
\ncould reportedly last for 1,200 years. This is also a very
\nfertile land. Some people have described Poso as \"a piece of
\nheaven\". One need only throw away a fruit seed on a plot of land
\nand wait until harvest time, one local said recently.<\/p>\n
The district is also an ebony exporter. In addition, 30
\npercent of Poso's some 7,000 square kilometers is currently given
\nover to cocoa plantations, an important export for the region and
\nthe nation. Poso is also rich in palm oil plantations, copra and
\ncloves.<\/p>\n
Control over Poso means having control over that wealth.<\/p>\n
The second group consists of individuals who actually make
\nshort-term financial profits. The individuals who sell weaponry
\nand ammunition, for instance, are the first to profit from the
\nviolence. One need only enter Poso to realize how well armed the
\nMobile Brigade and Army personnel are -- some 2,100 are currently
\nposted there depleting the Poso Administration's resources as it
\nis having to spend Rp 1 billion (more than US$ 100,000 at the
\ncurrent rate) to feed and accommodate these troops every month.<\/p>\n
Indeed, as of August, the word was that you could find weapons
\nalmost anywhere in Poso -- in one man's roof, in another's car
\nboot, underneath the loose-fitting blouse of an elderly woman, in
\na child's school bag.<\/p>\n
The next batch of profiteers comes in various guises and
\nshapes. As of August, a strict demarcation line has been drawn
\nbetween areas designated as Christian and Muslim. No Muslim,
\nunless they are related in some way to the military or other
\npowerful institutions, can enter areas such as Tentena or Sepe as
\nit would mean death. On the other hand, the Christian civil
\nservants who still have to work in the Muslim-controlled Poso
\ncity can only enter under the escort of paid security officers.<\/p>\n
In short, movements of people and goods are almost impossible
\nunless they are related to the security authorities.<\/p>\n
There may be many other parties who profit from the violence
\nin eastern Indonesia -- and it will continue unless the warring
\nparties stop to think how they are being manipulated.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/profiting-from-violence-in-eastern-indonesia-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}