Priorities: Legal, military reform<\/p>\n
By Peter Milne<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): It is obviously impossible to say at this stage
\nwhether the rather surprising delay in announcing the cabinet
\nline-up is a positive sign or not. It could be that great care is
\nbeing taken over the suitability of the appointees. Or the delay
\ncould indicate bickering and problems in accommodating all the
\nvarious political groups that made Megawati's ascendancy to the
\npresidency possible.<\/p>\n
Either way, the importance of getting the selection right for
\nthe future of the nation cannot be underestimated. The components
\nof the new cabinet will represent either a second chance to
\ncontinue along the difficult road to reform, or confirm many
\npeople's worst fears -- namely that the inclusion of technocrats
\nand professionals of the highest integrity must be sacrificed to
\npoliticians seeking to hold as much influence as possible for
\ntheir parties.<\/p>\n
Already, the fact that the announcement seems to be taking
\nlonger than expected is beginning to take its toll on the gains
\nmade by the rupiah in the days following the special session of
\nthe People's Consultative Assembly. This in itself is rather
\ndisturbing and irresponsible, when maintaining the strength of
\nthe rupiah is of the utmost importance in allowing the government
\nprecious room for maneuver in its fiscal, and consequently
\nmonetary, policy.<\/p>\n
In the meantime while we wait, one great gift that the Golkar
\nparty could offer to the nation -- one that, regrettably, has
\nvery little chance of being forthcoming -- would be for the
\nparty, fresh from its rather dubious victory in its court case in
\nthe Supreme Court, to decline any seats in the new cabinet. As a
\ngesture of goodwill and proof that it had truly reformed itself,
\nGolkar should accept the role of a loyal opposition -- a
\nconstructive voice of criticism towards the new government.<\/p>\n
By so doing, it would be able to fulfill an extremely
\nimportant role in the House of Representatives (DPR), show people
\nonce and for all that it was capable of putting the interests of
\nthe nation ahead of its own immediate lust for power, and
\ndemonstrate the quality of its ideas in opposition. Soeharto's
\nformer ruing party could even go so far as to copy the British
\nsystem of parliamentary opposition, by announcing its own "shadow
\ncabinet", to monitor and criticize the performance of the
\nexecutive cabinet and groom legislators to assume those positions
\nin a later government.<\/p>\n
Not only would such a gift help to educate the Indonesian
\npublic in its painful discovery of democracy the value of
\nconstructive criticism, it could also prove to be the smartest
\nmove that Golkar ever made: If things go less than well in the
\nHerculean task of managing recovery that lies ahead, Golkar would
\nbe ideally placed to win a sweeping victory at the next general
\nelection in 2004, based on its responsible opposition and the
\nappeal of its alternative policies to the electorate.<\/p>\n
Back to the real cabinet: As many observers have already
\nnoted, those individual selected to take up the economic
\nportfolios, followed by the legal portfolios, will give the first
\nclear indications of what lies ahead for Indonesia. Undoubtedly,
\nmarkets will be riveted by the decisions that are on the verge of
\nbeing made, and their reading of those decisions is likely to
\nhave an immediate and significant impact on both the rupiah and
\nthe stock market.<\/p>\n
Even in the best case scenario where professionals and
\ntechnocrats able to work closely and cooperatively together are
\nappointed to these posts, there is one further problem. The
\nlonger term sustainability of economic reform rests on reform of
\nthe legal system. In recent legal cases, and now with the
\ndisturbing assassination of a Supreme Court justice involved in
\nsetting up a tribunal for human rights abuses in the first days
\nof Megawati's presidency, it is clear that Indonesia continues to
\noperate under the "ruler's law" and not under the "rule of law".<\/p>\n
But who are the rulers now? Apart from the elite, who have
\nthe money and the resources to continue making their own "rules"
\nmuch as they have always done, there is also the Indonesian
\nMilitary (TNI)<\/p>\n
Having been the decisive factor in helping Megawati to the
\npresidency, the military will be looking for a major payback.
\nThis may come in a variety of forms. Given Megawati's well-known
\nsympathy for the military and its nationalistic goals, one form
\nis likely to involve a far freer hand in putting down separatist
\ninsurgencies. This implies a significant increase in bloodshed.
\nAn increase in bloodshed hardly bodes well for post-New Order
\nIndonesia on the road to reform.<\/p>\n
Another form is in military influence over the legal system,
\nto circumvent cases of human rights abuses that could be brought
\nagainst its members. This will inevitably mean that the status
\nquo will continue in the legal system, with all that this
\nimplies.<\/p>\n
Therefore, as we wait for the announcement of the new cabinet,
\nit is worth remembering that even if the best possible candidates
\nare appointed to the economics team and the markets rally in
\napplause, in the longer term it is legal reform that will
\nunderwrite sustainable progress towards economic recovery.<\/p>\n
But legal reform is most unlikely to come about unless there
\nis serious reform and true accountability of the Indonesian
\nmilitary. President Megawati would do well to remember that there
\nis a link between ultimate success in terms of economic recovery
\nand real reform of the military. She will need to show great
\ncourage and skill in tackling this issue over the coming months.<\/p>\n
Her distaste for the fray hardly inspires confidence. But if
\nshe does not rise to the challenge, she is likely to find that
\nshe has little more success than her predecessor in achieving
\nsustainable recovery beyond an impressive but temporary surge in
\nthe markets.<\/p>\n
The cycle of violent political change of power in Indonesia
\nhas apparently been broken. Economic recovery is now within
\nIndonesia's grasp as sentiment hovers, hopeful of seeing the
\nright signals in the coming days. But this is only a fleeting
\nopportunity. Economic recovery depends, ultimately, on legal
\nreform and therefore military reform.<\/p>\n
Both Megawati and the rising stars within the military need to
\nrealize that the cycle of military impunity must also be broken
\nif Indonesia is not to slide backwards. A sound economics team
\nwould be a great start, but it is not on its own enough. The
\nnettle of military reform must also be grasped, something that is
\nultimately also in the best interests of the military itself as
\nan institution, if not all its individual members.<\/p>\n
Former President Aburrahman Wahid failed in his attempt early
\non in his presidency, despite a valiant try. Indonesia now has a
\nsecond chance. It may not have the luxury of a third.<\/p>\n
The writer is managing editor of the Van Zorge Report,
\npublished by the Jakarta-based political risk consultancy firm
\nVan Zorge Heffernan & Associates.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/priorities-legal-military-reform-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}