Preventive diplomacy in Asia-Pasific<\/p>\n
By Hasjim Djalal<\/p>\n
The following article is based on a paper presented to the
\nInternational Symposium on Preventive Diplomacy in the Asia-
\nPacific region, jointly organized in Beijing from July 20 to July
\n21, 1998 by the Japan Forum on International Relations and the
\nChina Institute of Contemporary International Relations. The
\nviews expressed in the article are personal. This is the first of
\ntwo articles.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has endorsed a
\nconcept paper on how to tackle the political, security and
\nterritorial issues in the Asia-Pacific region through a three-
\nstage \"gradual evolutionary approach\".<\/p>\n
The three stages of the approach are \"promotion of Confidence-
\nBuilding Measures\", \"development of Preventive Diplomacy\" and
\n\"development of Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms\".<\/p>\n
There was no timeframe given to achieving each stage. Neither
\nwas there a clear indication whether the three stages were to be
\nworked out in sequence or undertaken gradually and evolutionarily
\nbut simultaneously.<\/p>\n
However, the three stages could, in theory, be undertaken
\nsimultaneously although gradually and evolutionarily.<\/p>\n
In its second and fourth meetings, the ARF gave some
\nguidelines that \"where subject matters at the Confidence-Building
\nMeasures and Preventive Diplomacy stages overlap, such matters
\ncan proceed in tandem with the Confidence-Building Measures
\nstage\". There was, however, no relationship mentioned between the
\nthree stages.<\/p>\n
In fact, a similar relationship could be made between the
\nthree stages, all of which could be identified not as subsequent
\nstages but merely as issues of somewhat different character but
\nhaving close links one to another.<\/p>\n
The concept paper enumerated the first and second stages in
\nterms of short, medium and long-term goals, but there was no
\nmention or enumeration of the third stage, namely whether it
\nshould also be looked upon in terms of short, medium and long-
\nterm goals.<\/p>\n
Some of the topics referred to in short and medium-term
\nConfidence-Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy were also
\ndealt with in the South China Sea Workshops (SCSW) on Managing
\nPotential Conflicts, where some progress has been made, albeit
\nbetween and among South China Sea participants. It should be
\nnoted that not all participants of the SCSW are members of the
\nARF, such as Taiwan, and not all members of the ARF are
\nparticipants in the SCSW, such as the United States, Japan,
\nAustralia.<\/p>\n
The ARF's short-term CBMs included, among other things, the
\ngoal to formulate a set of basic principles to ensure a common
\nunderstanding and approach to interstate relations in the region.<\/p>\n
Indeed, as early as 1991, the second SCSW in Bandung, West
\nJava, agreed that South China Sea issues would be settled
\npeacefully, meaning that force or threat of force should not be
\nused, that parties to the disputes should exercise restraint and
\nthat parties should develop cooperative programs and projects
\nregardless of the territorial disputes. These basic principles
\nwere in fact precursors to the principles adopted by the
\nAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at its Manila
\nDeclaration on the South China Sea in 1992.<\/p>\n
The short-term CBMs also included the adaptation of
\ncomprehensive security. Indeed, since its early inception in
\n1990, the SCSW had agreed to manage potential conflicts in the
\nSouth China Sea through promotion of dialogs, Confidence-Building
\nMeasures and designing cooperative programs and projects, on
\nwhich all participants could agree and could participate in their
\nimplementation. This was definitely looked upon as the embodiment
\nof a comprehensive approach to security.<\/p>\n
Like the need of the ARF to develop transparencies which
\ninclude dialogue on security perception, the SCSW had since the
\nvery beginning discussed the territorial, jurisdictional,
\npolitical and security issues in the South China Sea.<\/p>\n
Several workshops were devoted to these purposes. But such
\ndiscussions have now stalled because of the reluctance of some
\nparticipants to deal with the matter at this stage, arguing that
\nthey were not mandated to deal with these issues because they
\nwere so sensitive. But the participants had had better
\nunderstanding of the positions of each claimant in the South
\nChina Sea.<\/p>\n
With regard to the ARF's need to be transparent about defense
\npublications, participation in the United Nations (UN)
\nconventional arms register, enhanced contacts including high
\nlevel visits and recreational activities, exchanges between
\nmilitary academies, staff colleges and training, observers and
\nmilitary exercises, and annual seminars for defense officials and
\nmilitary officers in selected international security issues most,
\nif not all, of those Confidence-Building Measures have been
\ndiscussed at one time or another at the SCSW.<\/p>\n
Indeed, the Workshop in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, in 1994
\nthoroughly discussed the need not to expand the existing military
\npresence in the multilaterally contested South China Sea islands,
\nreefs and rocks.<\/p>\n
The Workshop in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, in 1995 also
\ndiscussed thoroughly the need for transparency by developing
\ncontacts between local military and administrative officials,
\neither by mutual visits or joint recreational activities. Again,
\nthe discussion on these issues have slowed down since some
\nparticipants considered that the workshops was not mandated to
\ndiscuss these matters.<\/p>\n
It should be noted, however, that most of the occupied South
\nChina Sea islands, reefs and rocks in the Spratly group are
\n\"closed\" areas, not open to public visitors. The only exception
\nis those under Malaysian occupation. Despite these difficulties,
\nhowever, the SCSW still has a consensus to discuss the
\nConfidence-Building Measures. In fact, some participants argue
\nthat the continuation of the workshops is already a Confidence-
\nBuilding Measures in itself.<\/p>\n
On Preventive Diplomacy, the ARF concept paper in the short
\nrun stated the need: to develop a set of guidelines for the
\npeaceful settlement of disputes, taking into account the UN
\nCharter and ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation; promote the
\nrecognition and acceptance of the purposes and principles of the
\ntreaty; and seek the endorsement of the ASEAN declaration on the
\nSouth China Sea.<\/p>\n
As I indicated above, the SCSW had already issued a statement
\nto this effect at its second workshop in Bandung in 1991.<\/p>\n
However, because all claimants in the multiple-claimed area in
\nthe South China Sea, except Taiwan, have adopted the UN
\nConvention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982, they should
\nagree to the dispute settlement mechanism provided by UNCLOS and
\nthe UN Charter, including the use of a third-party mechanism,
\nsuch as good offices, mediation, arbitration or even
\nadjudication, by using the International Tribunal for the Law of
\nthe Sea in Hamburg and the International Court of Justice in the
\nHague.<\/p>\n
It should be noted that there is now a growing willingness in
\nthe Asia-Pacific region to go to the International Court of
\nJustice, as Indonesia and Malaysia did to resolve their dispute
\nover the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands, and by Malaysia and
\nSingapore in their dispute over a tiny rock in the strait of
\nSingapore (Horsbourgh lighthouse).<\/p>\n
The claimants to the Spratly islands, reefs and rocks should
\nbe willing to go to the international courts or use other third-
\nparty dispute settlement mechanisms for their territorial,
\nmaritime and other disputes if they cannot find a solution among
\nthemselves within a reasonable period, say within five years.<\/p>\n
With regard to the ARF concept on the Southeast Asian Nuclear
\nWeapons Free Zone, seminars\/workshops on peacekeeping issues, and
\nexchange of information and experience relating to the UN
\npeacekeeping operations, the SCSW had never thoroughly discussed
\nthe matter.<\/p>\n
However, on maritime security cooperation, the SCSW has
\nalready discussed a number of issues. They have established a
\nGroup of Experts Meetings (GEM) on the matters and a number of
\nTechnical Working Groups (TWGs), such as those listed below.
\n* A TWG on Marine Scientific Research (MSR), which has met five
\ntimes, in Manila, Singapore, Jakarta, Hanoi and Cebu. A GEM on
\nbiodiversity also met in Cebu, and a workshop on training program
\non biodiversity has taken place in Singapore.<\/p>\n
The TWG on MSR formulated three cooperative projects which are
\nready for implementation -- a study on biodiversity in the South
\nChina Sea, a study on sea level and tide monitoring in the South
\nChina Sea within the context of climatic change, and preparing a
\ndatabase for exchange of information and networking among
\nscientists.
\n* A TWG on Marine Environmental Protection (MEP) has met in
\nHangzhou and Haikou and a GEM on MEP has also been convened in
\nPhnom Penh.<\/p>\n
This TWG agreed on a project on training programs for
\necosystem monitoring in the South China Sea. It has also
\ndiscussed various other cooperative efforts on marine
\nenvironmental protection in the South China Sea, such as the
\nexchange of documentation and environmental legislation among the
\nSouth China Sea governments and authorities.
\n* A TWG on Safety of Navigation, Shipping and Communication
\n(SNSC) has met in Jakarta and Bandar Sri Begawan, and its GEM on
\nhydrographic data and information exchange has met in Kuching,
\nMalaysia, and a GEM on training of mariners has also met in
\nSingapore.<\/p>\n
The TWG on SNSC agreed to concentrate on four programs of
\nactivities: hydrographic data and mapping to be coordinated by
\nTaiwan, marine environmental protection to be coordinated by
\nChina, illegal activities at sea and search and rescue to be
\ncoordinated by Malaysia; and promotion of training of mariners to
\nbe coordinated by Singapore.
\n* A TWG on Resources Assessment and ways of development has met
\nin Jakarta and decided to concentrate its activities on three
\nspecific subjects: studying the potential of hydrocarbon
\nresources to be coordinated by Indonesia, studies on hard
\nminerals to be coordinated by Vietnam, and studies on living
\nresources to be coordinated by Thailand.<\/p>\n
In fact, Thailand has prepared a proposal on stock assessment
\nin the South China Sea which is now under consideration in the
\nworkshop process. There was also a general agreement that a Joint
\nDevelopment or joint cooperation concept could be undertaken in
\ndisputed areas.<\/p>\n
There are already two joint development agreements in the
\nSouth China Sea, namely between Malaysia and Vietnam and between
\nMalaysia and Thailand. Although the Joint Development concept
\nmeans different things to different countries, there is a
\nwillingness to study this concept further.<\/p>\n
A special Study Group on Joint Development in the South China
\nSea was convened in Vientiane on June 16\/June 17, 1998, to look
\ninto various models of Joint Development around the world with a
\nview to seeing what could be adopted in the South China Sea area.<\/p>\n
With regard to the medium and long term goals of the ARF,
\nthere have also been many similar activities between the SCSW and
\nthe ARF initiatives.<\/p>\n
On Confidence-Building Measures, for instance, programs on
\nmaritime information databases, a cooperative approach to sea
\nlines of communication, the establishment of zones of cooperation
\nin areas such as the South China Sea, have already been the
\nsubject of many meetings in the SCSW. On Preventive Diplomacy,
\nexploring ways and devices and means to prevent conflicts is one
\nof the major concerns of the SCSW through promoting dialog,
\npromoting Confidence-Building Measures and devising specific
\nprojects for cooperation.<\/p>\n
Studies on sea level and climate monitoring systems,
\nprotection of the marine environment and joint MSRs in the South
\nChina Sea have already reached an advanced stage in the SCSW,
\nwhich the ARF mechanism could and should support.<\/p>\n
Dr. Hasjim Djalal is an Ambassador at Large for the Law of the
\nSea and Maritime affairs and also the initiator of the South
\nChina Sea Workshop.<\/p>\n
Window: The claimants to the Spratly islands, reefs and rocks should
\nbe willing to go to the international courts or use other third-
\nparty dispute settlement mechanisms for their territorial,
\nmaritime and other disputes if they cannot find a solution among
\nthemselves within a reasonable period, say within five years.<\/p>",
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