{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1403321,
        "msgid": "preventive-diplomacy-in-aisa-pacific-1447893297",
        "date": "1998-08-27 00:00:00",
        "title": "Preventive diplomacy in Aisa-Pacific",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Preventive diplomacy in Aisa-Pacific By Hasjim Djalal This is the second of two articles based on a paper presented at the International Symposium on Preventive Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region, jointly organized in Beijing from July 20 to July 21, 1998, by the Japan Forum on International Relations and the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations. The views expressed in this article are personal.",
        "content": "<p>Preventive diplomacy in Aisa-Pacific<\/p>\n<p>By Hasjim Djalal<\/p>\n<p>This is the second of two articles based on a paper presented<br>\nat the International Symposium on Preventive Diplomacy in the<br>\nAsia-Pacific region, jointly organized in Beijing from July 20 to<br>\nJuly 21, 1998, by the Japan Forum on International Relations and<br>\nthe China Institute of Contemporary International Relations. The<br>\nviews expressed in this article are personal.<\/p>\n<p>JAKARTA (JP): Implementing programs and projects has become a<br>\nmajor problem at both the South China Sea Workshops (SCSW) and<br>\nthe ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), even though they have been agreed<br>\nupon.<\/p>\n<p>For some years, there was difficulty in the SCSW in the<br>\nimplementation of programs and projects not only due to financial<br>\nreasons but also due to political and legal considerations.<\/p>\n<p>Some participants felt that implementation of specific<br>\nprojects by governments or authorities may involve territorial<br>\ndisputes, despite the fact that the SCSW had long agreed that the<br>\nimplementation should not prejudice any territorial or<br>\njurisdictional claims.<\/p>\n<p>Fortunately, the eighth meeting of the SCSW in Puncak, West<br>\nJava, in December 1997 agreed to concentrate and to begin the<br>\nprocess of implementation. The participants also agreed to ask<br>\ntheir respective authorities to specify and quantify their<br>\ncontribution to the implementation of the projects, either in<br>\nterms of expertise, facilities or finance.<\/p>\n<p>In addition, already since its fourth workshop in Surabaya,<br>\nEast Java, in August 1993, the SCSW had agreed that \"non-South<br>\nChina Sea states and other regional or global organizations would<br>\nbe invited, if necessary, to be involved and to participate in<br>\nthe realization of specific projects of cooperation\".<\/p>\n<p>The ARF would be able to cooperate and help the SCSW in this<br>\nprocess of implementation because by so-doing, the ARF would be<br>\nhelping itself.<\/p>\n<p>It is, therefore, clear that most, if not all, of the process<br>\nof Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy, as<br>\nenvisaged by the ARF, have already been carried out or are being<br>\ndiscussed in SCSW.<\/p>\n<p>It should be clear that some cooperation and coordination<br>\nwould have to be undertaken between the SCSW as an informal<br>\nmechanism and the ARF as a formal mechanism. Indonesia's Minister<br>\nof Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas already recognized this issue when<br>\nhe opened the eighth workshop in Puncak in December 1997.<\/p>\n<p>In fact, ARF had also recognized this when it repeatedly<br>\n\"noted the positive contribution made by the workshop on Managing<br>\nPotential Conflict in the South China Sea\", and expressed the<br>\nneed to be apprised of the activities of the SCSW through the<br>\ncurrent chairman of the Tract One activities, who will be the<br>\nmain link between Tract One and Tract Two activities. It is time<br>\nnow that the ARF should also involve the work of the SCSW in its<br>\nactivities and, if possible, to mutually support each other and<br>\navoid duplication of activities.<\/p>\n<p>The traditional ARF wisdom now is that the development of<br>\nConflict Resolution Mechanism is not something for the immediate<br>\nfuture, although it is the \"eventual goals\" of the ARF. The ARF<br>\nis stuck with the principles of \"graduality\", \"evolutionary\" and<br>\nat \"a phase comfortable to all participants\".<\/p>\n<p>This is a cautious attitude and may be a wise one up to this<br>\npoint. However, history is full of examples that being too wise<br>\nand too cautious may, in the end, be too late to avert any<br>\npotential conflict from worsening and erupting into unmanageable<br>\nproportion.<\/p>\n<p>While the mood in the Asia-Pacific region is good and the<br>\natmosphere for cooperation is conducive, and while time is<br>\n\"plenty\", the ARF should begin to work more seriously into the<br>\ndevelopment of Conflict Resolution Mechanism, namely to find out<br>\nand devise a mechanism that would be suitable to the Asia-Pacific<br>\nregion for now and for the future.<\/p>\n<p>The future situation in the Asia-Pacific region in some<br>\naccounts is still very fluid. Only in July, 1997, the fourth ARF<br>\nin Subang Jaya, Malaysia, applauded that \"the spread of<br>\nprosperity (in the Asia-Pacific region) has laid a solid<br>\nfoundation for political stability in the region \".<\/p>\n<p>Now, just one year later, many countries in the region are in<br>\nfinancial and economic turmoil, while their political and<br>\nsecurity implications to the Asia-Pacific region as a whole have<br>\nnot yet been fully comprehended. It is still to be observed<br>\nwhether the financial and economic crisis now in the West Pacific<br>\nwould strengthen or weaken the Asia-Pacific fabric of cooperation<br>\nand cohesion.<\/p>\n<p>After more than eight years attempting to informally manage<br>\npotential conflicts in the South China Sea through the promotion<br>\nof cooperation within the context of promoting Confidence<br>\nBuilding Measures and Preventive Diplomacy as generally<br>\nunderstood, a few lessons can be drawn as follows.<\/p>\n<p>* Bigger countries in the region should be mindful of the views<br>\nof their neighbors, especially the smaller ones. The bigger<br>\ncountries should be careful so that they are not perceived to be<br>\ndominating or bullying their smaller neighbors.<\/p>\n<p>* Attempts should be made to broaden the participants in<br>\ncooperative programs and deepen the areas of cooperation, while<br>\nat the same time, promote growth of the regional states. The more<br>\nthe cooperative effort develop economic contents for mutual<br>\nbenefits, the more likely the effort to be more successful. The<br>\napproach should be inclusive rather than exclusive.<\/p>\n<p>* There should be more emphasis on regional and common interests.<br>\nThe countries of the region should learn how to pursue their<br>\nnational interests within their regional harmony. In fact, they<br>\nshould perceive the pursuit of regional interests as parts of<br>\ntheir national interests.<\/p>\n<p>* There should be a gradual progression of the concept of<br>\nnational resilience to the promotion of the concept of regional<br>\nresilience and regional cohesion. The ASEAN's positive<br>\nexperiences in this regard have been very instructive.<\/p>\n<p>* The countries in the region should be less sensitive to the<br>\nconcept of national sovereignty, since more and more issues which<br>\nin the past might arguably be of a national character, now they<br>\nare becoming more and more regional and having more regional<br>\nimplications -- such as environmental issues, some domestic<br>\npolitical stability issues and even some monetary and financial<br>\nissues, as shown recently in Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n<p>* Within the true sense of oriental good neighbor, the countries<br>\nin the region should be able to be helpful to the neighbors in<br>\nneed if required.<\/p>\n<p>* The countries in the region should avoid an arms race among<br>\nthemselves. In fact, they should be able to coordinate their<br>\ndefense need, thus bolstering regional harmony and transparency.<\/p>\n<p>* Major external powers, wherever possible and practicable,<br>\nshould support the development of a constructive atmosphere in<br>\nthe region for peace, stability and progress.<\/p>\n<p>* Countries in the region should exercise preventive diplomacy by<br>\npreventing disputes from becoming open-armed conflicts or by<br>\npreventing a conflict from spreading or aggravating.<\/p>\n<p>* Countries in the region should develop cooperative efforts so<br>\nthat potential conflicts could be managed by converting them to<br>\nactual cooperation, since any potential conflict also contains in<br>\nitself elements for cooperation.<\/p>\n<p>* Countries in the region should develop various fora for dialog,<br>\neither bilateral or multilateral, formal or informal. The various<br>\nfora for dialog should hopefully, in the end, be able to produce<br>\na set of agreed codes of conduct for the region.<\/p>\n<p>* Countries should pursue various avenues of peaceful settlement<br>\nof disputes through negotiation, either bilateral if the disputes<br>\nare bilateral, or multilateral if the disputes are multilateral.<\/p>\n<p>* Third-party mechanism for disputes settlement should also be<br>\nexplored and utilized, such as good offices, mediation,<br>\narbitration and even, if necessary, adjudication through the<br>\ninternational court of justice or law of the sea tribunal. The<br>\nASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation had already formulated<br>\ncertain mechanism for dispute settlement among ASEAN countries. A<br>\nnew mechanism for the Asia-Pacific region as a whole should be<br>\nconsidered, either by drawing from the treaty or from other<br>\nmodels.<\/p>\n<p>* The countries in the region should attempt to settle their<br>\nland, maritime and jurisdictional boundaries as soon as possible<br>\nand respect the agreed boundaries. They should not settle<br>\nboundary problems through unilateral enactment of national<br>\nlegislation because enacting legislation tends to harden a<br>\nposition rather than enabling the parties to seek a solution.<\/p>\n<p>* In some disputed areas, the application of he Joint Development<br>\nconcept might be useful as long as the zone of the dispute is or<br>\ncan be identified.<\/p>\n<p>* While encouraging Tract One activities in the Asia-Pacific<br>\nregion to be more responsive and imaginative to deal with the<br>\npotential conflict, more discussion by the Tract Two, including<br>\nby academics and think tanks could also be helpful.<\/p>\n<p>* The interests of nonregional countries should be taken into<br>\naccount, and their potential contribution to avoid conflict or<br>\npotential conflict in the region should not be discarded<br>\naltogether.<\/p>\n<p>Dr. Hasjim Djalal is an Ambassador at Large for the Law of the<br>\nSea and Maritime affairs and also the initiator of the South<br>\nChina Sea Workshop.<\/p>",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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