{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1518095,
        "msgid": "power-sharing-could-be-a-key-to-stability-1447893297",
        "date": "1997-06-17 00:00:00",
        "title": "Power sharing could be a key to stability",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Power sharing could be a key to stability By Makmur Keliat SURABAYA (JP): The outcome of the election has conveyed disturbing signals. On the one hand, there is continuity. This has been shown by Golkar's incontestable position. Though the United Development Party (PPP) performed better in the election, Golkar is unmatched by any numeric measure. Therefore, it is impossible to expect that PPP would play a significant role in the House of Representatives compared to Golkar.",
        "content": "<p>Power sharing could be a key to stability<\/p>\n<p>By Makmur Keliat<\/p>\n<p>SURABAYA (JP): The outcome of the election has conveyed<br>\ndisturbing signals. On the one hand, there is continuity. This<br>\nhas been shown by Golkar's incontestable position. Though the<br>\nUnited Development Party (PPP) performed better in the election,<br>\nGolkar is unmatched by any numeric measure. Therefore, it is<br>\nimpossible to expect that PPP would play a significant role in<br>\nthe House of Representatives compared to Golkar.<\/p>\n<p>While Golkar and the PPP gained a higher percentage of the<br>\nvotes compared to the previous election in 1992, the conflict-<br>\nridden Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) has become a great<br>\nloser. But it is difficult to say with certainty whether the<br>\nelection has signaled a fundamental political realignment in<br>\nfavor of Golkar at the cost of PDI.<\/p>\n<p>It is most likely that Golkar's landslide victory and the<br>\nlarger number of seats gained by the PPP was mainly due to<br>\npsychological factors on the eve of the violence-marred election.<br>\nSupporters of the government-ousted PDI leader Megawati,<br>\nparticularly those with a Christian background, seem to have<br>\nvoted for Golkar, while the rest voted for PPP rather than for<br>\nthe government-backed PDI chairman Soerjadi. As such, there has<br>\nbeen no significant change.<\/p>\n<p>The 1997 election results are similar to the previous<br>\nelection. Regardless of the fact that PDI obtained a larger<br>\npercentage of the votes in 1992 compared to what it gained in<br>\n1987, at the time Golkar still dominated the House of<br>\nRepresentatives. In short, Golkar is still at the top of the<br>\nlist, followed by PPP and PDI.<\/p>\n<p>But there has also been a sign of change. For the first time<br>\nin the history of the New Order, the election has been tarnished<br>\nby the outburst of frenzy, as shown by the riots in Madura. As a<br>\nresult, new polls are to be held in several parts of the area.<br>\nOther new phenomenon has been the PPP's assertiveness. Despite<br>\nthe fact that PPP's leader Ismail Hasan Metareum is not a<br>\nflamboyant character, PPP protested the election results and<br>\nrefused to accept the outcome of the election in some places on<br>\ngrounds of vote-rigging. Amid this situation, PDI has released a<br>\nstatement that it may pull out of the House of Representatives.<\/p>\n<p>Based on the assumption that only Megawati's camp is not in<br>\nthe cohort of the election, one could say that all these facts<br>\nhave portrayed a shattered consensus at the elite level. While<br>\nthe government has said that the election has been held<br>\n\"peacefully\", \"orderly\" and \"smoothly\", PDI and PPP seem to have<br>\ntaken a different stance. This could pose a serious challenge to<br>\nthe New Order regime.<\/p>\n<p>First, for developing countries, consensus at the elite level<br>\nis decisive in maintaining stability. Malaysia, for example,<br>\nsuffered a violent conflict in 1969 due to the lack of consensus<br>\nbetween Malayan and Chinese elite. The lack of consensus at the<br>\nelite level spilled over into the people and turned into a bloody<br>\nconflict.<\/p>\n<p>Another challenge relates to the presumption that the election<br>\nwould become a sound solution to vulnerable stability, primarily<br>\ndue to the violence that occurred before the election. This<br>\npresumption seems not to have come true. The election seems to<br>\nhave augmented the problem rather than solved the problem itself.<br>\nThis could have a negative effect on economic development in<br>\nIndonesia, particularly if the situation lingers on.<\/p>\n<p>At this crucial stage, the role that will be played by the<br>\nArmed Forces (ABRI) would also be pivotal. ABRI is a very real<br>\npolitical force in Indonesia. Not only is ABRI equipped with<br>\nweapons, it is also one of the pillars preserving the New Order<br>\nregime. This being the case, one could say that the attitude<br>\nshown by ABRI -- even if in the form of inaction -- would be of<br>\nimportance in determining the sustainability of the political<br>\nsystem. It could either aggravate the existing situation or have<br>\nthe opposite effect.<\/p>\n<p>It is in this light of political fluidity that the New Order<br>\nregime needs to launch sincere political reforms. It is likely<br>\nthat impressive economic development in the past 30 years has<br>\ngenerated more articulate groups and this, in turn, has created a<br>\ndrive for change and a demand for new consensus. One of the<br>\nlogical consequences of the remarkable economic growth has been<br>\nthat the government can no longer assume that people are myopic.<br>\nPeople have become more knowledgeable and demanded more say in<br>\nthe decision making process, especially in the urban areas.<\/p>\n<p>Therefore, reforming the political system and improving the<br>\nquality of Indonesian democracy seem to be necessary. In this<br>\ncontext, there are two important points which need to be<br>\nconsidered before launching political reforms. First, we need to<br>\ndefine and understand democracy more as a method rather than a<br>\nform.<\/p>\n<p>This means that there must be an institutional arrangement in<br>\nwhich individuals, interest groups and political parties abiding<br>\nby the rules of the game are free to compete in the political<br>\nprocess. If an elected member of parliament can be recalled<br>\nbecause of his criticism of government policy, then it is certain<br>\nthat democracy is understood more as a form rather than method.<\/p>\n<p>Second, democracy is characterized not by majority rule but by<br>\nminority rule. As Robert A. Dahl (1963) said, not all groups are<br>\ninterested in every aspect of public policy since they have<br>\ndifferent concerns. Accordingly, democracy should not be<br>\nunderstood as a majority rule but a system in which all the<br>\nactive and legitimate groups in the population can freely<br>\narticulate their interest and voice their opinion, especially at<br>\ncrucial stages affecting their lives.<\/p>\n<p>In Indonesia, the above points imply that the government needs<br>\nto accept an idea of power sharing instead of power<br>\nconcentration. This is not an easy task. The problem is how to<br>\nconvince the government that the idea is not a menace but a key<br>\nto stability.<\/p>\n<p>The writer is a teacher at the Faculty of Social and Political<br>\nSciences, Airlangga University, Surabaya.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/power-sharing-could-be-a-key-to-stability-1447893297",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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