Power rivalry is Asia's evil<\/p>\n
By Onghokham<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): We are now watching leadership rivalry befalling
\ntwo organizations. Within both the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the
\nIndonesian Democratic Party (PDI) the legitimately elected
\nleadership is being challenged by claims of contending leaders.<\/p>\n
For the moment the rival leadership in both organizations do
\nnot look promising and is no threat to either the present
\nleadership of Abdurrahman Wahid of the NU Moslem socio-religious
\norganization or Megawati Soekarnoputri of the PDI political
\nparty. However, the rise of rival leadership within one
\norganization is an interesting cultural phenomenon.<\/p>\n
Every organization, whether it is a state, government,
\npolitical party or whatever, always has some dissenting members,
\na group with different opinions, interests or ambitions, within
\nits leadership. In modern countries this is usually found in the
\nform of loyal oppositions and sometimes when things get really
\nout of control this dissenting group splits the organization and
\na new organization is found.<\/p>\n
Is the rise of rival centers of power and legitimacy within an
\norganization a typical or even a Southeast Asian phenomenon?<\/p>\n
According to some historians like M.Addam and others this
\nseems to be the case. According to these historians, next to the
\ngreat centers of Southeast Asian \"palace-capitals\" such as
\nMajapahit, Ayuthia, Ava or Angkor Vat, there was always a rival
\n\"royal\" or even rebel \"princely\" capital contending for
\nlegitimate and ultimate power. Majapahit, for instance, had Daha
\nfor a contender.<\/p>\n
Indonesia's classical example of a contending center was the
\nexistence of the four keraton (royal centers) in Central Java:
\nThe sunan and mangkunegaran (both rulers) in Surakarta and the
\nsultanate and Paku Alam in Yogyakarta. In total there were five
\nkeraton: Kasepuhan, Kanoman, Kecerbonan, Kepatihan,
\nand Keprabon but since the beginning of the 19th century they
\nwere divested of all political power yet retained their adat
\n(traditional) social-cultural functions and therefore were still
\nof some importance.<\/p>\n
However, the Central Javanese keraton all originated from the
\nsingle Mataram dynasty and sunan of Central Java (around
\nYogyakarta-Surakarta) area.<\/p>\n
In 1755 the one single kingdom of Mataram, founded in the late
\n16th century, was divided among two claimants of the throne: the
\nlegitimate sunan of Surakarta and the newly recognized,
\nlegitimate claimant, Prince Mangkubumi who became the first
\nsultan of Yogyakarta. Both were of the same dynasty and were
\nclosely related. Then a few years later another rebel prince --
\nalso closely related to both sunan and sultan -- Raden Mas Sahid
\nwas pacified by being granted an independent princedom:
\nMangkunegaran, in the town of Surakarta.<\/p>\n
Although the original rivals were sunan and sultan eventually
\nmangkunegaran, which proved to be a very vigorous princely
\ndynasty -- in fact until now -- joined in all the rivalry to
\nbecome the number one keraton.<\/p>\n
The Dutch prevented all physical confrontation but they could
\nnot prevent cultural and social rivalries which continue until
\ntoday in dancing, music, batik and other cultural and art
\nactivities.<\/p>\n
When Thomas Stamford Raffles ruled Java between 1811 to 1816,
\nhe faced a recalcitrant Sultan of Yogyakarta. The English
\nlieutenant-governor of Java stormed the sultan's keraton and
\nexiled him. Raffles later found the arrangement of power split in
\nSurakarta between the sunan and mangkunegaran who watched each
\nother and reported on each other as very useful. Hence, Raffles
\ncreated the Paku Alam in Yogyakarta, who was head prince of the
\nYogyakarta-Mataram branch.<\/p>\n
As we have seen from the examples above, rival centers can
\narise from internal dynamics of a kingdom or can even be brought
\ninto existence because of outside manipulations. In the case of
\nthe traditional polities such as Cirebon and Central-Javanese
\ncourts they can continue to exist far beyond their original
\nfunctions. During colonial rule, perhaps due to this special
\nhistorical circumstances, the rival centers were able to persist.
\nMeanwhile the physical rivalry of violence became one of cultural
\ncompetition and rivalry.<\/p>\n
When Indonesians started to have modern political
\norganizations, the dissenting tradition, not surprisingly, again
\nfound itself in contending centers. To some extent the so-called
\nGreen Sarekat Islam (Islam elements) and its rival Red Sarekat
\nIslam (communist elements) were contending organizations bearing
\nthe same name.<\/p>\n
A better example of this phenomenon was given by the split
\nbetween the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) of Sukarno-Sartono
\nversus the PNI of Hatta-Syahrir. No real principles of an
\nideological nature were involved here. But the differences were
\nthings like style or small technicalities.<\/p>\n
As far as the history of the republic is concerned the last
\nreal big issue of contending power was the years of transition
\nbetween the Old Order and the New Order governments (1965-67).
\nEven the names of the rivals suggest the nature of its rivalry
\nand competition for supreme legitimacy and power. Recently we see
\nit has risen again among NU and PDI.<\/p>\n
Interestingly enough NU is one of the oldest Indonesian
\norganizations dating back from pre-independence days and is
\nusually referred to as an orthodox \"native\" Moslem organization
\nbased in rural areas. Hence, NU is thought of as traditional.
\nWhereas PDI claims to be a modern political party.<\/p>\n
In both organizations, however, we do find the phenomenon of
\nrival leaderships. Indeed, this should not surprise us at all for
\nwe have seen how typical this phenomenon is for expressing
\nIndonesian dissenting views.<\/p>\n
But why are Indonesian dissenting views expressed by rivalry
\nin leadership rather than in other ways such as secession or
\nloyal opposition?<\/p>\n
One could put this to political behavior, like the scourge of
\nlatah (duplicating) ailments or other action that gets the
\nparties nowhere. One could also say that culturally and socially
\nwe always focus on the center and it is this framework of
\ncentrist thinking that even in opposition one makes a rival
\ncenter rather than a movement for change and reform. There is too
\nmuch focused on personalities, hence the rival centers are
\nrivalries between two charismatic leaders.<\/p>\n
However, this form of opposition, the setting up of a rival
\ncenter, is also caused by the loosely organized polities of today
\nwhich are easily exploited by would- be opponents in the current
\nleadership. Nothing is easier than to withdraw from the
\ninstitution and set up a rival organization.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, today's cultural norms which do not recognize
\nopposition or the absence of rules to accommodate dissenting
\nviews further encourages this sort of political behavior.<\/p>\n
The writer is a senior historian and a former professor at the
\nUniversity of Indonesia.<\/p>",
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