Post Cold War political dust needs time to settle<\/p>\n
By Jusuf Wanandi<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The triangular relationship between the three
\ngreat powers in the Asia Pacific -- China, Japan and the U.S. --
\nis crucial for stability, peace and prosperity in the region. The
\nbilateral relations of these countries, however, are also
\nimportant.<\/p>\n
U.S.-Japan alliance is the anchor for the region's stability.
\nWhen the treaty was renewed, with the Clinton-Hashimoto
\nDeclaration, it enable both nations to deal with the strategic
\nenvironment in the post-Cold War era.<\/p>\n
The two economies are now integrated and an imbalance in trade
\nis unlikely to undo the relationship, although Japan cannot take
\nthis for granted. Economic cooperation is important to this
\nbilateral relationship.<\/p>\n
The U.S.-Japan collaboration is important for dealing with
\npotential crises in the future but the most important link for
\navoiding tension and conflict in the region is between the U.S.
\nand China.<\/p>\n
Flash points in the Asia-Pacific could turn into nasty
\nconflicts. There is the problem of nuclear proliferation in North
\nKorea and possible aggression, the use of force in the Taiwan
\nStraits if Taiwan declares independence and the possibility of
\nclashes due to overlapping sovereignty claims in the South China
\nSea.<\/p>\n
The resolution or stabilization of these potential conflicts
\nwill really depend, to a large extent, on the strategic relations
\nbetween the U.S. and China. This does not mean that they can
\nsolve all those problems by themselves. But their willingness to
\nfind a resolution are of paramount importance to finally
\nresolving those tensions.<\/p>\n
This important bilateral relationship is now full of
\nuncertainty because both sides are faced with domestic
\nconstraints and challenges that are hampering the development of
\nnormal relations.<\/p>\n
On one side, the U.S. domestic scene antiChinese feelings have
\narisen and China is being viewed as a potential new \"demon\",
\nreplacing the former Soviet Union. Behind the moves are right-
\nwing legislators, human rights advocates, religious rights groups
\nand the pro-Taiwan lobby.<\/p>\n
While the president is trying to find a balance, by
\nformulating overarching strategic relations with Chinese since
\nend of 1996, his ability to develop links has been hampered by
\n\"Asia Gate\".<\/p>\n
In addition, the president has no security and foreign affairs
\nadvisors at the cabinet level who know enough about Asia. In
\ngeneral the informed elite are still Europe-oriented and he has
\nnot been willing to sacrifice too much political capital for East
\nAsia, especially for China.<\/p>\n
The debate in the U.S. on a new national security and foreign
\npolicy, following the end of the Cold War, will continue for some
\ntime before a consensus can be reached. Therefore, some
\ncapriciousness and confusion in the policy debate toward China
\nare to be expected. This calls for a lot of patience among those
\nwho have to deal with the U.S., especially regarding the nation's
\nrelationship with China.<\/p>\n
China is developing very fast economically yet it is faced
\nwith some real domestic constraints in formulating a stable,
\nconstructive and positive policy towards the U.S. There is a
\n\"Middle Kingdom\" mentality with substantial achievements made in
\nthe reforms and modernization. But China has problems with
\nknowing how to behave properly toward the U.S.<\/p>\n
It needs the U.S. as an economic partner for modernization,
\nbut the U.S.'s ideological bias and great power status also
\ncauses a lot of pressures for China. This is being compounded by
\nthe capriciousness of U.S. policies and a president who is not
\nreally focusing his attention on foreign policy, especially not
\non East Asia or China.<\/p>\n
For the region, a stable strategic relationship between the
\nU.S. and China is a prerequisite for peace and stability as well
\nas prosperity and economic dynamism in the future. This is
\nespecially so for small and medium size countries adjacent to
\nChina, such as ASEAN nations. For this reason it is imperative
\nfor the association to play a constructive role in ensuring the
\nrelationship is a stable one, however limited this contribution
\nmight be.<\/p>\n
First, ASEAN has to support the U.S. presence in East Asia
\nthrough its alliance with Japan. This functions as an anchor for
\nstability in the region. Equally important are efforts to help
\nconvince China that the Clinton-Hashimoto Declaration in early
\n1996 is not directed at the nation but is, instead, aimed at
\nensuring some limited support from the Japanese to U.S. forces in
\na potential Korean Peninsula crisis.<\/p>\n
Second, ASEAN has to support multilateral efforts toward the
\ncreation of an Asia Pacific community. These efforts are
\ncurrently undertaken by organizations such as the Asia Pacific
\nEconomic Cooperation, the ASEAN Regional Forum and complementary
\nbodies including the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council,
\nPacific Basin Economic Council and the Council for Security
\nCooperation in the Asia Pacific.<\/p>\n
The active participation and engagement of China in these
\nefforts are vital to their success. ASEAN could act as a catalyst
\nin this regard. In the near future, the association should
\nparticipate in the debate on U.S.-China relations in the U.S.
\nthrough seminars and conferences, as well as through the media.<\/p>\n
Americans need to understand that for East Asia, and
\nparticularly ASEAN, the policy of containing China will be
\ndisastrous for the region even if it could be achieved. The
\nregion is of the opinion that the best policy is to engage China.
\nThis will give China the chance to participate fully in the
\nregion and become a responsible member, as one of the great
\npowers in the Asia-Pacific. And the nation can emerge in a
\npeaceful way with the acceptance and respect of the region.<\/p>\n
The coming decade will be the time to convince China of its
\nrole in the region. After a few years of \"learning\", China has
\nnow taken up multilateralism as one of its own strategies in
\ndealing with the Asia-Pacific region. This gives ASEAN a chance
\nto continue supporting China's participation in laying down a
\nregional order and establishing an Asia-Pacific community.<\/p>\n
ASEAN understands that this will not be easy. Some zigzagging
\nin China's reactions and policies should be also expected in the
\nfuture. But ASEAN should recognize that giving China the
\nencouragement and support it needs is part of the association's
\nmission in the Asia Pacific.<\/p>\n
The writer is chairman of the supervisory board of the Center
\nfor Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.<\/p>",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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