Political parties reluctant to make leadership changes<\/p>\n
The following are excerpts of the interview with sociologist
\nDaniel Sparingga with The Jakarta Post's A. Asip Hasani on the
\nissue of political party leadership.<\/p>\n
Question: Those calling for public officials, most notably,
\nPresident Megawati Soekarnoputri, to resign from their party
\nleadership posts, fear abuse of power given the strong position
\nin the executive. Your comment?<\/p>\n
Answer: My response to this issue is ambivalent. I've observed
\nthat it is difficult, on one hand, to promote the autonomy of
\ncivil society vis-a-vis the state, while on the other hand, the
\npolitical reality in this country makes it hard to resolve the
\nproblem. But the present period of transition doesn't seem to
\nprovide the luxury of enabling both areas -- the state and civil
\nsociety -- to be strictly segregated.<\/p>\n
The New Order has caused the emergence of a leadership crisis,
\nrendering such a dual function almost unavoidable. Political
\nparties themselves, due to our weak civil society, still rely on
\ntheir central figures to boost their authority. Political
\nparties, therefore, find it difficult to give up their leaders
\nwhen they have to join... the state, particularly the executive
\nbranch of the government. The case of the Indonesian Democratic
\nParty of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) and the United Development
\nParty (PPP) are the best example, because their leaders have
\nbecome president and vice president while the two political
\nparties continue to strive for greater authority and influence.
\nMoreover, the general elections of 2004 are approaching.<\/p>\n
So the charisma of political party leaders remains very
\nsignificant to the relevant parties...<\/p>\n
Not necessarily; charisma may apply in the case of Megawati
\nand her party but it's not so relevant in the case of Hamzah Haz
\nand PPP. Both leaders, however, are consolidating factors within
\ntheir parties as well as their mass base. Replacing their leaders
\nwhile the parties are expanding their influence will obviously
\ndisturb their stability, while elections are only two-and-a-half
\nyears away.<\/p>\n
Q: Are you not worried about the possibility of power abuse stemming
\nfrom political party leaders maintaining top positions in the
\nexecutive?<\/p>\n
A: In a more democratic system using the district system (in
\nelections) the problem can be eliminated and it may not even be
\nrelevant to raise as an important political theme. In a
\ndemocratic political system, the role of political parties is
\nmerely instrumental and very superficial, meaning that their
\nvotes are not everything. But we can understand public anxiety
\nbecause in our present political framework a party leader and
\nalso chair of its central board, has a major right to votes.<\/p>\n
While the country's political system has started the process
\nof decentralization and power distribution, some political
\nparties remain unchanged and even still replicate the New Order
\npolitical system of centralization.<\/p>\n
This is a peculiar phenomenon in a political system based on
\ndemocracy, as a party chairman is actually no more important than
\na manager. Even in countries with a presidential or parliamentary
\nsystem, a party president is just a head of office or
\nadministration in charge of conference or congress arrangements.<\/p>\n
Q: You referred to the leadership crisis under the New Order. Can
\nyou elaborate?<\/p>\n
A: The New Order created a particular political system, in which
\nthe entire force of civil society was integrated into the state
\nby means of cooptation or intervention. Its direct consequence
\nwas that despite the presence of political parties other than
\nGolkar, the parties which came forth were able to do so with the
\nconsent of the state. Anybody about to emerge as a political
\nparty leader, national or local, had to secure such consent. As a
\nresult, the party heads relied on the power of the state more
\nthan on their own constituents in a bottom-up fashion.<\/p>\n
So when the multiparty system was applied following the demise
\nof the New Order, the leadership crisis became a really crucial
\nissue. Today's political parties are in dire need of turning out
\nleaders who can consolidate both their parties and the masses.
\nThat's why these parties are reluctant to give up their leaders
\nso easily. Separating them from their chiefs will be a great loss
\nto the parties themselves.<\/p>\n
But this situation should be understood as transitional in
\nnature. When party leaders later only serve as office managers,
\nthe separation will automatically be easier without causing
\ninternal upheaval.<\/p>\n
Q: The Golkar party seems better prepared. If Akbar Tandjung had to
\nabandon his chairmanship of the party, his successor might be
\nable to replace him without any significant upset. Do you agree?<\/p>\n
A: Golkar's internal system is indeed the most well-organized in
\ncomparison with other political parties. This has been the case
\nsince the New Order's inception. Its structure is more inclusive
\nand its organizational experience is more evenly spread among its
\nleaders. In spite of problems with the grassroots and members, as
\nmanagers Golkar leaders have a lot of resources and no prominent
\ndifferences among each other.<\/p>\n
Therefore, Golkar is indeed more ready for decentralization,
\nbecause the quality of the leadership below Akbar is of a similar
\ncaliber and the number is fairly large. Golkar has a longer
\nexperience and tradition, while political parties like PPP,
\nthough long established, have never been organized as a modern
\nparty.<\/p>\n
Q: Fears of power abuse refer to interparty competition for economic
\nresources within the government and also abuse of public
\nfacilities for the interests of the parties involved. What's your
\nopinion?<\/p>\n
A: Though it's not easy to claim that both are directly
\nconnected, we can theorize that before any majority exists in the
\nlegislature, money politics would be a significant part of the
\ncountry's political arena, as money helps settle unsolved factors
\ndue to the absence of a single majority. Vote transactions among
\nfactions will be very important. I think all parties realize this
\nand it increases their need to accumulate resources not only for
\nfinancing costly election campaigns but also for buying votes in
\nlegislative bargaining. And I don't see any prospect of achieving
\na single majority in the next 15 years.<\/p>\n
Q: So would it more difficult to have autonomous political parties
\nas one force of civil society while they are still very
\ncentralistic with leaders wielding broad powers?<\/p>\n
A: That's right. This is the price parties have to pay and though
\nundoubtedly figures like Megawati and Hamzah Haz will
\nrhetorically state that national interests should take priority
\nover party concerns, there will always be a conflict of
\ninterests. Similarly, their attention will be divided and the
\nopposing interests will likely be hard to reconcile.<\/p>\n
Q: So there's little we can do to promote a clean government while
\nwe have party leaders also acting as the country's executive
\nleaders?<\/p>\n
A: It will be disastrous if other political structures with
\ncontrol functions fail to develop. This involves civil society as
\nwell as public institutions like the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK),
\nministries' inspectorates general, the legislature and other
\nagencies set up for power supervision.<\/p>\n
Development of power control bodies both within the state and
\nin civil society becomes extremely important today, such as the
\nIndonesian Corruption Watch, Parliament Watch, Government Watch
\nand other nonpartisan organizations.<\/p>\n
Q: What would happen to political parties, such as PDI Perjuangan,
\nPPP, the National Mandate Party (PAN), the Crescent Star Party
\n(PBB) and the others, if their chairmen and top executives who
\nalso hold government posts were told to resign from their
\nparties?<\/p>\n
A: In a short period there would be jolts within the parties. The
\nworst consequence would that they could be thrown into disarray
\nand profound splits would occur as many would compete for vacant
\npositions. It is widely assumed -- and is indeed true -- that
\ncentral executive posts in parties, let alone chairmen, have
\ngreat authority and access to government power.<\/p>\n
Q: What do you recommend facing this dilemma?<\/p>\n
A: If the district system cannot be introduced yet in the next
\ngeneral elections (2004), the parties themselves should carry out
\npower decentralization. Actually the spirit of decentralization
\nis already in their party statutes and internal rules, but their
\ncentral boards still retain extensive authority in, for instance,
\nmaking out the lists of legislative candidates for the elections'
\nproportional system.<\/p>\n
The central boards should receive the nominees from regions
\ninstead of sponsoring candidates, let alone determining their
\norder. If a lot more central authority is distributed to regional
\nboards at various levels, the ambition to struggle for central
\nboard seats will be reduced.<\/p>",
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