{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1247664,
        "msgid": "philippines-sovereignty-or-security-1447893297",
        "date": "2002-01-21 00:00:00",
        "title": "Philippines: Sovereignty or security?",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Philippines: Sovereignty or security? Amando Doronila, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Asia News Network, Manila The participations of about 600 American troops in joint military exercises with Philippine forces in Mindanao constitutes the largest deployment of U.S. forces in the U.S.-led war on terrorism after Afghanistan. The deployment makes the Philippines the new theater of the war targeting the al-Qaeda terrorist network. The form assumed by the U.S.",
        "content": "<p>Philippines: Sovereignty or security?<\/p>\n<p>Amando Doronila, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Asia News Network,<br>\nManila<\/p>\n<p>The participations of about 600 American troops in joint<br>\nmilitary exercises with Philippine forces in Mindanao constitutes<br>\nthe largest deployment of U.S. forces in the U.S.-led war on<br>\nterrorism after Afghanistan. The deployment makes the Philippines<br>\nthe new theater of the war targeting the al-Qaeda terrorist<br>\nnetwork.<\/p>\n<p>The form assumed by the U.S. deployment in the Philippines is<br>\nless explicit than in Afghanistan. In the Philippines, the U.S.<br>\nis inserting its military presence through the mechanism of the<br>\njoint exercise called \"Balikatan,\" authorized by the Visiting<br>\nForces Agreement (VFA). The purpose, however, of the exercises is<br>\nto train Filipino troops to fight effectively terrorist<br>\norganizations linked to the al-Qaeda -- in our case the Abu<br>\nSayyaf -- with sophisticated U.S. military equipment and the<br>\nexpertise of its troops.<\/p>\n<p>The exercises, which envisage the presence of U.S. troops in<br>\ncombat areas in Mindanao, are set against the background of<br>\nPresident Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's policy supporting the U.S.<br>\nmilitary campaign against terrorists, and opening the Philippines<br>\nto longer and wider U.S. military presence than is contemplated<br>\nby the VFA. The joint exercises are planned to last between six<br>\nmonths and a year, and represent the biggest concentration of<br>\nU.S. forces on Philippine soil since the withdrawal of U.S.<br>\nmilitary bases here in 1992.<\/p>\n<p>Since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., the texture<br>\nof Philippine-U.S. military cooperation have drastically altered,<br>\nstretching the limits of the VFA and even the Mutual Defense<br>\nTreaty of 1951. These agreements form the framework in which<br>\ncooperation would be carried out for the mutual security of the<br>\nPhilippines and the United States.<\/p>\n<p>The large and long-term deployment of U.S. forces within the<br>\nframework of joint military exercises have rekindled sensitive<br>\nnationalist and constitutional issues involving Philippine<br>\nsovereignty. These issues are acquiring a highly emotional<br>\ncontent.<\/p>\n<p>The issues include: Do the exercises constitute the return of<br>\npermanent basing of U.S. forces, in violation of the<br>\nconstitutional ban? Are the U.S. forces going to engage in combat<br>\nmissions together with the Philippine forces against the Abu<br>\nSayyaf? More basically, is their deployment an infringement of<br>\nnational sovereignty or does it enhance Philippine national<br>\nsecurity and the capability of our armed forces to fight<br>\nterrorist forces and other rebellions? The last-mentioned issue<br>\nhas something to do with striking a balance between sovereignty<br>\nand security.<\/p>\n<p>This article merely crystallizes and defines the issues.<\/p>\n<p>First, these military exercises are different from those in<br>\nthe past and their function and scope were not foreshadowed by<br>\nthe VFA signed in 1998. The joint exercises contemplated a<br>\nduration of a few weeks -- not six months to a year.<\/p>\n<p>The reason for the short duration is that the pre-Sept. 11<br>\nexercises were planned on hypothetical situations. \"Balikatan\"<br>\nbrings the exercises into the heart of the combat zone against<br>\nthe Abu Sayyaf. This is one reason why \"Balikatan\" cannot be put<br>\nin a time frame and seems open-ended. The war against the Abu<br>\nSayyaf is not hypothetical, and Mindanao is an actual war zone.<\/p>\n<p>Since the exercises are intended to upgrade the fighting<br>\nskills and use of weapons of Filipino forces, and are also tied<br>\nto the policy objective of crushing the Abu Sayyaf as part of the<br>\nal-Qaeda network (as well as rescuing the American couple held<br>\nhostage by the Abu Sayyaf), first, although Filipino and U.S.<br>\nofficials have asserted that the U.S. troops will not be deployed<br>\nin combat missions, they may accompany Filipino troops in combat<br>\nzones and, that if U.S. troops are fired upon, they can react in<br>\nself defense -- meaning, shoot the enemy. With this possibility,<br>\nthe thin line between being advisers and engagement as combat<br>\ntroops can easily disappear.<\/p>\n<p>Six months to one year are a long time for military exercises,<br>\nand deployment of forces for such duration mocks the word<br>\n\"exercises\" and colors them as actual military combat operations.<br>\nThere is a big risk. If in six months or one year the Abu Sayyaf<br>\nis not crushed, such a failure is likely to reflect on the<br>\nability of both Filipino and U.S. forces to destroy the Abu<br>\nSayyaf and can invite the deployment of larger foreign forces in<br>\nthe operations.<\/p>\n<p>The extension of the war on terrorism in the Philippines or<br>\nthe opening of a new front in that war is based on the doctrine<br>\nthat was successful in demolishing the Taliban regime. Pentagon<br>\nand U.S. state department authorities call it a \"proxy\" war in<br>\nwhich countries, where there are terrorist networks, are<br>\nencouraged to fight terrorism with the assistance of U.S. weapons<br>\nand troops. This worked successfully in Afghanistan where the<br>\nU.S. used the Northern Alliance as a proxy which, of course, was<br>\nheavily backed by the power of U.S. bombings on Taliban<br>\nstrongholds.<\/p>\n<p>The possibility of the return of permanent U.S. bases is<br>\nremote and strategic thinking in Washington does not favor bases<br>\nwhich are expensive to maintain and which create nationalist<br>\npolitical issues. Long-term presence of troops does not<br>\nconstitute permanent basing, but nationalists raise the issue of<br>\nsovereignty.<\/p>\n<p>The government argues that the exercises stand on firm legal<br>\nframework and the deployment of U.S. forces in combat zones does<br>\nnot violate the Constitution. But the larger question is whether<br>\nsovereignty is a real issue. This question is linked to enhancing<br>\nnational security, and if the Republic does not have the capacity<br>\nto quell rebellions and assert its sovereignty in Abu Sayyaf<br>\nareas, what sovereignty do we have?<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/philippines-sovereignty-or-security-1447893297",
        "image": ""
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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