Philippine military gets lift from Spratlys<\/p>\n
China's encroachment onto a reef claimed by the Philippines has
\nprovided the latter's armed forces with a much needed boost.
\nFrancisco L. Roman Jr. examines the issue.<\/p>\n
The combination of the ascendancy of Corazon Aquino to the
\npresidency in 1986, and the end of the Cold War in 1989,
\nsubstantially eroded the Philippine military's traditional role
\nas the defender of the nation against both internal and external
\naggression. The communist insurgency in the Philippines has lost
\nits ideological edge and it is being treated, to a large extent,
\nas a problem of banditry. And the Philippines, without the U.S.
\nmilitary bases, is no longer a prime military target in any
\npotential global conflict.<\/p>\n
Up to 1991, the Philippine Armed Forces used to receive US$200
\nmillion in military aid from the U.S. as part of the U.S.' global
\ncontainment policy. During the Marcos years, the official line
\nitem on the defense budget reached more than $300 million in 1986
\nwhen Aquino took over. The 1990s might seem unkind to the
\nPhilippine military but the defense budget has been increasing,
\nalthough the increases have had little to do with post-Cold War
\nregional issues such as the Spratlys. In Aquino's time, probably
\nas a result of the more than half a dozen abortive coups, the
\nannual defense budget rose spectacularly, to a threefold high of
\n$1 billion by 1992, when Fidel Ramos took his turn at the helm.
\nSince then, the annual budget has increased by about 15 percent.
\nNote, however, that more than $1 billion is less than 2 percent
\nof the Philippines' GDP, compared with 5.5 percent of GDP for
\nSingapore's defense budget, or 2.7 percent for Thailand, for
\nexample.<\/p>\n
Since the 1990s, the Philippine armed forces has therefore
\nbeen trying to redefine its role and by experimenting with an
\nassortment of non-traditional social development activities,
\nincluding disaster relief and environmental protection. As an
\nexample of the latter, soldiers have been assigned to protect
\n8,000 hectares of virgin forest adjacent to the former naval base
\nin Subic Bay and to guard watershed areas in Lake Lanao, a major
\nresource of hydroelectric power for the southern island of
\nMindanao. The armed forces is also engaged in tree-planting
\nprograms, and there are plans to use military helicopters to
\nprotect forest lands from illegal loggers, whose activities
\ndeplete the forest cover, erode the soil, and create floods and
\ndrought. These activities result in desirable and even calculable
\nbenefits to society and, at the very least, make for excellent
\npublic relations by placing the military on the side of the
\nunderdog. Unfortunately, such non-traditional activities have not
\nprovided sufficient urgency to justify substantial increases in
\nthe budget of the armed forces.<\/p>\n
An incident in February this year changed this picture. This
\nwas the \"sighting\" of Chinese naval vessels, followed by the
\n\"discovery\" of an assortment of Chinese installations, such as
\nguard posts and communication facilities, already well in place,
\non one of the scattered islands in the Spratlys area. The island
\nis appropriately named \"Mischief Reef\", which the Philippines
\ncalls \"Panganiban Reef\" and which it claims as part of its
\nterritory.<\/p>\n
The Mischief Reef incident at one point received daily media
\ncoverage and television crews competed with one another to
\nbroadcast from, or as close as possible to, Mischief Reef.
\nPresident Ramos himself went on television to tell the nation
\nthat his government regarded the intrusion as a serious matter
\ninvolving national security.<\/p>\n
The Spratlys incident coincided with a another discussion in
\nthe Philippine legislature of long-standing proposals to spend an
\nadditional 50 billion pesos (about $2 billion) over a five-year
\nperiod to upgrade the nation's armed forces. For example, the
\ncurrent stock of a dozen aging F-5s can hardly compare with the
\nannounced purchases of MiG-29s by Malaysia and a further tranche
\nof F-16s by Singapore. The expenditure would be over and above
\nthe current line item on defense and, therefore, required
\nlegislative approval. The armed forces got its budget increase in
\nmid-February. One congressman, Joker P Arroyo, went on television
\nto speculate that the entire affair was merely a campaign to
\nensure passage of the bill. However, one of its chief proponents,
\nSenator Ernesto Meceda, in voting for its approval, indicated
\nthat the bill was not a \"knee-jerk\" reaction to the Spratlys
\ncrisis. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Roberto Romulo, went
\npublic to state that the issue was being resolved through \"quiet
\ndiplomacy and amicable discussions\" with the Chinese. In any
\nevent, Philippine national security no longer appears to be at
\nstake and the issue is no longer in the public eye. The Chinese
\nnaval vessels may or may not still be in Philippine waters but
\nthe installations, which were present long before they were
\n\"discovered\", are still on Mischief Reef.<\/p>\n
Where does that leave the Spratlys, at least in so far as
\ndefense implications for the Philippines are concerned? Probably
\nnowhere. Hand in hand with the increase in the military's budget
\ncame statements from the Secretary of Defense, Gen. Renato de
\nVilla, that the Philippines will focus on peaceful resolution of
\nthe Spratlys problem and that any military response will be a
\nlast resort, defensive measure. It seems unlikely that Mischief
\nReef is going to be significantly reinforced by a Philippine
\ncontingent in the near future, although naval and air
\nreconnaissance will undoubtedly continue.<\/p>\n
The increases in the Philippine defense budget, however,
\ncarries other implications unrelated to the Spratlys. For one,
\nthe Philippine military has been concerned over the law and order
\nsituation in the south, where regional autonomy for the Moslems
\nis a long-festering issue; the issue is exacerbated by the growth
\nof two Moslem groups, the Moro National Liberation Front, and the
\nlarger Moro Islamic Liberation Front, both of which maintain men-
\nat-arms. For another, the armed forces still has strong
\nproponents among its generals and colonels for the military's
\nnon-traditional activities in social development; the National
\nSecurity Council, for example, defines intelligence and defense
\nas tools for achieving broad-based, socio-economic goals of
\nequity, social justice and poverty alleviation.<\/p>\n
Furthermore, from a purely economic perspective, illegal tuna
\nfish catchers, for instance, deprive the Philippines of an
\nestimated $1 billion in revenues, which the Philippine Navy's 50-
\nodd patrol, support and transport vessels can do little to
\nimpede. So, the enhanced military budget might find immediate
\nuses other than that of resolving the dispute over the Spratlys.<\/p>\n
Dr. Francisco L Roman, Jr is Director of the Manila-based Asian
\nInstitute of Management's Policy Forum.<\/p>",
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