People have yet to adjust after a change of regime<\/p>\n
The following is the second part from an interview with Greg
\nBarton Ph.D, senior lecturer at Deakin University, Australia, who
\nis also the authorized biographer of Indonesian President
\nAbdurrahman \"Gus Dur\" Wahid.<\/p>\n
An expert on liberal Islam in Indonesia, Barton started
\nwriting the biography a long time before Gus Dur became President
\nlast October. He expects to finish the book toward the end of
\nthis year. Barton, who is a regular visitor to Indonesia, talked
\nto The Jakarta Post's Harry Bhaskara in Jakarta early this week.<\/p>\n
What are other typical elements in a country undergoing a
\nregime change?<\/p>\n
Another element is euphoria in the initial stage and a sense
\nof high expectation, followed by a period of big disappointment.
\nWe saw this very clearly with Russia.<\/p>\n
There is a natural euphoria associated with change and there
\nis a natural desire to push things ahead faster than perhaps
\nmight be the best course of action.<\/p>\n
The lesson for us is that expectation tends to be
\nunrealistically high and there is the danger that when this
\nexpectation fails, people become embittered and look for some
\nway of countering that. I think the lesson of such circumstances
\nis we need to be patient about the pace of change.<\/p>\n
I think one of the strengths of Gus Dur is his personal
\norientation toward evolutionary rather than revolutionary change.
\nRevolutionary change as a political mechanism has a very poor
\ntrack record. It almost always fails to produce what people hope
\nfor. And the aftermath is a disappointment. The cost of getting
\nthere is often very high as well.<\/p>\n
A third element is that countries that are coming out of very
\nauthoritarian rule almost invariably experience their
\ninstitutions being distorted and eroded. Individuals responsible
\nfor certain tasks in the public sector, bureaucrats and so forth,
\nhave in some ways been compromised and corrupted but even more
\ninsidiously than that the culture has been a culture that has
\nill-prepared them with the new era.<\/p>\n
An obvious problem area is the legal system that just does not
\nfunction properly. One of the sad ironies of regime change is
\nthat often its legal system that works after a fashion within
\ncertain limitations and certain prejudices and malicious intents
\nunder authoritarian rule proves to be very unsatisfactory in a
\nmore open government.<\/p>\n
Could you cite an example?<\/p>\n
In Indonesia we can see this clearly in that even though we
\nknow that in democracy we need to have ministers who are capable
\nto take initiatives, the people who are in a situation that makes
\nup government ministers today for the most part have no
\nexperience to take the initiatives.<\/p>\n
Under Soeharto it was the natural cultural orientation that
\nthe president gave you guidelines and told you what to do. So it
\nis a great irony that one of the criticisms of Gus Dur's
\ngovernment is that he is not giving enough direction.<\/p>\n
But this is not unique to Indonesia, this is another facet of
\nregime change.<\/p>\n
You said you don't subscribe to the theory of Balkanization of
\nIndonesia, what is the basis of your view?<\/p>\n
For all of the failings of Sukarno's and Soeharto's
\ngovernments, there is today in Indonesia, a sense of being
\nIndonesian. For Indonesians who were born after Soeharto became
\npresident, their first identity is Indonesian and their second
\nidentity might be religious or ethnic. This is a very positive
\nthing.<\/p>\n
There are also things that I can't put my finger on but I feel
\nin my heart to be true, like the existence of a natural
\nresilience in Indonesian society. Despite all the awful things
\nthat have happened, there is a desire to make things work.<\/p>\n
You said people need to have patience in a regime change, why
\ndo you think so?<\/p>\n
Well, there are at least three reasons.<\/p>\n
One is that a lot of awful things are happening now and it is
\nunderstandable that people want to see them stop. We would all
\nlike to see the violence in Maluku stop tomorrow. There have been
\nseveral thousand people killed already. We would like to see that
\ndeath toll stop right now, not even increase by one person. But
\nwe know that is not realistic. Yet it is a legitimate desire.<\/p>\n
Similarly if you walk around Jakarta and see people who find
\nit hard to feed their children and you say poor people should not
\nbe like this. Poor people should have enough to at least eat.
\nKids, all kids whether they come from rich families or poor
\nfamilies should go to school. But we are feeling the effect of
\nthe economic crisis still. So it is a very legitimate desire to
\nhope things will get better.<\/p>\n
The second reason, something we have touched on earlier, is
\nthe lack of experience of a regime change. We don't have an
\neffective yardstick to use in measuring the rate of progress. If
\nyou use the yardstick of international experience with Latin
\nAmerica or Eastern Europe we would see that actually the progress
\nof this government is not too bad. But we all lack this
\nexperience. Most Indonesians today were born after Soeharto came
\nto power.<\/p>\n
The third factor, is there are some individuals whether for
\nparty political reasons or because they are linked directly or
\nindirectly with the former regime who are trying to destabilize
\nthis government.<\/p>\n
They are playing upon people's natural and quite
\nunderstandable feelings of concern and impatience and they
\ninflame those concerns for their own purposes.<\/p>\n
And of course they use the language of concern for the poor,
\nconcern for change. But it is cynical and manipulative because
\nthey are not concerned for the poor. They are only concerned
\nabout their own futures and their own possibilities of being
\ntaken before a court of law or losing wealth or whatever.<\/p>\n
You touched on the military withdrawal from politics earlier,
\nhow long will it take this process to arrive at a point of no
\nreturn?<\/p>\n
The only way of being certain of this is to have a strong
\ncivilian government in place that gives no excuse for military
\nintervention. Even a fairly reform minded military if it sees a
\ncivilian government that is not performing would be tempted to
\nintervene, right or wrong.<\/p>\n
But there needs to be cultural change from the military
\nitself, a change in mindset so that over a period of years people
\nquite naturally say dwifungsi (dual function) belongs to the
\npast, that is not the future. Now we are concentrating on doing
\nprofessional duty. That takes some years, although I don't know
\nhow many years.<\/p>\n
It also takes time for interference from the counter-
\nreformation forces to be completely overcome. I think in the
\nearly years of change that will be a factor. Only over time do
\nthey begin to loose their power.<\/p>\n
I think through the course of the five-year time of Gus Dur
\nthis will be a factor but I would like to believe by the time we
\nhave the next elections, the military will accept that its role
\nis not to intervene directly in politics.<\/p>\n
How do you see Gus Dur's health?<\/p>\n
His present health is excellent. He is considerably overweight
\nfrom a medical point of view and he has a history of stroke. But
\nhis blood-pressure has been stable for some time. He is not
\nanywhere near the danger zone. And because it has been stable for
\nsome time there is every reason to expect that it will continue
\nto be stable, in which case we need not fear for another stroke.<\/p>\n
Although his health seems slightly worse perhaps than his
\npeers, his level of energy and stamina is extraordinary. He also
\nhas much more fire of intelligent and much greater power of
\nmemory than his average.<\/p>\n
Some of his critics, furious over occasional moves they
\nconsider confusing to the people, say the President can no longer
\nchange. Do you think Gus Dur can learn from his mistakes?<\/p>\n
This is a question of a relative nature. Can he make a
\ndramatic change physically and drop 20 kilograms? I don't think
\nthat will happen.<\/p>\n
He could try to be a good manager and a good administrator,
\nbut I don't think he is going to either and I don't think he
\nwill.<\/p>\n
In certain ways, Gus Dur will stay as Gus Dur. But we
\nshouldn't go to the other extreme that he won't change because
\nthere is a lot of evidence that shows here is somebody who is a
\nvery genuine individual. As part of that, he has got a very
\ngenuine humanitarian outlook and concern and a lot of personal
\nintegrity.<\/p>\n
For that reason he has been open to change. All of his life he
\nhas been a student of human nature. And his love of literature
\nand of studying politics and studying biographies make him
\nacutely aware of human nature.<\/p>\n
He still tends to be a man who finds it hard to take advice,
\nparticularly from younger people, but I think he is more open now
\nthan he has been in years past.<\/p>\n
Bear in mind the background he comes from. And the pesantren
\n(Muslim boarding school) where he comes from and it is not
\naverage. It does not necessarily equip one to be emotionally
\nexpressive and open to taking advice and so on.<\/p>\n
I think in that context he has made changes. He is more easy
\ngoing and relaxed, emotionally demonstrative and open person than
\nhe has been in the past. And I think that gives reason to hope
\nthat he will continue to change in a moderate way.<\/p>\n
Some think Gus Dur has a different yardstick to decide things
\nright or wrong due to his pesantren background. For example, when
\nhe accepted money from the Sultan of Brunei or received money
\nfrom people prior to his overseas trip...<\/p>\n
I think there are two factors to consider here. One, we need
\nto reflect if we make the statement that Gus Dur's style of doing
\nthings is like a kyai in a pesantren.<\/p>\n
I think in certain respects this is true but it is not
\ncompletely true by the way. Pesantren is said to be very feudal
\nand authoritarian. In some respects pesantren is more democratic
\nthan we expect.<\/p>\n
Even if it is true that in many ways Gus Dur's style is like a
\nkyai and pesantren we have to ask the question, okay, so it's not
\nlike a modern approach to governance. But is a modern approach to
\ngovernment necessarily and automatically successful in a period
\nof regime change?<\/p>\n
To put it practically, Gus Dur got a soft-loan of US$ 2
\nmillion from the Sultan of Brunei and rather than put it through
\nthe government's account it goes through an account he has
\npersonal control over. That gives the wrong impression.<\/p>\n
On the other hand if he would have put it in a government
\naccount, it could be a little bit like putting a loaf of bread,
\nin a cupboard while we know full well that at the back of the
\ncupboard there is a large hole. You can be fairly sure that the
\nloaf will be nibbled away by the rats.<\/p>\n
I think that it is practically difficult to work in an
\nentirely legislative and normal way at the moment. Because you
\ncan't trust the institutions, you can't trust the law courts, you
\ncan't trust government departments necessarily.<\/p>\n
So that's one issue. In some ways, it is idiosyncratic, a sort
\nof pesantren style, may be more appropriate for a regime change
\nthan we acknowledged. I am not saying perfectly appropriate but
\nwe need to give credit when the credit is due. We are not in a
\nperiod of a normal governance here.<\/p>\n
The second factor of this, Gus Dur as a kyai from pesantren to
\nconsider, is that as irritating as it may be, inappropriate as it
\nmay be, there is a positive side to it as well.<\/p>\n
Good kyai, not all kyai are good, many kyai in their lifetime
\nhandle million of dollars but they don't become millionaires
\nbecause they are stewards of the money. And their fear of God
\nautomatically stops them from enriching themselves. They channel
\nthat money through the pesantren which may be in their names
\nillegally but they don't regard it as personal property. And many
\npoor people get education.<\/p>\n
There are good examples and bad examples. But at its best a
\npesantren tradition is a tradition of stewardship. And I think it
\nis quite clear with Gus Dur, whenever he is failing he is not an
\navaricious individual, he is not greedy for money. And his
\nmotivation is sound, even if the application or the
\nimplementation is not always appropriate.<\/p>\n
You seem to be optimistic about changes taking place which
\nappear to be in contrast to what most observers here think. Does
\ndistance matter?<\/p>\n
To some extent my distance does help because I can stand by
\nand ask, \"well how is Indonesia compared with other countries?
\nHow would things look in the longer term?\"<\/p>\n
Looking at contrasts with other countries and looking at the
\nlonger term, it is easy to be optimistic. Another reason for my
\noptimism is I know Gus Dur very well. People, of course, quite
\nreasonably, would be critical of me saying that I am just
\ndefending him or I am just too one-sided. That may be true but I
\nseek to be objective in my analysis. But I get the privilege to
\nknow him in a way that other people don't.<\/p>\n
And the advantage of this privilege is that I have a sense of
\nconfidence about his moral integrity and purpose that others may
\nnot have, simply because I know him. But I think there are plenty
\nof external factors that support this analysis.<\/p>\n
Some critics have gone as far as to suggest Gus Dur has to go.
\nSuppose we put ourselves in their shoes, what alternative of
\nleaders do we have?<\/p>\n
At this stage it is very hard for me to imagine that we will
\nget somebody necessarily better. I can accept that if we change
\nGus Dur we would get somebody better in certain areas, maybe a
\nbetter manager, maybe more efficient, maybe a better
\ncommunicator, less mysterious, whatever, but I am not convinced
\nthat we would get somebody who is better overall.<\/p>\n
But there is another factor about change. If we call ourselves
\ndemocrats and committed to reform, that means that we can't
\nlightly accept the possibility of change of government unless it
\nis done in a constitutionally legitimate way.<\/p>\n
Democracy very seldom produces a result that is completely
\nsatisfying but we have to live with what we get. We should think
\nabout ways which we can help him, strengthen him rather than
\nallow energies channel into undermining him.<\/p>\n
Even if there was somebody better and even if there is a
\ndemocratic way to undergo a leadership change, the human cost is
\nlikely to be very high. Such changes very likely would
\ndestabilize the whole country.<\/p>\n
Maybe this is providential that he is here at this point in
\ntime when we need a rather unusual leader, perhaps even a
\nmaverick leader to deal with regime change.<\/p>\n
In some ways it reminds me of Winston Churchill. Churchill may
\nhave been a very strange prime minister or a very strange man but
\nin the middle of World War II he was exactly the right man for
\nGreat Britain.<\/p>\n
In what way should sections of society strengthen him?<\/p>\n
Well, strengthening him may be put a bit too narrowly because
\npart of our role should be strengthening society. For example, if
\nthere was a large conference organized involving the leading
\nintellectuals on issues of regime change and international
\nexperts were brought in, not necessarily academics but people who
\nhave lived through the experience themselves.<\/p>\n
Invite people from Latin America or Eastern Europe or
\nwherever, and they could share with us their experiences. That is
\nnot focused on changing Gus Dur but on educating ourselves and
\neducating society.<\/p>\n
In terms of helping the government directly, a big challenge
\nfacing Gus Dur is thinking about the issue about consolidating,
\nrestructuring or perhaps streaming down significantly, perhaps
\nchanging substantially his cabinet toward the end of this year.<\/p>\n
For example, even now, it is possible to help somebody like
\nMarzuki Darusman talking with him about his vision and
\ndifficulties and give him a chance to talk about this to the
\ngeneral public. In that way civil society can really strengthen
\nthe government.<\/p>\n
In some way it is like the relationship between husband and
\nwife. Any successful relationship involves a degree of mutual
\nchange.<\/p>\n
Some of the changes that can occur not just from the level of
\ngovernment ministers and the President but also civil society.
\nFor example, in the legal system, it is certain that civil
\nsociety can make a contribution there. Also in terms of reform of
\nthe military, if it is mature, sensitive and intelligent. The
\nestablishment of strong NGOs for specific tasks can be very
\nconstructive and we have seen that in the past.<\/p>\n
If there were groups who were intelligently and articulately
\nagitating for better basic wages, better conditions for factory
\nworkers, I think that it is quite likely to help the government
\nbringing some change. So there is scope for taking initiative
\nwithout saying it is just a question of changing the government.<\/p>\n
One of the minor tragedies of this whole process of regime
\nchange is that many civil society groups have been so focused on
\nthe condition of the reformist regime they are almost like caged
\nbirds.<\/p>\n
Once the door of the cage has been opened, they don't know
\nwhat to do. And they surely don't feel like flying out of the
\ncage.<\/p>\n
Slowly, I think, NGOs and other elements of civil society will
\nthink about the new possibilities to have under this government.
\nAnd those new possibilities include and go well beyond just
\ncriticizing the government. There are actual projects that they
\ncould be doing. And they can now do it in a way they couldn't do
\nit in the past.<\/p>",
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