PDI-P seeks power on continued compromise<\/p>\n
Anton Doni, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta<\/p>\n
At the beginning, it was the \"little people\" (wong cilik) who
\nwere the source of power of the Indonesian Democratic Party of
\nStruggle (PDI-P). Suppressed under the New Order regime, the
\npeople were in need of any figure perceived to be able to bring
\nabout a relatively better life.<\/p>\n
They eventually found Megawati Soekarnoputri, daughter of the
\nfirst president, who was then treated unworthily by then
\npresident Soeharto. The later years of the New Order saw throngs
\nof people rallying around Megawati, the alternative figure.<\/p>\n
Following this came the deep economic crisis and the momentum
\nfor the substantial growth of a \"reform\" movement. A free
\nelection was held in 1999 and the party gained the most votes,
\nalthough only 33.7 percent. From then on PDI-P and Megawati,
\nfirst as vice president and then as president, started a new
\njourney -- which is now five years old. No less than the \"little
\npeople\" themselves have made judgment on whether PDI-P has been
\nserious in meeting their expectations.<\/p>\n
Many of the party's previously fanatic supporters have
\nconcluded that what the party has been looking for all along is
\npower; hence its need of masses of \"little people\".<\/p>\n
This is what they could understand from price hikes such as
\nthose for electricity, while the price of foodstuffs was still
\nrelatively high. Of course the policy was a joint product of
\nother parties in power, but Megawati and PDI-P also supported the
\npolicy.<\/p>\n
Coming to power to eradicate corruption, Megawati, the symbol
\nof PDI-P who once gave an assurance that her family would be
\nclean from anything smelling like corruption, has not been able
\nto deliver on her commitment. Stories of family members' business
\npractices have raised eyebrows.<\/p>\n
Worse, the government has yet to come up with a bold poverty
\nalleviation measure, a clear policy to overcome unemployment,
\namid seemingly timid action against alleged human rights
\nviolators and large-scale corruptors. In Megawati's early days
\nshe supported the reelection of Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso -- not
\nonly the capital's military commander during the violent takeover
\nof Megawati's faction of the then split Indonesian Democratic
\nParty in 1996 -- but a governor who has increasingly displayed a
\n\"no-turning-back\" attitude on evictions of slum dwellers, a large
\npart of the wong cilik.<\/p>\n
Coming to power and forgetting promises is a typical story.
\nWith PDI-P there was also the issue of incompetence, a sad
\nreality for any party other than the previous ruling party
\nGolkar.<\/p>\n
The PDI-P was initially shocked at its abundant power
\nfollowing the 1999 elections. The most competent people it had
\nwere still poor organizers and largely inexperienced politicians.<\/p>\n
As a result, its members at various levels frequently failed
\nin carrying out their legislative duties. They were weak in the
\nface of new temptations. Economist Kwik Kian Gie, a deputy
\nchairman of PDI-P, angered party colleagues when he said that
\nPDI-P was among the most corrupt political parties.<\/p>\n
In this precarious situation the party was open to power-
\nseeking people who at least appeared to be competent in technical
\nor political skills. A new power configuration in the party grew,
\nwhile the party did not see a significant increase in executives
\nwho displayed a strong commitment to the common people.<\/p>\n
With barely 35 percent of votes PDI-P also lacked the
\npolitical clout needed in decision making.<\/p>\n
This constraint was most evident ahead of Megawati's struggle
\nto replace Abdurrahman Wahid as president. The support secured
\nfrom other parties and the need to retain it have exacted their
\nown toll.<\/p>\n
The first is worsening relations with the National Awakening
\nParty (PKB), a party that along with PDI-P was considered among
\nthe potential pillars for a new Indonesia, at least given its
\nmass base.<\/p>\n
At one point Abdurrahman Wahid, PKB founder and Megawati's
\nformer political confidante, joined the Muslim-oriented \"central
\naxis\", which was hostile to the prospect of a female president.<\/p>\n
The second relates to the political support available from the
\nGolkar Party -- allegations immediately emerged of Megawati's
\nadministration compromising on promises to fight corruption.
\nAmong several signs was the failure of legislators to establish a
\nspecial committee to investigate alleged corruption of billions
\nof rupiah from the State Logistics Agency (Bulog).<\/p>\n
The third toll was PDI-P's compromise regarding Islamic
\nideological ideas, despite the party's \"nationalist\" rhetoric.<\/p>\n
The controversial law on the National Education System rules
\nthat the purposes of education include those regarding faith,
\niman dan takwa (faith and piety) -- terms that critics said only
\napplied to Muslims.<\/p>\n
Whatever the party's excuses for the incompetence of its
\nlegislators, its absence of a clear position on this law confirms
\nits fear of losing its support from the Muslim political elite.<\/p>\n
Therefore, plurality has become the high price of PDI-P's need
\nto maintain the support of the Muslim parties.<\/p>\n
A fourth toll has been PDI-P's costly compromise with the
\nmilitary. Until now the accountability of the military's
\nleadership remains a question, among others in the cases of the
\nTrisakti and Semanggi shootings of students in Jakarta. Hence,
\nPDI-P is perceived to have benefited the most from the early days
\nof the \"reform movement\", regardless of the students who
\nsacrificed their lives.<\/p>\n
Also, in the absence of the party's clear paradigm on a
\n\"unitary state\", PDI-P seems only to accept uncritically the
\nnotion that everything must give way for the sake of territorial
\nintegrity, regardless of what people in the said territory may
\nactually feel.
\nThis leads, in turn, to the party's upholding of military action
\nin dealing with separatist and supposedly separatist movements.<\/p>\n
Thus, to gain more power and to sustain it, the party, riding
\non its rhetoric of \"the party of the little people\", has broken
\nits commitment and the moral foundations upon which its power
\noriginated.<\/p>\n
Surveys have already indicated its decreasing support. But
\nthe following factors must also be taken into account.<\/p>\n
First, PDI-P can still count on voters' loyalty in several
\nprovinces. Competition from other parties with the same
\nnationalist orientation is a threat, but PDI-P's \"nationalist\"
\nbrand is still too strong in a number of areas.<\/p>\n
Second, many voters in villages do not have access to
\ncriticism of the party. A smaller decrease in support in villages
\nwould be expected, compared with that in the cities.<\/p>\n
Third, PDI-P is increasingly reaching out to people at all
\nlevels; it now has opinion leaders ready to \"neutralize\" negative
\nviews of the party.<\/p>\n
Fourth, for the common people in many places there seem to be
\nno alternative figures or parties. At present, since all parties
\nlook unreliable to them, they might simply vote the way they did
\nin the last polls. This might work to the advantage of PDI-P.<\/p>\n
The writer is a member of PDI-P.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/pdi-p-seeks-power-on-continued-compromise-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }