Part 2 of 2: Democracy, defense and development<\/p>\n
Juwono Sudarsono, Jakarta<\/p>\n
President Soeharto, who presided over the centralized top-down
\nsystem justified the TNI's role as the praetorian guard of the
\nIndonesian state, much as the Brazilian military in the 1970s and
\nthe Turkish army defined themselves in their more recent history.
\nThe firm, pervasive presence of the TNI in domestic politics
\nenabled political stability that ensured 7 percent annual
\neconomic growth for more than 30 years, but exacted a price in
\nterms of the decline of military professionalism across many
\nunits of all three services.<\/p>\n
After President Soeharto left office in May 1998, the TNI
\nredefined its role throughout the administrations of B.J.
\nHabibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri (1998-
\n2004), committing itself to the following measures:<\/p>\n
Adoption of the TNI's \"new paradigm\", in which it would
\nsupport and encourage, rather than lead, civilian politics in
\ngovernment, parliament, the judiciary and local bureaucracy. The
\nTNI has redefined itself as facilitator rather than initiator of
\nstate policy. It relinquished its position in the 2004
\nlegislative elections. The TNI Act of October 2004 recast the
\nTNI's role as accepting and affirming civilian authority.<\/p>\n
Reposition its role by ceding to the police prime
\nresponsibility for domestic security while emphasizing external
\ndefense and military professionalism. In real terms, however, the
\nTNI continues to play its newly calibrated domestic security role
\nbecause, like the TNI itself the police force needs at least a
\ndecade before it can achieve its projected standard of
\nprofessionalism and competence.<\/p>\n
Reviews are needed of its intelligence, command and
\nterritorial doctrine to emphasize its commitment to improve each
\nservice's mission capability and focus on defense capacity rather
\nthan on assessments of external threats. The defense mandate
\nwould entail a balance between defense of the population and
\ndefense of the country's natural resources. Most importantly,
\nboth the Defense Act of 2002 and the TNI Act of 2004 recognize
\nthe importance of non-military defense: defense of skills and
\nnatural resources, defense of the environment, of the values and
\nculture of the nation. In short, defense encompasses the
\nconstitutional mandate of sishankamrata (total defense and
\nsecurity).<\/p>\n
Reviews of its force structure are also required. For a
\ndefense force comprising roughly 350,000 uniformed personnel and
\nwith an official budget of 1.7 percent of GDP, ($2.3 billion; 8-9
\npercent of annual budget) the TNI is the most officially
\nunderfunded force among the larger nations of Southeast Asia. The
\npercentage of the annual budget for education is 6 percent to 8
\npercent; for health 5 percent to 7 percent and for employment is
\n7 percent to 9 percent.<\/p>\n
Clearly, in terms of capital spending for new equipment,
\nmaintenance and repairs, as well as the logistics of linking the
\n5,000 kilometers between north Sumatra and Papua, the \"rotational
\ncover\" by naval and air forces barely copes with minimum
\nstandards of military preparedness. The strategic waterways and
\narchipelagic sea lanes that account for roughly 46 percent of
\nsea-borne trade in East Asia needs to be defended by an
\naccountable and credible defense force.<\/p>\n
Following the inauguration of Gen. (ret) President Susilo
\nBambang Yudhoyono in October 2004, the Ministry of Defense and
\nthe TNI are committed to civilian supremacy, democratic control
\nand accountability in policymaking, strategic planning and
\ndefense management.<\/p>\n
The final \"D\", Economic Development, comprises three main
\nareas of policymaking to maintain macroeconomic stability. A
\nstable government since 2001 has enabled GDP per capita growth to
\nincrease to $1300 in 2004\/05 from $650 in 1998. Poverty remains
\nacute at 36 million. But current growth is largely driven by
\ndomestic consumption.<\/p>\n
The 3 D's of Democracy, Defense and Development can only
\nsucceed if Indonesia's leaders, from all walks of life, promote
\nand act upon good governance in public office and in private
\npersonal conduct.<\/p>\n
In turn, that will depend on how all of the people in
\nleadership positions work together to reinforce yet another set
\nof three D's, namely: Decisiveness, Determination and Delivery.
\nDecisiveness is crucial at the policymaking level of governance,
\nwhether in public of private sector organizations. Determination
\nhas to emanate from the leader's personality as well as from his
\nor her particular authoritative position. It is critical to
\nmaintain a sense of urgency.<\/p>\n
But the ability to deliver is the most critical factor of all.
\nA leader must be able to deliver the goods, to match promises
\nwith performance: harnessing political stability, driving
\neconomic recovery and crafting social reconciliation. Only then
\ncan there be a more peaceful and stable political environment.
\nOnly then can there be more food, shelter, clothing, employment
\nfor those 36 million living below the poverty line and the nine
\nmillion openly unemployed. Only then can there more tolerance and
\ngreater understanding among our diverse, ethnic, communal,
\nreligious and provincial identities, from Sabang to Merauke.<\/p>\n
The writer is the Minister of Defense.
\nThis is an excerpt of his speech, presented recently at the 13th
\nSenior Course (KSA-XIII) at the National Resilience Institute
\n(Lemhannas).<\/p>",
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