Part 1 of 2: Strategies for RI civil service reform<\/p>\n
Staffan Synnerstrom, Jakarta<\/p>\n
Many in Indonesia seem to agree to the need for civil service
\nreform. But a consensus on what a civil service reform would
\nimply does not exist. Partly, this is because there has not been
\nan extensive public debate in which various options have been
\ndiscussed and examined. These two articles will elaborate on what
\nsuccessful civil service reform in Indonesia would require,
\nhopefully to initiate such a debate.<\/p>\n
The articles are partly based on reports published by the
\nAsian Development Bank (ADB) and the Partnership for Governance
\nReform. They are also based on experience from other transitional
\ncountries that, similar to Indonesia, have made dramatic changes
\nfrom centralized political and planned economic systems to ones
\nbased on democratic institutions and open markets.<\/p>\n
To be successful, civil service reform will require clear and
\ncommunicated strategies and strong and committed leadership.
\nExperience from other countries show that when the highest
\nleadership of a country is behind a reform, it will succeed. If
\nnot, the results easily get lost in turf wars and obstruction.
\nChanges should be facilitated by well-composed reform teams,
\nthorough preparations, enforced accountability, increased
\ntransparency, well sequenced and resourced implementation and by
\nsetting up model organizations providing good examples to others.<\/p>\n
In addition, successful civil service reform requires external
\nexpertise with comparative knowledge providing guidance,
\nfacilitation and capacity building. The Partnership for
\nGovernance Reform, which in the last few years has emerged as a
\nunique Indonesian organization that has facilitated reforms
\nacross a wide spectrum of issues and with a diverse set of
\npartners, is well suited for such a role.<\/p>\n
Central to civil service reform is the manner in which staff
\npositions are categorized and organized. Positions in the
\nIndonesian civil service are generally not professionally
\nclassified, although some functional positions such as doctors
\nare. Without professional classification and adequate job
\ndescriptions, anyone, regardless of educational or professional
\nbackground, can be put into any position.<\/p>\n
That is why, in the Indonesian civil service, engineers can
\nbecome auditors or can be assigned to prepare legislation.
\nWithout professional job classification and adequate job
\ndescriptions it is impossible to set up professional selection
\ncriteria for recruitment. It is further impossible to set up
\nperformance criteria and evaluate performance. This is one reason
\nwhy Indonesian civil servants are recruited based only on
\neducational levels and promoted on the basis of seniority and
\nattendance of certain mandatory training, not on performance.<\/p>\n
The Indonesian civil service used to operate with some 2,000
\nprofessionally classified jobs up to 1968, when the professional
\npositions were replaced by the current 17 ranks divided into four
\nechelons. Given the dramatic shift towards democracy in
\nIndonesia, it would seem high time to replace the military-like
\ncivil service system introduced by President Soeharto with a
\nprofessionally classified civil service, as was the case before
\n1968.<\/p>\n
Job evaluation and job classifications schemes need to be
\ndeveloped and implemented. Without professional classification of
\npositions, young people cannot look to the civil service for a
\nprofessional career -- rather they look to it for reasons of job
\nsecurity, pension guarantee, and the possibility to be part of
\nthe fund-sharing taking place within public institutions.<\/p>\n
Corruption related to recruitment and promotion is said to be
\nsignificant in the Indonesian civil service. Positions and
\npromotions are traded. \"Fit and proper tests\" executed behind
\nclosed doors tend to become bargaining sessions rather than tests
\nof suitability. The practice of selling and buying positions
\nmultiplies corruption, since investments to gain positions need
\nto be recovered. This devastating practice should be an early and
\nparticularly important target in a civil service reform.<\/p>\n
As a consequence of introducing professionally classified
\njobs, candidates would have to apply for specific positions with
\nspecific selection criteria ensuring that candidates with the
\nright educational and professional background would be selected.
\nCompetition and transparency in the selection would further
\nguarantee that the best candidate would be selected and it would
\nalso prevent trading of positions.<\/p>\n
In addition to problems related to job classification, staff
\nresources are not allocated according to operational needs but
\nthrough a superficial procedure aiming to safeguard a certain
\nnumber of positions on each level in any organizational unit,
\njust like in the army. This inflexible way of determining
\norganizational structures and allocating staff -- \"putting the
\npyramid in place\" -- is wasteful and creates overstaffing in most
\norganizations.<\/p>\n
Instead, staff allocations should be based on real needs
\nrelated to the tasks and the workload of an organization and
\nadequate numbers of professionally classified positions should be
\nallocated in accordance with those operational needs. All staff
\nallocations should be reviewed in the yearly budget process.<\/p>\n
Functional reviews and staff inspections need to be executed
\nto determine adequate organizational structures and staff
\nallocations. The reviews and inspections could in the early stage
\ntarget a limited number of institutions and\/or districts to
\ntransform them into early model organizations. Such model
\norganizations could possibly be created in the parts of Aceh
\nwhere the administration is to be rehabilitated or at central
\nlevel in the KPK or the Attorney General's Office.<\/p>\n
In determining how to move forward with civil service reform,
\ndecentralization must be one key. Decentralization has required
\nmany regional governments to expand their workforce to meet their
\nnew obligations, while central ministries have not reduced the
\nsize of the departments where tasks have been transferred to
\nregional governments.<\/p>\n
Since the civil servant payroll determines a large part of
\nthe DAU -- the general block grant that provides the major part
\nof local governments financing -- overstaffed regional
\ngovernments have no incentives to cut down their workforce and
\nunderstaffed regional governments do not get resources enabling
\nthem to catch up. As long as budget funds are provided based on
\nformulae and not on expenditure needs, these kinds of
\ninequalities and restructuring needs will remain.<\/p>\n
Three central bodies -- MenPAN, BKN, and LAN --
\nhave ultimate responsibility for public administration and civil
\nservice issues. The three institutions could be merged into one,
\ntaking on responsibility for the remaining central civil service
\nfunctions in a decentralized administration, such as making
\ngeneral civil service policies and legislation, managing the
\ndatabase on civil servants, monitoring civil service management,
\naccrediting training programs and providing advisory services to
\nline ministries and regional governments.<\/p>\n
Staffan Synnerstrom is Governance Advisor at ADB's Indonesia
\nResident Mission in Jakarta. He is the editor and co-author of
\nthe Country Governance Assessment Report Indonesia (ADB, 2004).
\nThe views presented in this article are his personal views.
\nHe can be reached on ssynnerstrom@adb.org.<\/p>",
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