{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1135828,
        "msgid": "part-1-of-2-democracy-defense-and-development-1447893297",
        "date": "2005-06-13 00:00:00",
        "title": "Part 1 of 2: Democracy, defense and development",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Part 1 of 2: Democracy, defense and development Juwono Sudarsono, Jakarta From a centralized government backed by the military for more than 32 years under President Soeharto, Indonesia today remains the focus of attention of many policymakers and academicians. The questions posed were: Can civilian-dominated politics take root in Indonesia and become the vanguard of democratic government in a country that has the largest Muslim population in the world?",
        "content": "<p>Part 1 of 2: Democracy, defense and development<\/p>\n<p>Juwono Sudarsono, Jakarta<\/p>\n<p>From a centralized government backed by the military for more<br>\nthan 32 years under President Soeharto, Indonesia today remains<br>\nthe focus of attention of many policymakers and academicians. The<br>\nquestions posed were: Can civilian-dominated politics take root<br>\nin Indonesia and become the vanguard of democratic government in<br>\na country that has the largest Muslim population in the world?<br>\nCan a democratic government, facing multiple economic and<br>\nfinancial crises, recover sufficiently in the short run to<br>\nrelease itself from the vicious circle of political instability,<br>\neconomic stagnation and social conflict?<\/p>\n<p>What is the role of the military in the new political<br>\nenvironment? Will the military's repositioning in the new<br>\npolitical system enhance both democracy and development? Finally,<br>\nhow efficiently will Indonesians utilize, to the maximum, their<br>\nendowed natural resources for equitable and sustainable<br>\ndevelopment in an increasingly competitive regional and global<br>\nenvironment?<\/p>\n<p>Let us first take up some general points about the first \"D\":<br>\nDemocratic government. Most social and political scientists would<br>\nagree that a functioning democracy would require the following<br>\nunderpinnings:<\/p>\n<p>An agreement on fundamentals about state identity (what is it<br>\nto be Indonesian?) to galvanize and underpin the diversity of 300<br>\nethnic groups across 17,000 islands, unevenly distributed in the<br>\ndensely populated island of Java (65 percent of the population<br>\nwith 15 percent of the land area).<\/p>\n<p>The outer islands where resource-rich provinces (Aceh, Riau,<br>\nEast Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua) are largely underpopulated<br>\nand have less political leverage at the central government level.<br>\nOur first president, Sukarno, provided the basis for state<br>\nidentity, Pancasila, by which all Indonesians are theoretically<br>\nbound to believe in, because of the resonance and resilience of<br>\nthese precepts in the body and soul of all Indonesians from Aceh<br>\nto Papua.<\/p>\n<p>An important aspect of Pancasila is that although Indonesia is<br>\nthe largest Muslim country, it is not an Islamic state. In fact,<br>\nIslam and democracy are compatible in Indonesia precisely because<br>\nour version of Islam is enriched through healthy interaction with<br>\nother faiths.<\/p>\n<p>Our challenge, of course, is to continuously replenish the<br>\nvitality of that state identity and the notion of \"Indonesian-<br>\nness\" through broader social, economic, judicial and political<br>\nparticipation. As the world's fourth most populous country and<br>\nthird largest democracy, we must rise to the challenge that the<br>\ndemocracy we have committed ourselves to will be able to deliver<br>\nthe goods to the deprived, the desperate and the despondent.<\/p>\n<p>A \"critical mass\" is needed from the locally defined middle<br>\nclass, ideally comprising at least 30 to 40 percent of the<br>\npopulation, who will define civic government and become the<br>\n\"transmitters\" between the very rich and the very poor. While<br>\ncomparisons can be misleading, democracies generally function<br>\nwith agreement on fundamentals only if a committed middle and<br>\nlower class enjoy access to basic human needs (food, shelter,<br>\nclothing) and public goods: electricity, roads, harbors, public<br>\neducation, primary health care.<\/p>\n<p>The GDP per capita ideally should be at least $3000-$4000 with<br>\nmonthly household spending ranging between $500 and $1500 a<br>\nmonth. They constitute the concerned citizens who fight for<br>\ngrowth and equity, for a fairer political and legal system and<br>\nwho vigorously contest unwarranted gains from the economic pie.<\/p>\n<p>Unfortunately, GDP per capita of $1300 and 15-20 percent<br>\nmiddle class show that our path towards a functioning democracy<br>\nremain marked by glitches, the crashing of social and cultural<br>\ngears across ethnic, provincial and religious lines before it<br>\ngets better in 10-15 years. Kalimantan, Aceh, Poso, Ambon and<br>\nPapua in recent years have shown the seriousness of our<br>\nleadership challenges.<\/p>\n<p>A competent and professional bureaucracy enables government to<br>\nfunction properly and truly be a provider of public goods in<br>\nterms of the delivery of services through taxation and fiscal<br>\nmeasures in order to provide utilities(road, harbors,<br>\nelectricity, telecommunications, potable water ) to the larger<br>\npopulation.<\/p>\n<p>In this respect, Indonesia's four million-strong bureaucracy<br>\nstill leaves much to be desired. The bulk of our civil service is<br>\nlargely undertrained and lack the capacity to run a functioning<br>\nadministration, which should be able to effectively allocate<br>\ncritical social services.<\/p>\n<p>For a nation of 215 million there are just 5,000 Ph.Ds in all<br>\nfields ranging from bio-technology to the arts.<\/p>\n<p>The second \"D\" has to do with the role of the Indonesian<br>\nMilitary (TNI). For more than 30 years (1966-1998) it defined the<br>\nparameters of governance at all levels: national, provincial,<br>\ndistrict and local. Because the system lacks the fundamentals of<br>\ndemocratic government (organized political parties, civic groups,<br>\na politically neutral civil service) the TNI became all-pervasive<br>\nin defining domestic security and external defense.<\/p>\n<p>Its all encompassing national security doctrine sanctified<br>\nactive and retired officers to gain prominent roles in the ruling<br>\npolitical party, the bureaucracy, in the legislature, the<br>\njudiciary, the prosecutors office and the court system. Up until<br>\n1999-2000, the police were under the authority of the TNI<br>\nheadquarters. Each service had independent sources of extra-<br>\nbudgetary funding through clusters of foundations, enterprises<br>\nand cooperatives.<\/p>\n<p>The writer is the Minister of Defense.<br>\nThis is an excerpt of his speech, presented recently at the 13th<br>\nSenior Course (KSA-XIII) at the National Resilience Institute<br>\n(Lemhannas).<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/part-1-of-2-democracy-defense-and-development-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}