~(paragaph berikut dipakai untuk window dalam article)<\/p>\n
'The action should change to a broader and bigger U.S.
\nrole in empowering Indonesian SMEs to enter the global market.'<\/p>\n
Revisiting Indonesia-United States relations<\/p>\n
By Tony Agus Ardie,
\nPresident of KIKAS*<\/p>\n
Recent times have seen a profusion of developments which
\ncould substantially influence the state of relations
\nbetween Indonesia and the United States.
\nSome originated from the Indonesian side: the so-called
\n"sweeping" of American hotel guests in Surakarta, anti-U.S
\ndemonstrations, a call for boycotts of American branded products,
\nthe Bali bombings, as well as the abolishment of the free visa
\nfacility for U.S. citizens.<\/p>\n
Some others came from the U.S. side: warnings for American
\ncitizens not to visit Indonesia, new limitations on imports of
\nIndonesian products, the war in Iraq. Directly or indirectly,
\nmost have the potential to strain or even worsen relations.
\nRegardless of the developments, however, the fundamentals
\nof Indonesia-U.S. relations have remained largely unchanged.
\nIndonesia, the world's fourth most populous country with
\nmore than 210 million people, is geopolitically pivotal to peace
\nand stability in Southeast Asia. As the nation with the largest
\nMuslim population, its position has become even more crucial in
\nthe present global constellation.
\nIt has the potential either to become a bridge between
\nthe U.S. and other Islamic peoples, or an obstruction to better
\nrelations. Indonesia is also richly endowed with a vast variety
\nof natural resources for American industries.
\nThe United States, as the world's largest economy, the
\nbiggest source of technology and the greatest influence on the
\nglobal financial market, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
\nand the World Bank, plays an important role in supporting
\nIndonesia's efforts to solve its economic crisis.
\nAs the most powerful democracy it could also assist
\nIndonesia in coping with the painful process of transition from
\nan authoritarian, centralized government into a more democratic
\nand decentralized state.
\nThese fundamentals are strong reasons for both sides to
\nwork for closer relations. However, this is not reflected in the
\nchanging reality. The gap is widening - not closing - for various
\nreasons, e.g. domestic politics, differences in national
\ninterests and priorities.
\nActually, the very same reasons are also arguments for
\nstriving toward good, sustainable relations. A stronger, more
\nstable Indonesia - in political as well as economic terms - would
\nbe more beneficial for U.S. interests in many aspects, including
\nin implementing its war on terrorism.
\nA more basic reason for this gap is information
\ndisparity: the lack of knowledge, thus of understanding and
\nempathy, on each side about the other.
\nBasic knowledge about Indonesia is negligible in the U.S.
\nMost Americans have very little idea about Indonesia,
\ngeographically and otherwise. Bali is still better known than the
\nwhole country. American reference books still put the wrong date
\nabout Indonesia's independence and disregard its revolution. Yet
\nan incident in any small Indonesian town would be interpreted as
\nif the whole country is unsafe.
\nDistortion could bring dire consequences when it comes to
\ncomplex analyses of the country. Complications in the reforms
\nundertaken by Indonesia since 1998 are to be expected considering
\nits enormous dimensions and speed. But it often prompts many U.S.
\npoliticians and analysts to be fixated with the daily turmoil of
\nevents, raucous demonstrations, corruption cases or security
\nproblems, neglecting substantial progress.
\nThis often results in overly pessimistic assessment of
\nIndonesia's future, overlooking the medium and long term
\nperspectives after all this agonizing learning process.
\nTrue, structural impediments such as the lack of trust in
\nthe judicial system, excesses in the initial process of
\ntransferring power to district-level administrations, virtually
\nbankrupt big corporations and low investor confidence have been a
\nturnoff to new investment.
\nHowever, these problems are being tackled with great
\nassistance from the World Bank, the IMF and the international
\ncreditor consortium, the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI),
\nof which the United States has been a loyal donor member since
\n1967.<\/p>\n
Progress has been made, as can be noted from the strengthening
\nmacroeconomic and political stability. The most positive
\ndevelopment is that Indonesian national resilience has passed the
\ntoughest test over the past five years of political turbulence
\nand economic debacle. Such progress, however, is seldom reported
\nby the media and hardly known in the U.S.<\/p>\n
To be fair, similar distortions concerning the U.S. also occur
\nin Indonesia. Despite admiration for American products, popular
\nculture and lifestyles, Indonesian public understanding of the
\nU.S. is superficial at best.<\/p>\n
Their image is filled with negative stereotypes, prejudices
\nand skepticism. The U.S. is invariably described by the country's
\nmedia as an arrogant power whose actions bring far-reaching
\nconsequences unfair to Indonesia.<\/p>\n
When the U.S. issues travel notices to dissuade Americans from
\ncoming to Indonesia, it is also discouraging visitors from other
\nlands and thus affecting the tourism industry extensively.<\/p>\n
U.S. trade pressure to import and consume American products is
\ncontrasted to its tight control of Indonesian imports. New rules,
\nsuch as anti- bio-terrorism inspection, add burdens to Indonesian
\nexporters at US$250 per container box.<\/p>\n
The widespread image is its own self-interest, shown in the
\ndecline in purchase contracts for Indonesian's manufactured
\ngoods, the withdrawal of investments and the relocation of
\nactivities to other countries, while simultaneously expecting
\nIndonesian support for U.S. interests.<\/p>\n
These actions are neither unusual nor unreasonable in
\ninternational practice of doing business. Nevertheless, they do
\nnot contribute to the accomplishment of understanding and trust
\nwith the wider population.<\/p>\n
It does not matter that such sanctions may in fact be
\ndirected at big economic players. But the ultimate impact will be
\nfelt by the grassroots who may arrive at simplified conclusions,
\ne.g. that U.S. actions are the cause of their tough lot,
\ndeclining job opportunities and increasing the already high rate
\nof unemployment.<\/p>\n
In the public perception, such acts show a lack of compassion
\nfor the already tough lot of the general public. As the majority
\nis composed of the same Muslims that the U.S. supposedly likes to
\nbefriend, this is also viewed as a lack of sensitivity and
\ncomprehension regarding Indonesia's Muslims' social situation.<\/p>\n
Clearly, the relationship between any two countries can only
\nbe improved if it is based on sufficient knowledge and mutually
\nfavorable attitudes. These include adequate regard and respect,
\nhigh credibility, and trust between each other.<\/p>\n
With current advancing distrust, communications efforts should
\nbe shifted to nonverbal, practical actions-which could speak much
\nlouder than words and statement, as the saying goes. Such action
\nshould begin in an area of mutual concerns to both peoples. This
\nis an employment opportunity.<\/p>\n
Indonesia's unemployment and underemployment today are
\nestimated at a total of 40 million, and the number keeps rising
\nby 2.5 million annually, particularly in the lower classes in the
\nMoslem community.<\/p>\n
Notwithstanding the contributions of American giants in
\nIndonesia's development, the action should change to a broader
\nand bigger American role in empowering Indonesian small and
\nmedium-size enterprises (SMEs) to enter the global market,
\nincluding the U.S.<\/p>\n
After all, the American small business development scheme
\nunder the Small Business Act is one of the best-managed programs
\nin promoting business incubation.<\/p>\n
The choice of SMEs is even more appropriate as it is the
\nbusiness sector that is closest to the general community and has
\naccomplished a lot to overcome unemployment since the crisis.<\/p>\n
When many big national companies collapsed, more than 95
\npercent of the SMEs were able to survive. Of this figure, 31
\npercent succeeded in restructuring their organizations while 64
\npercent others expanded operations and passed the crisis with
\nflying colors, thus capable of providing jobs for 64.3 million
\npeople.<\/p>\n
The U.S. model has been tested by pioneering SME empowerment
\nefforts in Yogyakarta, involving the community's three pillars -
\nthe local administration, committed private entrepreneurs and
\nGadjah Mada University - which are now attracting support of the
\nVienna-based United Nations Industrial Development Organization.<\/p>\n
With its long experience in community-based development
\nprojects in various provinces in Indonesia, the United States
\nAgency for International Development could play a role in SME
\nempowerment as well.<\/p>\n
Such action programs will extend and upgrade the present
\nrelations between the United States and Indonesia into a new,
\npeople-to-people based diplomacy, which facilitates and improves
\nthe official relationship that in the past was hampered by people
\nvs. people misunderstanding and prejudice.<\/p>\n
*KIKAS is the U.S. Committee of the Indonesian Chamber of
\nCommerce and Industry (Kadin).<\/p>\n
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