Overcoming the fear: PKS and democratization<\/p>\n
Zulkieflimansyah, Jakarta<\/p>\n
PK reconfigured itself into the PKS ahead of the 2004
\nelections and garnered 7.5 percent of the popular vote, gaining
\n45 seats in the 550-member House of Representatives and becoming
\nthe seventh largest party in Indonesia. It is this perceived
\ngrowth in the strength of the popular support for the PKS that
\nhas led to arguments regarding the potential threat of the party
\nto Indonesia's democracy. Since the PKS campaigned in a non-
\nIslamist language in 2004, observers worry there is a hidden
\nagenda that will rear its head when the time is appropriate.<\/p>\n
Such fears need to be conquered and the PKS should be
\nevaluated objectively as a political party. We must be critical
\nin rethinking the assumptions of exceptionalism by which we
\napproach Islamist political parties. Only then can we realize
\nthat like other political organizations, the translation of
\nideology into practice is hardly absolute nor is it static for
\nthe PKS.<\/p>\n
Similarly, as a political party the PKS has found itself
\nsubject to the same institutional rules of the political game. In
\nother words, the transformation of the PKS from a movement into a
\npolitical party was a significant one. The change was not in name
\nonly nor did it serve as simply a tactical move for the
\nmovement's ultimate aim of establishing an Islamic state (or
\nworse, as Dhume asserts, an Islamic caliphate).<\/p>\n
As a political party, the PKS has had to adapt its ideological
\nframework to the realities of democratic politics in Indonesia.
\nThe PKS is not confronted with an authoritarian regime that it
\nmust fight against. Instead, it is faced with access to
\ngovernment via a democratic process, and this has translated into
\nthe practical realities of bargaining as part of a governing
\ncoalition. In other words, the party has to deal with the
\nnecessary compromises with other actors within the political
\nsystem, including other political parties and the government.<\/p>\n
There are ample examples which point to the complexities
\ninherent in the PKS functioning as a political party and not just
\na religious movement. As the seventh largest political party in
\nthe country, PKS leaders were faced with the option of joining
\nthe governing coalition in 2004 or serving as an opposition in
\nthe legislature. Had the party leaders stuck to the static
\nframework of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is unlikely the PKS would
\nhave agreed to partake in government.<\/p>\n
Yet, the PKS decided to engage with and support the governing
\ncoalition led by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice
\nPresident Jusuf Kalla. Party leaders were convinced that such
\ncooperation would add to their political education, including the
\nart of governing. The party leaders also saw participation as a
\nmeans to prevent Islamic radicalism from entrenching itself in
\nIndonesia as a result of Muslim communities feeling alienated
\nfrom participation in the government structure.<\/p>\n
Internally, the PKS has also begun to learn the art of
\ndemocratic practice. For example, in the run-up to the
\npresidential election in 2004, PKS leaders had to decide on which
\ncandidate to support. A segment of the party advocated support
\nfor Gen. (ret) Wiranto for pragmatic reasons, chiefly the
\ncalculated chance of Wiranto winning the election. The majority,
\nhowever, supported Amien Rais. In the end the Majelis Syuro
\n(religious council) voted in favor of Amien Rais, despite strong
\npressure for the party to throw its weight behind Wiranto.<\/p>\n
The government's recent decision to sharply raise fuel prices
\nis another example of the PKS' political education, particularly
\nin the art of compromise. As part of the governing coalition, the
\nPKS had to face the difficult task of supporting the decision
\neven when it would affect the everyday lives of its constituents.
\nThe decision to support the government was based on the rational
\ncalculation of supporting an unpopular government move for the
\nlonger term benefit of turning the economy around and stabilizing
\nthe democratic process.<\/p>\n
At the same time PKS leaders sought to remind the government
\nof the need to channel the accumulated savings into community-
\noriented projects like education for the masses, an important
\ncomponent of the party's overall objective of improving society.<\/p>\n
The fallout from the party's decision to support the
\ngovernment has been quite real, so much so that the highest
\ndecision-making body in the party, the Majelis Syuro, has had to
\nreconsider the PKS' continued role as part of the governing
\ncoalition. PKS supporters have been quite vocal in their calls
\nfor the party to reposition itself as an opposition facing the
\ngovernment, rather than being within the government. Indeed, such
\na move would be extremely popular.<\/p>\n
However, PKS' leaders have stuck to the need to work with the
\ngovernment for the overall stability of Indonesia's
\ndemocratization process.<\/p>\n
One needs to overcome this fear of Islamist parties in order
\nto evaluate them objectively. There is as yet no single example
\nof an Islamist party that has successfully gained access to
\ngovernment via the democratic process and which subsequently went
\non to subvert that same democracy. Should the PKS succeed in
\nbecoming one of the two largest parties in Indonesia, it would be
\nthe first Islamist party with the power to form the government.
\nWhat it does subsequently can then be judged.<\/p>\n
From all indications thus far it is unlikely that the PKS will
\nundermine the democratic process.<\/p>\n
First, its Islamist framework does not necessarily preclude
\nsupport for the democratic process, though admittedly more can be
\ndone in terms of the party's approach to issues of plurality and
\nthe role of women in the public sphere. Party leaders are already
\ncognizant of the issues they have to address as they adapt to the
\nprevailing process. There are no indications of wanting to
\nsubvert the system, but rather of learning and finding the
\nbalance between the Islamist model they began with and the
\nexisting system of the modern, globalized world.<\/p>\n
Second, the best scenario for Indonesia is the evolution of a
\nwell-institutionalized two-party or three-party system. It is
\nunlikely the PKS will be able to emerge as the sole
\ndominant\/hegemonic political party. It will most likely have to
\ncontend with more secular-oriented, non-Islamist political
\nparties in government. Continued bargaining and compromise will
\nremain the political game well into the future. This will serve
\nas a moderating force for the PKS, whether members like it or
\nnot.<\/p>\n
Finally, and more importantly, perhaps, is the fact that as
\nthe party grows it must, in the end, respond to the middle ground
\nof the electorate. The structural dynamics at play will pressure
\nthe PKS to become a mainstream political party in Indonesia, but
\none with the potential capacity and mandate to push for good
\ngovernance.<\/p>\n
Dr. Zulkieflimansyah is a member of the House of
\nRepresentatives from the PKS and a lecturer in the postgraduate
\nprogram at the University of Indonesia's Economics Department. He
\ncan be reached at zzulkieflimansyah@yahoo.com.<\/p>",
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