Our democratic tug-of-war<\/p>\n
The following is the first of two articles based on a
\npresentation by Dr. Ignas Kleden of The Go-East
\nInstitute\/Institute for East-Indonesian Affairs in Jakarta. The
\nsociologist spoke at the Asian Leadership Fellow Program Reunion
\nConference 2001 in Bangkok on Aug. 7.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA: The German philosopher Juergen Habermas has recently
\npublished his Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a
\nDiscourse Theory of Law and Democracy. This opus can be seen as
\na continuation of Habermas' discourse on the theory of morality
\nand its implementation in the political and legal sector. It can
\nalso be treated as a continuation of his theory of the public
\nsphere and how this contributes to \"deliberative democracy.\"<\/p>\n
The basic assumption of deliberative democracy is that
\ncitizens' participation in the democratic process have a rational
\ncharacter; that voting, for example, should not simply aggregate
\npreferences but rather follow on a process in which citizens
\nbecome informed of the better argument and more general interest.<\/p>\n
This basic assumption seems to rest, however, on some fairly
\nunexamined anthropological beliefs. First, it is assumed that
\npeople who engage in a political discourse compete for an
\nargument with more truth content than other arguments. Second,
\nonce the better argument has been achieved, most people can be
\npersuaded to accept that argument by demonstrating the higher
\ndegree of truth content. Third, once people are convinced
\nintellectually of the truth content, they will become
\npsychologically motivated and satisfied with the new
\nenlightenment.<\/p>\n
The recent political changeover in Jakarta on July 23 can
\nexemplify some difficulties in applying Habermas' theory to
\nrealpolitik. Based on the 1945 Constitution, the president and
\nthe House of Representatives are of equal power and position. The
\npresident is therefore in no position to dissolve the House while
\nthe latter has no political capability and legal right to impeach
\nthe president. This balance of power is because the president is
\ninstalled in office not by the House but by the People's
\nConsultative Assembly (MPR). So the president is subordinate to
\nthe Assembly, gets his presidential power as a mandate of the
\nAssembly, and is obliged to make his administration accountable
\nin its General Session at the end of his term.<\/p>\n
In an emergency, however, the House is entitled to propose a
\nspecial session to the Assembly to ask for the accountability for
\nsome of the president's measures which are considered
\nfundamentally deviant or politically dangerous. The question is
\nwhat should be a sufficient reason for the House to make such a
\nproposal and on what grounds would the Assembly find it necessary
\nto call for a special session? This question becomes particularly
\nimportant if the political relationship between the president and
\nthe House as well as the Assembly happens to be aggravated by
\nmutual dislike and personal rivalry, as was the case with
\npresident Abdurrahman and Akbar Tandjung, the House speaker and
\nAmien Rais, the Assembly speaker.<\/p>\n
In this balance of power, the president's position is fairly
\nshaky. The president is subject to accountability, whereas the
\nHouse is not obliged to give its accountability because this is
\nnot required by the present system of general elections, whereby
\na member of the legislature is not directly responsible to his or
\nher constituency.<\/p>\n
The same can be said of the Assembly which seems to be
\nresponsible to nobody except to itself because it is the most
\nsupreme political institution. With regard to the real balance of
\npower, a proposal for the special session of the Assembly can be
\ncanceled if the president is supported by a majority of members
\nof the legislature. Abdurrahman was supported by no more than his
\n11 percent-strong National Awakening Party (PKB), which he helped
\nestablish before his presidential election.<\/p>\n
The trigger toward the special session was the installment of
\nthe acting National Police chief on July 20 by Abdurrahman,
\nshortly after he fired the National Police chief. An Assembly
\ndecree rules that the installment or dismissal of the National
\nPolice chief needs approval of the legislature -- which
\nAbdurrahman did not secure. This was the main reason for the
\ndisobedience of the incumbent police chief. Strangely, there was
\nno protest from both the person concerned and from the House.<\/p>\n
The incumbent Gen. S. Bimantoro himself was installed to that
\nposition by the president without the House approval. Be that as
\nit may, the House found the installment of the acting police
\nchief highly dangerous since it could create dualism within the
\npolice leadership, something which was feared to jeopardize
\npolitical stability and national security.<\/p>\n
The rest was nothing but a psychological tug of war between
\nthe president and the legislature on the one hand, and between
\nthe president and the opposing political parties on the other. On
\nthe evening of July 22 there was an informal meeting of
\nchairpersons of all big political parties at the private house of
\nMegawati Soekarnoputri. After the meeting, Amien stated that
\nhopefully Indonesia would have Megawati as the president in the
\nnext two or three days. This statement was made by Amien in
\nresponse to Megawati's request to him to speak as the Assembly
\nspeaker. The episode was totally confusing, because those high-
\nranking politicians were invited as representatives of their
\npolitical parties, and yet Amien was asked by Megawati to speak
\nas the Assembly speaker.<\/p>\n
This was not politically correct because the Assembly speaker
\nshould have only been able to speak on behalf of the Assembly in
\na session, but never on his own behalf.<\/p>\n
The situation then led Abdurrahman to become totally out of
\ncontrol, as reflected in his presidential decree declared at 1:10
\na.m. the next morning. The decree stipulated first, the
\ndissolution of the Assembly and the House; second, the freezing
\nof Golkar as a political party; and third, that the general
\nelection be held in one year.<\/p>\n
Obviously the president went too far. The House was his
\npolitical and constitutional equal, whereas the Assembly was his
\nconstitutional superior. The freezing of Golkar as a political
\nparty could only be done with the approval of the Supreme Court.<\/p>\n
Hence after the decree was announced, House Speaker and also
\nGolkar Party chairman Akbar Tandjung asked for the Supreme
\nCourt's legal opinion. The answer was that the presidential
\ndecree to suspend the House and the Assembly violated the
\nConstitution, whereas the freezing of Golkar was rejected.<\/p>\n
The Assembly then found it safe to convene the Special Session
\nat 8 a.m. on July 23, in which all parties present (those absent
\nwere the two parties which walked out) agreed to impeach
\nAbdurrahman and to install Megawati as the new president, in line
\nwith the 1945 Constitution.<\/p>\n
In this critical situation, Abdurrahman had practically no
\npolitical support from almost all political institutions. The
\nAssembly, the House, the Supreme Court, the military and National
\nPolice were all against him. Even the media did not show great
\nefforts to give a balanced and well-thought reporting and opinion
\nabout the position of both the president and the legislature. The
\nonly support came from PKB and from individual supporters --
\nreligious figures, activists, groups of students, as well as
\nleaders and rank and file of Nadhatul Ulama, the biggest Muslim
\norganization once chaired by Abdurrahman.<\/p>\n
What can be seen in this situation? There is a split here
\nbetween what Habermas called \"system integration\", which works
\naccording to functional relations within the system and \"social
\nintegration\", based on values and norms. Those who sided with
\nAbdurrahman at that critical moment seemed to believe that he was
\na man seriously committed to some basic values of democracy such
\nas freedom, equality before the law, human rights and protection
\nfor minorities.<\/p>",
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