Our defense priorities<\/p>\n
Indonesia's defense capability cannot be in any sorrier state
\nthan the one found today as recently described by the chiefs of
\nstaff of the Navy and the Air Force.<\/p>\n
Only a handful of our warships are operational; none are
\nequipped to engage in combat due to a lack of ammunition. The way
\nNavy Chief of Staff Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh described it at
\na hearing with the House of Representatives, his ships are good
\nfor fishing expeditions and nothing else. Had this information
\nbeen made public earlier, the deployment of several Navy warships
\nnear East Timor's waters during its inception to nationhood in
\nMay would have been construed more as a laughable show of
\nweakness and than the show of force it was intended to be.<\/p>\n
The Air Force's combat readiness is not in any better shape.
\nMany of its planes have been grounded for lack of spare parts or
\npoor maintenance. Only 11 of its 16 air defense radar stations
\nare operational, making Indonesia a minnow in the region when it
\ncomes to its air defense system and capability. Air Force Chief
\nof Staff Marshal Chappy Hakim, during his hearing with the House,
\ndisclosed that many of his airmen have not even been able to
\nclock the standard flying time required of military pilots.<\/p>\n
Bernard and Chappy cited a lack of funds as the chief reason
\nfor this reduced air and sea defense capability. While we may
\nfeel fortunate that we live in times of peace, and find comfort
\nin the knowledge that we are not facing any immediate threat of
\nforeign aggression, this in no way should lead us to complacency
\nand to allow our defense posture to become compromised.<\/p>\n
Even during peace time, no country will feel safe unless it
\nhas taken adequate measures to deal with possible threats from
\noutside, no matter how remote the chance is. That is the reason
\nwhy every single nation has a military -- to defend the country,
\nthe people, the territorial integrity, and the economic resources
\nand interests. If you're going to have a military, you'd better
\nbuild one that is credible and capable, and one that the nation
\ncan be proud of and depend on. That also means we have to build
\none that is strong enough to repel any foreign attack.<\/p>\n
Such disclosures of our defense capability -- incapability is
\nprobably a better word -- would have been frowned upon in the
\npast. Showing our weaknesses to the outside world would have
\ncompromised our defense ability. The fact that both the Navy and
\nAir Force have gone public with this information reflects the
\ngravity of the situation, and the need to act quickly.<\/p>\n
The most appropriate course of action would have been to
\nincrease the defense budget and allow the Navy and the Air Force
\nto buy whatever equipment they need. But given that Indonesia is
\nstill in a state of economic crisis, this option is not available
\nfor many years to come.<\/p>\n
But in the interim, the House and the government could help to
\ndemand that the Indonesian Military (TNI) realign its spending
\npriorities. Part of the problem with our defense posture has been
\nthe misplaced priorities of developing our armed forces, which
\nwas built chiefly to deal with suppressing internal dissension
\nrather than with external threats.<\/p>\n
That has meant that the bulk of military spending, including
\nfor the purchase of military hardware, have gone to the Army, at
\nthe expense of the development of the Navy and the Air Force to
\nthe point of compromising our air and sea defense capabilities.<\/p>\n
Realigning our defense priorities is made possible with the
\ndeparture of the National Police from TNI in 1999, leaving TNI
\nwith three services: Army, Navy and Air Force. This separation
\nhas led to a clearer division of labor: internal security is now
\nwholly the domain of the police, and defense (meaning defense
\nagainst external threats) is the chief affairs of the TNI.<\/p>\n
If the TNI, particularly the Army, wholeheartedly accepts its
\nnew limited role, it should have been easy to realign its
\nspending priorities. Unfortunately, the TNI, again the Army in
\nparticular, is not ready to let go of its powers and privileges
\nyet. Witness its reluctance to dismantle its awesome territorial
\nstructure.<\/p>\n
The Army's territorial network, with commands all the way down
\nto the district levels, have served not only to help maintain
\ninternal security, but also to exercise its political privileges.
\nNow that TNI has agreed to leave the political arena, and that
\nthe internal security is being given to the National Police,
\nthere is no need for the Army to keep its regional commands.<\/p>\n
Dismantling the Army's territorial commands, and sending the
\nsoldiers back to the barracks, would represent a huge savings for
\nthe TNI. The money released could be used to build or develop
\nNaval and Air Force bases or even to start replenishing the
\nweaponry.<\/p>\n
It is clear therefore that dismantling of the Army's huge
\nterritorial structure, as reluctant as many in the Army may feel,
\nmust form part and parcel of the overall military reforms, that
\nalso include the realignment of its spending priorities, and the
\ndevelopment of the Navy's and Air Force's capabilities. The
\nquicker we realize this, the sooner this nation can build a more
\nrespectable and credible defense posture.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/our-defense-priorities-1447893297",
"image": ""
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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