{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1437724,
        "msgid": "one-year-later-1447899208",
        "date": "1999-05-21 00:00:00",
        "title": "One year later",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "One year later One year after Soeharto was forced to step down as president of Indonesia, the balance sheet of democratic reforms promised by the new regime that replaced him gives little cause for rejoicing, particularly to the youths and students who spearheaded the movement, often at the cost of their lives. Under pressure of the circumstances that prevailed at that time, the man who replaced Soeharto -- his vice-president and long-time protege B.J.",
        "content": "<p>One year later<\/p>\n<p>One year after Soeharto was forced to step down as president<br>\nof Indonesia, the balance sheet of democratic reforms promised by<br>\nthe new regime that replaced him gives little cause for<br>\nrejoicing, particularly to the youths and students who<br>\nspearheaded the movement, often at the cost of their lives. Under<br>\npressure of the circumstances that prevailed at that time, the<br>\nman who replaced Soeharto -- his vice-president and long-time<br>\nprotege B.J. Habibie -- began some of the most urgent economic<br>\nand political reforms needed to correct the worst of the ills of<br>\nSoeharto&apos;s corrupt and authoritarian regime. To be fair, some of<br>\nthose efforts have borne results.<\/p>\n<p>On the economic front, restructuring efforts in banking and<br>\nother sectors were undertaken to repair the country&apos;s economic<br>\nfundamentals, severely distorted by more than three decades of<br>\nmisuse and mismanagement under Soeharto&apos;s New Order regime. As a<br>\nresult, the paralyzing economic crisis appears to have bottomed<br>\nout, though many analysts caution against any overoptimism at<br>\nthis point. On a wider national scale, the press was given back<br>\nits freedom. The freedoms of association and of expression were<br>\nrestored, leading, among other things, to the emergence of a<br>\nplethora of new political parties. Though many political<br>\nprisoners remain in jail, many others were set free.<\/p>\n<p>But as welcome as those measures are as stepping stones toward<br>\ndemocracy, they do not by themselves touch the core objective<br>\nwhich the reformists envision -- which is to build a lasting<br>\nframework for a clean and democratic civil society. However, all<br>\ntoo many indications exist that the current transitional<br>\ngovernment of President Habibie is halfhearted at best in its<br>\nefforts to bring about real reform. To mention a few examples,<br>\nnone of the string of cases of violence and human rights<br>\nviolations involving the death or disappearance of students and<br>\npolitical activists have been satisfactorily resolved. Since<br>\nofficial incompetence on this scale is difficult for the common<br>\nIndonesian to believe, the most simple conclusion is that the<br>\ngovernment is unwilling to reveal the real perpetrators behind<br>\nthe incidents because of their links and positions in the former<br>\nNew Order regime.<\/p>\n<p>Another example involves demands that Soeharto be put on trial<br>\nfor his alleged corruption and nepotism during the 32 years he<br>\nwas in power. Though government officials have consistently<br>\ndenied that any proof of wrongdoing by Soeharto exists, the<br>\nlatest Time magazine investigation into the wealth of the<br>\nIndonesian ex-president&apos;s family has only helped to fuel<br>\nsuspicions that the Habibie government is determined to leave the<br>\nissue of Soeharto&apos;s wealth alone. The next inevitable conclusion<br>\nthat this invites is that at least some very powerful people in<br>\nthe present Habibie administration are afraid to comply to the<br>\npublic demands lest, apparently, their own wrongdoings in the<br>\npast will be exposed.<\/p>\n<p>All this can have far-reaching consequences on the success, or<br>\nfailure, of the current reform drive. One onerous question that<br>\nhas been plaguing many Indonesians in the past weeks is why the<br>\nruling party Golkar and Habibie are so adamant on winning the<br>\nupcoming general election. Could it be because there are certain<br>\nthings that they would prefer to remain hidden forever? And would<br>\nthey be willing to resort to any means in order to achieve that<br>\nobjective? And, once firmly in power again, wouldn&apos;t they have<br>\nsecond thoughts about bringing about reforms? After all,<br>\npractically all the top-echelon officials and ministers in<br>\nPresident Habibie&apos;s cabinet are members of Soeharto&apos;s New Order<br>\nadministration.<\/p>\n<p>The Golkar party and Habibie could have avoided all these<br>\nproblems by graciously bowing out of the upcoming elections, as<br>\nmany esteemed observers and analysts have proposed. But since<br>\nthat seems to be too much to hope for, the best thing the<br>\nproreform camp can do is to make sure that they win the ballot in<br>\nthe June 7 elections. The only way to ensure that is by setting<br>\naside, at least for the moment, all their differences and strive<br>\nas one toward one goal: to ensure that the reform movement<br>\nremains on track by winning the elections.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/one-year-later-1447899208",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}