On the brink of war?<\/p>\n
Ever since disruption of the operations of the Joint Security
\nCouncil in the middle of last month, it has been obvious that
\nPresident Megawati's government has lost its trust in the
\nCessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), only four months after
\nthe document was signed. The last-ditch "peace" talks that were
\nheld over the weekend in Tokyo as a result of very high-level
\ninternational pressure clearly showed that the government of
\nIndonesia is not very keen to pursue dialog. The Indonesian
\ndelegation went there with clear demands not contained in the
\nCOHA. It has been more a case of "take it or leave it!"<\/p>\n
The government, however, has presented a number of strong
\nreasons to support its stance. Members of the Free Aceh Movement
\n(GAM) are accused of not complying with the agreement facilitated
\nby the Geneva-based Henry Dunant Centre. Instead of promoting the
\ncontent of the agreement among the population during the first
\nfew months, they have continued to promote the idea of
\nindependence. Instead of proving their commitment to peace, they
\nare using the opportunity of being able to move around Aceh to
\nenhance their military strength. They have even abused the
\nagreement by taxing local people on the grounds that they are
\nentitled to do so as the counterpart of the government of the
\nRepublic of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, the local government has been doing almost
\nnothing to popularize the agreement directly with the people of
\nAceh, and, instead of reaching out and trying to win the hearts
\nand minds of the people, it has been acting as if nothing has
\nhappened and has continued to abuse its authority for its own
\nnarrow interests, with impunity. It has acted as though the COHA
\nwas solely the business of the central government, not the local
\ngovernment's too.<\/p>\n
These matters seem to have been ignored by the government. It
\nhas even disregarded the articles of the COHA, which stipulate
\nthat both parties to the conflict should refrain from increasing
\ntheir military strength and relocate their troops to defensive
\npositions, and that the government should reformulate the mandate
\nand mission of the discredited Brimob (Mobile Brigade) of the
\nNational Police.<\/p>\n
Instead, the government revealed its plan to launch what it
\nhas referred to as "integrated operations", combining
\nhumanitarian, law and order restoration and security operations.
\nWhile the humanitarian as well as the law and order operations
\nhave not been clearly spelled out, the security part of the
\noperations are a good deal more obvious to the public. The number
\nof troops and police in the resource-rich province has been
\nincreased from 38,000 to more than 45,000 in recent weeks. The
\nHouse of Representatives has not objected.<\/p>\n
With such strength, as well as the claimed professionalism of
\nthe military and police personnel, it is reasonable to say that
\nthe 5,000 troops of GAM would not last long in a conventional
\nwar. But nobody believes that GAM troops will engage in
\nconventional war. It will probably be a repetition of what
\nhappened during the military operation zone (DOM) in Aceh from
\n1989 through 1998. The result is a matter of history: More than
\n10,000 civilians killed; GAM increased its strength; the number
\nof GAM sympathizers among the Acehnese increased and the province
\nremained torn by strife.<\/p>\n
We should never forget that GAM, which proclaimed its
\nexistence in 1976, is only a small part of the multifaceted
\nproblem of Aceh. The restiveness of the province originated a
\nlong time before the movement existed. At the risk of being
\nrepetitive, it is worth noting again and again that since the
\nearly 1950s there has been a common feeling of betrayal at the
\nhands of the Republic of Indonesia. After all, the people of
\nAceh, from the very first years of the Republic, contributed to
\nthe nation's independence and the ensuing years of "development".<\/p>\n
The so-called integrated operation, which is supposed to be
\nlimited to around six months, does not address the real problem
\nof Aceh. What we need is consistency in the long term and
\nsystematic planning. This entails the role of a "civil society to
\nexpress, without hindrance, its democratic rights", as stipulated
\nin the COHA. Let us not allow the political agenda of next year's
\ngeneral election to set the terms for Aceh.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/on-the-brink-of-war-1447893297",
"image": ""
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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