On demands for greater decentralization<\/p>\n
By Elwin Tobing<\/p>\n
BOSTON (JP): The current widespread demand for greater
\ndecentralization emerged primarily from the dismal performance of
\nthe highly centralized development policy under the New Order
\nregime. The regime not only failed to improve the social and
\neconomic conditions of the nation but also alienated the people
\nand local and regional authorities from the decision-making
\nprocess of vital policies.<\/p>\n
Defined broadly as a transfer of authority from a higher to
\nlower level of government for the management of public functions,
\ndecentralization is considered an effective strategy to resolve
\nour national problems in improving planning and implementing
\nnational development programs at the local level. This argument
\nis based at least on two reasons.<\/p>\n
The first and more important is that decentralization will
\nenhance the people's participation in the development process.
\nThrough the people's participation, the practice of democratic
\nprinciples at the grassroots level can be fostered and national
\nunity can be promoted.<\/p>\n
Greater participation of the people and local governments will
\nalso reduce potential sources of conflict. Certainly, the people
\nwho are directly affected by a decision will not always make the
\nright choice. If they make a mistake, they will suffer the
\nconsequences and this will give them the awareness to make wiser
\nchoices in the future. However, if someone else made that
\ndecision for them, they would have every reason to direct their
\nanger at the responsible institution. The separatist movements in
\nAceh and Irian Jaya can be viewed as expressions of anger at the
\ncentral government in Jakarta.<\/p>\n
The other reason is based on the principle of optimal-level
\ndecisions. Jan Tinbergen (1981), a Noble prize winner in
\neconomics for having developed and applied dynamic models for the
\nanalysis of economic policies, identified two properties of an
\noptimal level decision. First, it is the lowest possible level
\nthat a maximum of participation and information is used. Second,
\nit is high enough to entail negligible effects on the welfare of
\nindividuals living outside the area for which the central
\nplanners are responsible.<\/p>\n
This is very important since central planners often do not
\ncare about the consequences of the decisions they make on local
\nand regional development policies. A classic illustration is the
\nWorld War I Gallipoli campaign of 1915 to 1916. As portrayed in
\nthe film Gallipoli, a general in a bunker deep behind the
\nfront lines used his telephone to order wave after wave of young
\nmen to storm a heavily defended trench, ignoring the local
\ncommander's advice that the effort is futile. As a result of the
\ngeneral's order, all the men died.<\/p>\n
Experience shows, however, that many decentralization
\nprograms, especially in developing countries, do not live up to
\ninitial expectations. In several African, Asian and Latin
\nAmerican countries, decentralization programs paradoxically
\nboosted centralization.<\/p>\n
By examining the effects of local government reforms in six
\ncountries, including Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, Nooi
\n(1987) concluded that decentralization programs not only failed
\nto enhance local autonomy, they enhanced the centralization of
\npower. Experience from countries such as Tanzania and Kenya also
\nsuggests that the people's participation as a means of
\ndecentralization did not materialize; instead the control over
\ndevelopment policies remained highly centralized.<\/p>\n
The story from Latin American countries reveals the same
\nresults. Mawhood (1993) noted that economic failings in the
\nregion were a result of centralized development policies neatly
\nveiled beneath the avowed decentralization policy statements of
\ngovernments.<\/p>\n
The failure of decentralization in many countries to enhance
\nthe people's participation has eroded the euphoria about its
\nvirtue as an effective strategy to improve national development
\nprograms. There were suggestions of returning to centralization,
\nespecially with the economic success stories of the \"Asian
\nTigers\". The Tigers -- Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and
\nTaiwan -- have proven that economic power and a higher standard
\nof living can be attained not through the decentralization of
\npower but also the concentration of power in the hands of the
\ncentral government.<\/p>\n
Yet, the demand for decentralization is never diminished. The
\ncriticism expressed at the failure of decentralization was
\nprimarily a result of the lack of increased participation by the
\npeople. Another explanation is that power was decentralized to
\nthe wrong people, either central government appointees or the
\nlocal elite. It is also believed proposed reforms have not been
\nimplemented as intended and there has not been a significant
\ndecentralization of power and authority.<\/p>\n
The lessons for us are clear. Decentralization should not be
\nseen as a general solution or a quick fix for all of our current
\nnational problems. Significant improvements in development and
\nthe participation of the people cannot be achieved merely by
\ndecentralizing our development programs. It is a necessary step
\nbut not sufficient by itself.<\/p>\n
It is also imperative to underline that the implementation of
\ndecentralization requires strong political and administrative
\ncommitments from national leaders. The experience of the New
\nOrder regime revealed that national leaders misused
\ndecentralization programs for their own economic and political
\ninterests. The programs were designed in such a way that boosted
\nthe authority of the central government.<\/p>\n
In addition, decentralization requires a fundamental change in
\nthe cultural behavior of local and central government officials.
\nOur local and regional authorities are used to functioning as
\nagents of the central government in communicating its
\ninstructions. The virtue of decentralization is not only the
\ntransfer of power from higher to lower-level authorities, but
\nalso from the government to the people. Unless people are the
\ncenter of any decentralization program, there will always be a
\nswing back to centralization.<\/p>\n
Last but not least, decentralization has to be supported by
\nadequate financial resources, skilled personnel and physical
\ninfrastructure at the local level. Also, decentralization
\nprograms have to be followed by rural financial reform. Almost 70
\npercent of our population still lives in rural areas. Without
\ngiving them access to financial resources, any new
\ndecentralization programs will only join the list of past
\nfailures.<\/p>\n
The writer is studying for his doctorate in economics at
\nBoston College in the United States.<\/p>",
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