Old network masterminds terrorist attacks on Bali?<\/p>\n
Hermawan Sulistyo, Jakarta<\/p>\n
Entering the months of September and October, the Bali Police
\nhad in fact tightened security measures to prevent terrorism.<\/p>\n
Bali Police chief Made Mangku Pastika took the measures in
\nanticipation of possible terrorist acts, particularly bombing.
\nThe policy itself was based on the existing pattern of previous
\nbombings, including targets and timing.<\/p>\n
The bombs, however, exploded anyway. The police could be
\naccused of a security failure but it is not easy to prevent such
\nan attack. It is near impossible to monitor the thousands of
\npeople with backpacks in public spaces to find which one is
\ncarrying a bomb. Though, it cannot be denied that extreme caution
\nis never kept up for more than a month after an attack has
\noccurred.<\/p>\n
Speculation has been rife in the aftermath of the Oct. 1
\nattack concerning the perpetrators and their motives.<\/p>\n
One version says the bomb was an instrument of terror against
\nthe Helsinki peace agreement on Aceh. This is unlikely as, so
\nfar, retaliation related to the Aceh cause has been confined to
\nJakarta and Bandung.<\/p>\n
The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) has accepted the terms of the
\npeace deal. Similarly, there is no strong argument for some
\nformer hard-line officers who are against the Helsinki agreement
\nto launch such an attack.<\/p>\n
The second theory is that the bombings were orchestrated to
\nshift the focus away from the recent oil price increases.
\nBut any effort to shift attention away from one issue by creating
\na potentially disastrous situation for the country is illogical.
\nThe government would not jeopardize its image as a nation capable
\nof fighting terrorism.<\/p>\n
On the contrary, there is another theory that the bombs were
\nset off to protest the fuel price increases. This scenario is
\nalso far from reality. People were informed of the increases well
\nin advance.<\/p>\n
The fact is these were suicide bombers and three executors of
\nthe bombings are dead. There is only one group linked to Jamaah
\nIslamiyah that has the capacity for such an attack.
\nThis is the same network that bombed the JW Marriot hotel and the
\nfront of the Australian Embassy. Some analysts and former
\nterrorists speculate that the perpetrators are new recruits led
\nby old players.<\/p>\n
At least 250 people in the region have the skills to make a
\nbomb; they gained their skills from training in the Abu Sayyaff
\ncamp in the Southern Philippines and\/or the battlefield in
\nAfghanistan. If everybody in this group functions as a leader
\nthen he needs no less than three to four trained assistants,
\nmeaning the group totals more than 1,000 recruits. It is
\ndefinitely not an easy task to control more than one thousand
\ntrained potential terrorists.<\/p>\n
The network usually consists of three categories of activists:<\/p>\n
The first group consists of religious hard-liners. Although
\nthey are devout and activists for their cause they do not
\npractice violence.<\/p>\n
The second group consists of political hard-liners. Although
\nstemming from religious devotion, they are more active in
\npolitics, both formal politics through political parties and
\ninformal politics through various pressure groups.<\/p>\n
The third consists of military hard-liners. They are, of
\ncourse, religious hard-liners but they believe that violent
\nactions -- including terrorism -- is the best and most effective
\nway to raise their cause. This third group is clandestine.<\/p>\n
The problem with the three groups is that they know each other
\nbut are unaware of individual group activities. The majority, if
\nnot all, activists from religious and political wings do not know
\nthat some of their members are militarily active. That explains
\nwhy many activists try to protect colleagues who are involved in
\na bombing because they do not believe that their friends were
\nreally involved in the bombing.<\/p>\n
Any analysis of an attack like the Oct. 1 bombings, is only
\nspeculative without forensic proof. If the old network is the
\nperpetrator, then why were the bombings not on the same scale as
\nthose of 2002? That is another question to be addressed in
\nanother area of the investigation.<\/p>\n
The writer is a history student specializing in political
\nkillings, terrorism and violence. Editor of the Police's White
\nBook on the 2002 Bali Bombings and CEO of Bukafe (bookstore &
\ncafi), he may be reached at kikiek@centrin.net.id.<\/p>",
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