Indonesia is drawing closer to realising its first nuclear power\nplant (NPP). Nuclear power is an appealing option among other new and\nrenewable energy sources, given the large amounts of energy it can\ngenerate with lower operating costs and emissions than fossil-fuel\nplants such as gas and coal.<\/p>\n
Furthermore, advances in NPP technology could benefit the industries\ninvolved. But building a nuclear power plant is not merely a technical\nmatter. Indonesia must establish long-term partnerships with foreign\nparties, and that decision could affect its position in global\npolitics.<\/p>\n
On the one hand, the benefits of nuclear power in meeting growing\nenergy needs make its development worthy of support. On the other, a\nfundamental question arises: how prepared is the Indonesian government\nto face the consequences and long-term commitments involved in building\nan NPP?<\/p>\n
The idea of building an NPP is not new in Indonesia. It has been\ndiscussed since President Soekarno\u2019s administration, and has resurfaced\nat various times under successive presidents.<\/p>\n
Recently, however, PLN\u2019s 2025\u20132034 Electricity Supply Business Plan\n(RUPTL) set a target for Indonesia\u2019s first NPP to begin commercial\noperations in 2032, with a capacity of 0.5 GW, in Bangka Belitung and\nWest Kalimantan.<\/p>\n
In the 2025\u20132060 National Electricity General Plan (RUKN), the\ngovernment set a target for total NPP capacity to reach 35 GW by 2060,\nequivalent to 11.7 per cent of the national primary energy mix.<\/p>\n
This ambitious target reflects nuclear power\u2019s status as a strategic\nnecessity for Indonesia, given the country\u2019s future energy needs. As\nfossil-fuel energy declines, the share of new and renewable energy (NRE)\nis set to increase.<\/p>\n
According to estimates by the National Energy Council, the combined\ncapacity of the NRE and fossil-fuel mix will reach only 1,548 TWh by\n2045, below estimated total demand of 1,700 TWh. Nuclear power is\ntherefore needed to fill the energy supply gap and support the economy\nover the long term.<\/p>\n
However, the benefits of nuclear power come with a number of\nconditions. Indonesia does not have sufficient uranium reserves to\nproduce nuclear fuel independently. Uranium enrichment also requires\nexpensive technology and is subject to strict requirements.<\/p>\n
That is where the paradox lies. NPPs offer large-scale electricity\nsupplies to strengthen energy security, but their construction still\nrequires cooperation with other countries. The situation is becoming\nmore complex amid escalating geopolitical tensions between Western and\nEastern blocs.<\/p>\n
Choosing a reactor is therefore not simply a matter of technological\nsuitability; it also involves choosing a strategic partner.<\/p>\n
The stakes are high. NPPs operate for decades, far longer than the\nterms of the administrations that sign agreements and build them.\nDecisions made today will have consequences for several generations of\nfuture leaders.<\/p>\n
Several foreign companies, including Russia\u2019s Rosatom and the United\nStates\u2019 NuScale and ThorCon, have already explored opportunities to\ndevelop NPPs in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
South Korea\u2019s experience shows how nuclear cooperation can constrain\na country\u2019s room for manoeuvre. The United States strictly controls the\nuse of nuclear technology to prevent nuclear fuel from being used as a\nweapon.<\/p>\n
Under a revision to the 123 Agreement on nuclear cooperation in 2015,\nSouth Korea gained wider scope for cooperation in nuclear fuel\nmanagement, including reprocessing and uranium enrichment of up to 20\nper cent. However, it must obtain the United States\u2019 approval and\nwritten consent.<\/p>\n
The change was achieved only after more than four decades had passed\nsince the agreement was signed in 1974. This has created obstacles to\nSouth Korea\u2019s ambition to become a leading NPP exporter.<\/p>\n
The experience illustrates the dilemma of nuclear cooperation. The\nbenefits of developing NPPs are real, but the accompanying conditions\ncan limit a country\u2019s technological and diplomatic flexibility for\ndecades.<\/p>\n
A solution may lie in the principle of an independent and active\nforeign policy, which has long underpinned Indonesia\u2019s diplomacy. It\nallows Indonesia to reduce the risk of dependence by building\npartnerships with countries from different blocs at the same time.<\/p>\n
Indonesia could gain access to a range of technologies, strengthen\nthe resilience of its fuel supply chain and accelerate construction by\nworking with different partners at each stage.<\/p>\n
Dependence on foreign parties would not disappear entirely, but it\ncould be managed so that it is not concentrated in a single country that\nmight restrict Indonesia\u2019s room for manoeuvre in the future.<\/p>\n
This idea is not new. During President Soekarno\u2019s administration, a\nRussian research reactor was planned alongside a United States design,\nbefore the plans were cancelled following the political upheaval of\n1965.<\/p>\n
Diversifying partners, in other words, is not a new concept but part\nof Indonesia\u2019s strategic instinct. Vietnam, for example, will operate\nNPPs built by Russia and Japan, conduct research with Rosatom and\nGeneral Electric, and develop its workforce with South Korea.<\/p>\n
In Egypt\u2019s case, although it is operating Russian reactors\nexclusively at El Dabaa, it has also engaged Australia\u2019s WorleyParsons\nfor site surveys and analysis. Indonesia has pursued a similar approach\nin the past.<\/p>\n
If managed well, the returns would extend beyond electricity\ncapacity. A single 1,000 MW light-water reactor could create 1,200 jobs,\nwith a further 600 jobs over its 50-year operating life.<\/p>\n
Given the scale of Indonesia\u2019s NPP ambitions, those figures could\nmultiply. Benefits would also extend to the cable, electrical\ncomponents, specialised construction, safety testing and maintenance\nindustries. All these sectors could gain new experience and\ncapabilities.<\/p>\n
Ultimately, everything comes down to one question. Nuclear power\noffers a rare combination of relatively clean, reliable, large-scale\nelectricity and the potential to drive industrialisation, making it\nworthy of a place in Indonesia\u2019s energy mix.<\/p>\n
But building an NPP is not simply a matter of buying megawatts. It is\na strategic commitment that will outlast the governments that decide to\nbuild one or oversee its construction.<\/p>\n
Success should not be measured by the number of reactors built, but\nby Indonesia\u2019s ability to preserve geopolitical flexibility, manage\nsafety, develop domestic industries and reduce dependence over time.<\/p>\n
The real question, then, is not whether Indonesia can build an NPP,\nbut whether it can navigate the lengthy process effectively, weigh the\ngeopolitical consequences and make the right choices.<\/p>\n
Being a nuclear-powered country is not merely about owning NPPs; it\nis also about mastering the processes that underpin them. Energy\nsovereignty must be built and planned carefully so that it does not\nburden future generations.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/nuclear-power-the-energy-security-paradox-and-geopolitics-1793094765", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }