No changes yet in China's policy after Deng's death<\/p>\n
By Rizal Sukma<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): It has been more than two months since China's
\nparamount leader Deng Xiaoping passed away. However, there has
\nnot been any sign suggesting that the country's political
\nsituation will turn chaotic as speculated by many analysts and
\nChinese watchers.<\/p>\n
It seems that the current China leadership led by Secretary-
\nGeneral Jiang Zemin, despite speculations about a possible power
\nstruggle outbreak, continues to show signs of unity. It also
\nappears to have been functioning normally without any significant
\nchange in national priorities or domestic policies.<\/p>\n
Indeed, recent developments in China after the death of Deng
\nsuggest that Chinese leadership remains committed to the four
\nmodernization programs (Si Xiandaihua) laid down by Deng two
\ndecades ago.<\/p>\n
Despite the fact that political differences among China's
\npolitical elite has not led to an open power struggle does not
\nescape such a possibility. It is still too early to claim that
\nChinese leaders have solved the question of succession in the
\npost-Deng era. The possibility of a quest for power and influence
\namong contending leaders continues to be one of the most
\nformidable issues in Chinese domestic politics. A major concern
\nfor China's neighbors is that if a power struggle was ever to
\nerupt, how would it effect China's foreign policy?<\/p>\n
It can be speculated that in the near future, China's foreign
\npolicy would not be affected by domestic developments. China's
\nleaders have repeatedly asserted that the death of Deng would not
\nbring about any significant change in China's foreign policy,
\nespecially in its policy towards Asia-Pacific in general and
\nSoutheast Asia in particular. China's leaders have stressed that
\nBeijing would continue to pursue its current policy of regional
\ncooperation in order to create a favorable external condition for
\nits domestic economic development.<\/p>\n
Despite such assurances, however, there are strong reasons for
\nSoutheast Asian countries not to take the future developments of
\nChina's foreign policy for granted, especially in the face of
\nuncertainty about the future of China's domestic politics. That
\nuncertainty, which primarily stems from a period of transition
\nwhich characterizes China's domestic politics at present, could
\nbring about unexpected consequences to China's stand, attitude
\nand position with regard to some fundamental issues in its policy
\ntowards Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
It can be speculated that during such a period of transition,
\nforeign policy could be used for political purposes domestically.
\nIf China's leaders are locked in a power struggle, it is likely
\nthat the contest would center around the quest for legitimacy.
\nUnlike leaders from the revolutionary generation, such as the
\nlate Deng Xiaoping or Chen Yun, current Chinese leadership cannot
\nrely on historical sources of legitimacy in their attempt to
\njustify their right to rule. They can only rally around
\ncontemporary themes, such as the need to continue economic
\ndevelopment programs.<\/p>\n
However, the fact that almost all Chinese leaders -- moderate
\nand conservative -- have pledged their commitment to development
\nmakes this theme less attractive as an instrument in
\nstrengthening legitimacy of a particular group. It serves as a
\ncommon basis of legitimacy for the entire Chinese leadership, not
\njust for a particular leader or group of leaders.<\/p>\n
Significant changes in China's foreign policy would come about
\nonly if the current Chinese leadership rallies around political
\nthemes such as nationalism and patriotism in the attempt to
\ncultivate their legitimacy. Indeed, if a power struggle outbreak
\ncannot be prevented, it is likely that contending leaders would
\ntry to project themselves as true nationalists or patriots. In
\nother words, nationalism and patriotism might become two
\nimportant parameters by which the legitimacy and authority of a
\nleader would be judged.<\/p>\n
If this unpleasant scenario becomes a reality, one of the main
\nforeign policy areas that might be affected is that of China's
\npolicy towards the South China Sea. This is related to the fact
\nthat territorial issues, such as the question of sovereignty in
\nthe South China Sea, would increasingly become more significant
\nfor competing elites in the struggle for leadership.<\/p>\n
At one extreme, territorial issues that could serve as a
\nvehicle for competing leaders who want to project a nationalistic
\nimage, by taking a tough policy stance, could easily be charged
\nas being less nationalistic. Meanwhile, in a situation
\ncharacterized by the lack of sources of legitimacy, nationalism
\nand patriotism constitute two primary sources for claiming and
\njustifying the right to rule.<\/p>\n
However, it is important to emphasize that the possibility of
\nsuch a scenario materializing would depend on China's national
\npriority. In this regard, post-Deng leadership in Beijing
\nrealizes that trends in economic transformations cannot be
\nreversed. As mentioned earlier, the success of economic reform
\nhas become the most fundamental basis of legitimacy in China's
\npolitics.<\/p>\n
The ability of central government to maintain that success
\nwould depend also on its ability to maintain a peaceful external
\nenvironment through an accommodating foreign policy. Here,
\nChina's leaders realize that a tougher stance in its policy
\ntowards territorial disputes would not be in China's best
\nnational interest. Even though nationalism becomes one important
\nsource of legitimacy, the most likely option for China's elite at
\npresent is that of status quo. In other words, it is unlikely
\nthat China's policy towards territorial disputes would deviate
\nfundamentally from current trends.<\/p>\n
Ironically, it is the status quo in China's policy towards
\nSouth China Sea territorial disputes that presents a major
\nsecurity challenge for ASEAN. Since the end of the Cold War,
\nterritorial disputes in the South China Sea have been seen as the
\nmost difficult challenge for ASEAN. A number of regional
\ninitiatives taken by Indonesia have not produced any significant
\nbreakthroughs.<\/p>\n
Therefore, there is no doubt that Southeast Asian countries
\nwould like to see some changes in China's foreign policy. In this
\nregard, it is important to convince Beijing that its policy in
\nthe South China Sea would be seen as a stick by which China's
\nregional intentions could be measured. For its part, through its
\nrole in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN has provided China
\nthe best opportunity to become a trustworthy partner with
\nregional countries.<\/p>\n
The writer is a researcher at the Center for Strategic and
\nInternational Studies (CSIS), Jakarta.<\/p>",
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