New wave of Islamic intellectuals<\/p>\n
Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik
\nIslam di Indonesia (Islam and the State: The Transformation of
\nIslamic Thought and Political Practices in Indonesia);
\nBy Bahtiar Effendy;
\nYayasan Paramadina, Jakarta, October 1998;
\nxvii and 374 pp;
\nRp 35,000.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): In Indonesia, the political relationship between
\nIslam and the state since the end of Dutch colonialism has been
\nproblematic. The problem rests on how to develop synergy between
\nthe practices and political thoughts of Islam and the state.
\nTension has frequently arisen in connection with the dominant
\nposition of Islam as the majority religion.<\/p>\n
Tension repeatedly arose during founding president Sukarno's
\nadministration and continued through the rule of Soeharto.
\nIslamic-oriented political parties were viewed as potential
\nrivals and considered capable of destroying the nationalist-based
\nstate.<\/p>\n
The regime's anxiety over Islam led to efforts to tame
\nIslamic-oriented political parties. As a result, Islamic
\npolitical activists not only failed to establish Islam as the
\nstate ideology and religion, but also were relegated to the role
\nof a minority group accused of challenging the state ideology of
\nPancasila. Physically, bureaucratically and even symbolically,
\npolitical Islam has been conquered by the authorities.<\/p>\n
Tension escalated because Islamic political activists also
\nviewed the state with suspicion. How could such an environment
\noccur? This question is examined by Bahtiar Effendy by
\nidentifying all the relevant factors and seeking all possible
\nsolutions in an effort to change a suspicious situation into a
\nharmonious and mutually beneficial one. He focuses his analysis
\non the development of a new wave of Islamic intellectuals in the
\n1980s.<\/p>\n
Bahtiar believes the tension between Islam and the state
\noccurred as a result of the formal and legalistic practices of
\npolitical Islam during the revolution period of the mid-1940s,
\nthe liberal period of the mid-1950s and the New Order period of
\nthe late-1960s. During the above periods, the idealism of
\npolitical Islam reached its peak with the demand to establish
\nIslam as the state ideology and religion, complete with all the
\nsociopolitical consequences.<\/p>\n
Historically, the demand did not appear in a vacuum. The
\n"meeting" between political Islamic activists and Western
\ncolonialism, which was considered negative because it nullified
\nthe opportunity for Indonesian Muslims to receive proper
\neducations and channel their political aspirations, was an
\nopportunity for Islamic activists to raise political Islam as an
\nideology against Westernism.<\/p>\n
Several political thinkers and activists, who were concerned
\nwith keeping Indonesia united, rejected the idea. Also, a sector
\nof the Indonesian Muslim community did not support the idea.<\/p>\n
What occurred next, during the first 25 years of the New Order
\nera, was that the idea of political Islam became the target of
\nideological and political suspicion. This situation has attracted
\nthe interests of Islamic intellectuals and activists since the
\n1970s.<\/p>\n
Bahtiar divides this generation into three different
\nintellectual groupings. The first is the theological and
\nreligious reform group, the second is the political and
\nbureaucracy reform group and the third is the social
\ntransformation group.<\/p>\n
The first group does not see politics with formalistic,
\nlegalistic or scriptural orientation (p. 131). This is in
\naccordance with what Sukarno did in the 1930s to find the essence
\nof Islam, not literally or textually. The group is represented in
\nfigures like Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahid and Nurcholish Madjid.<\/p>\n
The second group puts Islam not in the frontal position
\nagainst the state. It does not place Pancasila as opposing Islam;
\non the other hand, they complement each other (p. 153). Dahlan
\nRanuwihardjo, Sulastomo and Ma'ri Muhammad are among the earlier
\ngenerations of this group.<\/p>\n
The third, the social transformation group, is a practical and
\npopulist movement. It is people-oriented and aims to build a
\nstrong society. This group prefers to overcome concrete and
\nserious matters facing Indonesians (p. 166). Those in this group
\ninclude Adi Sasono and Dawam Rahardjo.<\/p>\n
What the three groups tried to achieve was a transformation of
\nthe political Islam's point of view from formalism and legalism
\nto substantialism. Through this effort, Bahtiar concludes that
\nthe current political Islam has found a new format, which covers
\nall theological grounds, purposes and approaches, and is
\nconsidered comparable to the construction of a united Indonesia.<\/p>\n
The new format does not need a legalistic or formalistic
\nrelationship between Islam and the state, as long as the state's
\nvalue system is not against Islamic teaching.<\/p>\n
Bahtiar's analysis clearly shows Indonesian Muslims undergoing
\na significant shift from formalism and legalism to
\nsubstantialism. As Kuntowijoyo once said: "it's high time for
\nrational and functional politics and to work for mutual interests
\n-- welfare, justice and democracy".<\/p>\n
One important note is that the shift in orientation does not
\nmean that formalism in Islam has disappeared. There still are
\nindications of the development of a formal political Islam.<\/p>\n
-- Islah Gusmian<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/new-wave-of-islamic-intellectuals-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }