{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1446234,
        "msgid": "new-hope-for-ris-diplomacy-1447893297",
        "date": "1999-04-07 00:00:00",
        "title": "New hope for RI's diplomacy",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "New hope for RI's diplomacy This is the first of two articles on the development of Indonesia's diplomacy prepared on a personal basis by Widjoseno Sastroamidjojo, a staff member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. JAKARTA (JP): Indonesia's diplomacy on East Timor during the last 23 years of the New Order administration often collided with the continuing development of international values, particularly those in decolonization and human rights.",
        "content": "<p>New hope for RI's diplomacy<\/p>\n<p>This is the first of two articles on the development of<br>\nIndonesia's diplomacy prepared on a personal basis by Widjoseno<br>\nSastroamidjojo, a staff member of the Ministry of Foreign<br>\nAffairs.<\/p>\n<p>JAKARTA (JP): Indonesia's diplomacy on East Timor during the<br>\nlast 23 years of the New Order administration often collided with<br>\nthe continuing development of international values, particularly<br>\nthose in decolonization and human rights.<\/p>\n<p>Consequently, the diplomacy created a negative image that was<br>\nvery costly and burdensome to the conduct of Indonesia's foreign<br>\npolicy, and the Indonesian society considered it as a complete<br>\nfailure by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' diplomatic efforts to<br>\nadvance the country's interest in international forums.<\/p>\n<p>Actually, such an accusation against the ministry was not<br>\nentirely true, given the fact that until 1982, Indonesia's<br>\ndiplomacy had successfully managed to gain trust from the<br>\nmajority of United Nations (UN) members, even at a time when<br>\ndecolonization was becoming a very dominant issue. The trust was<br>\nreflected in a steady decrease in the number of states opposing<br>\nthe integration of East Timor into Indonesia, until the day when<br>\nthe East Timor issue was deferred from the agenda of the UN<br>\nGeneral Assembly. In fact, the prospect of finding a<br>\ncomprehensive solution to the East Timor problem through wide-<br>\nranging autonomy was initiated in 1994, but it was overruled<br>\nbecause of political considerations.<\/p>\n<p>Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas said that \"two-thirds<br>\nof all the existing problems on East Timor happened within the<br>\ncountry.\" That implicitly meant that the foreign policy was<br>\nmerely an extension of the domestic policy and relied heavily on<br>\nhow the domestic policy was played out.<\/p>\n<p>Relations between both domestic and foreign policies should<br>\nhave been in parallel or harmony but in practice, the<br>\nimplementation of the domestic policy in the territory frequently<br>\ndeviated from what the government had planned and from what had<br>\nbeen assertively promoted abroad by Indonesian diplomats (in<br>\nterms of human rights).<\/p>\n<p>Given this unfavorable condition, as well as the technological<br>\nadvancements in communications, the diplomats often faced a great<br>\ndeal of difficulties in defending Indonesia's position, no matter<br>\nhow brilliant they were. Besides, in today's era of<br>\nglobalization, it is very unwise to believe in an old saying that<br>\n\"a diplomat is someone sent abroad to lie for his country\".<\/p>\n<p>The recent fundamental change in Indonesia's political<br>\nsituation, which marked the beginning of the reform era, has<br>\npaved the way for significant reforms in almost every aspect of<br>\npolitical life in the country, and developments thus far are<br>\nshowing encouraging signals for the future.<\/p>\n<p>Within the realm of foreign policy, such winds of change could<br>\nbe best seen through the government's flexibility in dealing with<br>\nthe East Timor issue, marking a new start at the turn of the<br>\ncentury through the offering of two possible alternatives for the<br>\nterritory: wide-ranging autonomy or independence from the<br>\nRepublic of Indonesia.<\/p>\n<p>If the first alternative of wide-ranging autonomy was<br>\naccepted, then the UN, through its General Assembly, would have<br>\nto rescind East Timor from the List of Non-self Governing<br>\nTerritories. This means that the East Timor issue should no<br>\nlonger be an international problem (even though this does not<br>\nguarantee that independent fighter Ramos Horta will end his<br>\nattempts to bring the settled issue back to surface).<\/p>\n<p>Similarly, if the first alternative is rejected by the parties<br>\nconcerned, and the second option of the East Timor release is<br>\neventually approved by the People's Consultative Assembly in its<br>\ngeneral session later this year, Indonesia will turn over the<br>\nterritory to the UN, which should reinstate its status of a non-<br>\nself governing territory as it had been before its \"integration\"<br>\ninto Indonesia in 1976. In short, whatever the end result might<br>\nturn out, both alternatives would certainly alleviate Indonesia's<br>\npolitical burden, and concurrently enhance its diplomatic<br>\nmaneuverability.<\/p>\n<p>Through those alternatives, the current government has indeed<br>\nshown the world its true position of openness, sincerity,<br>\nflexibility and cooperation in trying to find the best<br>\ncomprehensive solution for all parties concerned in the East<br>\nTimor question.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/new-hope-for-ris-diplomacy-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}