New approach needed for cabinet coordination<\/p>\n
By Aleksius Jemadu<\/p>\n
BANDUNG (JP): Political analysts have argued that one of the
\nweaknesses of the former cabinet was an obvious lack of
\ncoordination among ministries. Conflicting statements made by
\nministers often led to confusion in society. At the same time,
\nthe absence of clear objectives regarding the solution of the
\neconomic crisis had prevented individual ministers from taking
\ninitiatives, with the effect that the national economy had only
\nmoved from bad to worse.<\/p>\n
The biggest challenge of the new cabinet is how to end the
\neconomic crisis and reestablish international confidence on the
\nprospect of Indonesian economy. In order to accomplish such a
\nheavy task, the new cabinet really needs an alternative approach
\nto interministerial coordination. There is no doubt about the
\nexpertise and experience of the new cabinet members.<\/p>\n
However, interministerial coordination cannot be taken for
\ngranted. Even the most intelligent and experienced minister could
\nend up with feelings of frustration if his or her ability was not
\nemployed properly. In a bureaucratic culture where vertical
\nloyalty matters more than meritocracy, capable and creative
\nministers can be hampered by some kind of self-imposed
\ncensorship.<\/p>\n
Interministerial coordination becomes even more difficult in a
\nsituation where repartition of competence among ministers is
\nunclear and job overlapping prevail. Political analysts question,
\nfor instance, the division of tasks between the state ministry
\nfor the empowerment of state enterprises and the former
\ndirectorate general of the supervision of state enterprises
\nwithin the ministry of finance. Another case in point is a
\npossible overlap of authority between the ministry of health and
\nthe new post of state minister of food, drugs and horticulture.<\/p>\n
The new cabinet might have a well-intentioned policy to solve
\nthe economic crisis, however, the implementation of such a policy
\ncannot be taken as merely translation of goals into routine
\nprocedures. Policy-action relationships need to be regarded as a
\nprocess of interaction and negotiation taking place overtime,
\nbetween those seeking to put the policy into effect and those
\nupon whom action depends (Barret and Fudge, 1981).<\/p>\n
In working out an economic reform as proposed by the IMF, the
\nnew cabinet cannot deny the fact that such reform could go
\nagainst the vested interests of the political elite. Willy-nilly,
\nwe have to take into account fundamental questions about
\nconflict, decision-making, and the distribution of costs and
\nbenefits among major and powerful policy stakeholders. A tug-of-
\nwar between the urgency of a comprehensive economic reform and
\nthe preservation of those interests will determine how quick
\nthe nation can liberate itself from the current crisis.<\/p>\n
There are two approaches which can be used to improve
\ncoordination at the cabinet level. The first approach relies on
\ncentralization of power and control. This approach has been
\nextensively used by the New Order government. Thus, the President
\nhas established several coordinating ministries responsible for
\ndifferent groupings of affairs.<\/p>\n
As chief executive, the President coordinates the different
\nfunctions of ministries. He requires each minister to report to
\nhim the progress of his or her job.<\/p>\n
In addition, regular cabinet meetings are conducted to ensure
\na convergence of goals and strategies among ministries. The
\nPresident has also established several coordinating ministries
\nresponsible for different groupings of affairs so that they might
\nhelp him in his coordinating function.<\/p>\n
This approach has several weaknesses. First, too much
\ncentralization of power can make individual ministers too
\ndependent on the President. Consequently, they cannot develop
\ntheir own creativity. Second, competing and conflicting interests
\namong different ministries could impede the accomplishment of
\ncommon objectives. Third, this approach is not flexible
\nenough to incorporate the participation of the private sector in
\nachieving national goals. For instance, the agenda of promoting
\nnon-oil exports and foreign investment necessitates active role
\nof private companies.<\/p>\n
An alternative approach to the centralization of power is a
\npolicy network approach. It can be understood as \"mechanisms of
\npolitical resource mobilization in situations where the capacity
\nfor decision-making, program formulation and implementation are
\nwidely distributed and dispersed among public and private actors\"
\n(Marin and Mayntz, 1991). This approach requires a recognized
\ninterdependence not only among different ministries but also
\nbetween public and private agencies. The main function of the
\ncoordinator in this case is to improve conditions for cooperation
\nand mutual adjustments.<\/p>\n
The application of such an alternative approach can improve
\nthe capacity of the new cabinet to work out an economic recovery
\nin the midst of a volatile external environment. Modern
\ngovernance is said to rely more and more on policy networks. This
\nmight be the only way for the new cabinet to deal effectively
\nwith its global challenges.<\/p>\n
The writer is head of the school of international relations at
\nthe University of Parahyangan, Bandung.<\/p>\n
Window: In working out an economic reform as proposed by the IMF,
\nthe new cabinet cannot deny the fact that such reform could go
\nagainst the vested interests of the political elite.<\/p>",
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