Nervous Acehnese make political calculations<\/p>\n
Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Sociologist, Jakarta<\/p>\n
There are various political calculations regarding Aceh; for
\ninstance, the planned military operation estimated to cost more
\nthan Rp 1 trillion for the first six months; or speculation of
\ncorruption regarding funds of Rp 6 trillion for the province, of
\nwhich the local administration will only manage Rp 1.5 trillion.<\/p>\n
Yet, regardless of all the calculations, the sense of security
\namong the Acehnese has become increasingly shaken since a full
\nalert status was declared for the region.<\/p>\n
In Kutaraja, people do not go out after 9 p.m. Given the
\nsearches launched by the military, residents avoid getting into
\ntrouble by staying indoors. The homes of activists, however,
\ncould become targets for raids simply if authorities say they
\nhave received a tip that cannabis or documents of the Free Aceh
\nMovement (GAM) are on the premises. In a number of instances,
\ntroops were on the scene, reportedly abducting and torturing the
\nactivists before releasing them.<\/p>\n
Even human rights activists from Jakarta are no exception,
\nsuch as Johnson Panjaitan of the Indonesian Legal Aid and Human
\nRights Association (PBHI). Strangely, he was terrorized after
\nreporting his case to the police and the culprits were not found.<\/p>\n
In this tense atmosphere, a local councillor whispered to me
\nthat the Acehnese have their own political calculation.<\/p>\n
We remember first president Sukarno, who shed tears at the
\ngrand Baiturrahman mosque in Banda Aceh. He wept because of a
\nrequest to put his promise to Aceh in writing. But he failed to
\nkeep his pledge to grant Aceh exclusive regional status for
\nhaving contributed assets to Indonesia's exiled government and
\nthe republic's continuity. Aceh was merged into the republic, and
\nSukarno fell in an attempted military coup.<\/p>\n
The next president, Soeharto, again promised special status to
\nthe people of Aceh at the same mosque. However, through Law No.
\n5\/1974 on regional administration, Aceh lost not only its special
\nposition; its society and culture crumbled. It was made a
\nmilitary operation zone (DOM) from 1989-1998, ending shortly
\nafter Soeharto stepped down.<\/p>\n
His successor B.J. Habibie also pledged to enforce truth and
\njustice regarding soldiers who committed crimes against humanity
\nduring the DOM period. Yet military operations began again, and
\ntargeted civilian movements in particular. The 1999 elections
\nwere boycotted in the greatest exhibition of civil disobedience
\nin Indonesia's political history. Later, Habibie lost his
\npresidential seat in a legislative vote.<\/p>\n
Abdurrahman Wahid, or Gus Dur, then came to power. He promised
\nto hold a referendum within the next six months. The upholding of
\nhuman rights failed and instead of a referendum, a political
\numbrella was provided for the military to launch its operation
\nthrough Presidential Instruction No.4\/2001. Gus Dur was also
\nbrought down after he was overpowered by Megawati with the
\nsupport of military hard-liners. Aceh merely gained a referendum
\non applying the syariah.<\/p>\n
So the Acehnese have come to their own political calculation
\n-- that every president of this republic who pledges something to
\nthe people of Aceh at Baiturrahman mosque will fall unless they
\nkeep their promise. So what about Megawati Soekarnoputri?<\/p>\n
President Megawati, like her father before her, also tearfully
\nmade a promise to the Acehnese at the same mosque that no
\nAcehnese blood would be spilled during her term in office. But
\nthe reverse has happened ever since she made that commitment. The
\nAcehnese now ask: Will Megawati's fate follow that of her
\npredecessors?<\/p>\n
Rational arguments may point to, for instance, comparing the
\npolitical orientation and context of the rule of Sukarno and that
\nof his daughter, who is showing signs of providing a political
\numbrella to military hardliners.<\/p>\n
Nonetheless, the Acehnese, who are in the grip of fear, have
\ntheir own way of reasoning to maintain their political
\ncalculation. In their view, Aceh is the entrance to the Holy Land
\nso that every deed reaps God's rewards or punishment. The grand
\nmosque is a place of worship, therefore a promise cannot be
\ntwisted into empty political jargon.<\/p>\n
Aceh, they reason, is the land where martyrs are buried,
\nmaking it even more sacred. Lying to the people may be seen as
\ndeceiving the martyrs. Furthermore, Aceh's many victims include
\nwidows and orphans, whose prayers receive God's prompt response.<\/p>\n
Some perhaps would argue based on religious rationality that
\nall the unkept promises constitute \"political retribution\". The
\nAcehnese once protected leaders of the republic when the
\ncommunities outside the restive province were no longer able to
\nprovide refuge to them. The Acehnese also once gave economic,
\npolitical and military assets to ensure the republic's continuity
\nat a vulnerable time when foreign aggressors were trying to take
\nover the republic.<\/p>\n
If in return the Acehnese are subjected to deceptions and
\natrocities, they reason that \"political retribution\" will take
\nplace.<\/p>\n
In the end, their reasoning also reflects their capacity for
\nsurvival amid the frustration of having been deceived, and their
\nanger and disappointment for being made victims of crimes against
\nhumanity.<\/p>\n
The writer is the author of Dari maaf ke panik Aceh, sebuah
\nsketsa sosiologi-politik (From apologies to panic on Aceh, a
\nsociological and political sketch).<\/p>",
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