`National Police are not mere dishwashers'<\/p>\n
Sr. Comr. Anton Tabah, Expert Staff of the National Police Chief,
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
The National Police may be blamed for the conflicts raging in
\nMaluku, Aceh and Papua. They may be blamed for the failure to
\nunravel the mysteries of the murdered labor activist Marsinah,
\nthe journalist Fuad Muhammad Sjafruddin (Udin), the shooting of
\nstudents at Trisakti University and Semanggi in Jakarta and many
\nother incidents, including a number of bombings.<\/p>\n
In recent years, relief and optimism set in as the National
\nPolice (Polri) continued to improve itself. Prior to Polri's 57th
\nanniversary, which falls on July 1, the police have had some
\nsuccess, particularly in combating terrorism. They have received
\npraise from the international community, although the public at
\nhome continues to express dissatisfaction with Polri's
\nperformance, mocking and cursing them. The police have even been
\naccused of not being reform-minded.<\/p>\n
Despite efforts at becoming more professional there are
\nobstacles to this desire, such as the interests of the ruling
\nelite. Maybe this explains why only a few of the police's top
\nbrass have stood up against tyranny -- such as those of the
\ncaliber of Gen. Soekanto, the first minister of police affairs,
\nand Gen. Hugeng and Gen. Bimantoro, both former National Police
\nchiefs.<\/p>\n
When president Sukarno planned to make the National Police
\npart of the Indonesian Armed Forces, like the Army, Navy and Air
\nForce, Soekanto firmly opposed the idea. For him, this would only
\nharm police professionalism and would even dash all hopes that
\nthe police would ever become an authoritative force.<\/p>\n
Soekanto's worry became a reality. Gen. Hugeng gave up his
\nposition because he was not allowed to expose a corruption case,
\nwhile Gen. Bimantoro rejected a presidential executive order and
\nan unconstitutional decree to remove him from his post (he was
\nperceived to be siding with legislators who wanted to replace
\nthen president Abdurrahman Wahid, or Gus Dur -- Ed.), a move
\nwhich contributed to the toppling of Gus Dur.<\/p>\n
In the New Order era, the police organization was virtually
\nruined and law enforcement was no longer independent. In the case
\nof Marsinah, who was killed in 1993, the police quickly managed
\nto expose the murderer and location of the crime. Unfortunately,
\nto save the face of the powers-that-be, the results of the
\ninvestigation were simply shelved.<\/p>\n
Now there is more hope for police professionalism -- also
\nmeaning the police become independent and authoritative -- with
\nthe decrees on the police issued in 2000 by the People's
\nConsultative Assembly. How this hope is translated into reality
\ndepends on the state's political treatment of the police. The
\npolice should never again be tempted into \"political
\nexperiments\".<\/p>\n
At least part of the National Police's wish for reform has now
\nbeen realized. Structurally, the police are now no longer part of
\nthe Indonesian Military (TNI). Instrumentally, Law No. 2\/2002 on
\nthe National Police has been issued. Yet cultural changes need
\nmore time.<\/p>\n
The state now no longer interferes with police affairs as
\nregards professional quality and independence. Still, reform
\nwithin Polri will be conducted in stages. This is not because of
\na lack of regulations or a lack of improvisation in the police
\napparatus -- the police must catch up with growing public demand
\nregarding their role.<\/p>\n
The reason is that, first, the police are still in the process
\nof structural adjustment, which relates to the factor of power.
\nRelations with other state institutions, which entail bargaining,
\nmay lead to an unfavorable direction for the police. Political
\ndivisions took place in the period leading to Gus Dur's executive
\norder and in its aftermath. Some officers reportedly disobeyed
\nsuperiors. New values are yet to take shape while old ones
\nremain.<\/p>\n
Second, the National Police still seems to be treated as a
\ndishwasher. Dirty plates from the parties of the past are all
\nover the place. The dirt is from, for instance, the looting of
\nnatural resources, economic banditry and mafia-like groups,
\ngambling, corruption, pornography, and from press freedom. While
\nthe police must handle white-collar crimes, the public demands
\nthat the police continue to investigate robbery, other petty
\ncrimes and even people living together outside of marriage.<\/p>\n
Third, the police seem to be in a long-distance race without a
\nfinish line. The public demands that this regime must be \"totally
\nreformed\". When social tension intensifies, a clash is
\ninevitable. Against this backdrop the police must anticipate
\nchanges; and they can only do so if they can make cultural
\nadjustments.<\/p>\n
So we face two crucial developments: First, the kick-off of
\nthe reform movement was marked with the wide popular demand to
\nreverse the existing situation; the desire to severe the strong
\ngrip of state control and replace it with \"people's control\".<\/p>\n
Yet this was not coupled with the presence of a compatible
\ncapacity, particularly the role of the National Police. Many
\nmembers of the current political elite were perceived to side
\nwith the people, but have become a disappointment -- leading to
\nwidespread frustration.<\/p>\n
Second, while past modernization showed amazing growth,
\nIndonesians have been \"overwhelmed\" by their own environment.<\/p>\n
The police now find that they must anticipate such a condition
\nand prepare required measures, including guidelines at the
\noperational level. Meanwhile, software and hardware must be
\nmodernized. The fact that foreign vessels are involved in illegal
\nfishing in our territorial waters makes it absolutely necessary
\nfor us to have an adequate number of patrol vessels for the Sea
\nand Air Police. Personnel development must be geared toward the
\nestablishment of a police force with specialized skills. Until
\nnow the police have played their role like superhumans, dealing
\nwith everything from traffic violations and petty thievery to
\ncross-border crimes, while their personnel and skills are
\nlimited.<\/p>\n
One may indeed expect that a police officer should be
\nhospitable, nimble and agile. But it would be hard to find the
\nideal policeman given his empty stomach and a host of domestic
\nproblems. Worse, he might take off his uniform and rush out as a
\nmotorcycle taxi driver to supplement his income.<\/p>\n
At the level of leadership, one finds officers quick to
\nstigmatize \"certain groups\" or \"masterminds\" of major crimes. The
\nresponse of a professional policeman would instead be measured
\nand empirical, toward seeking a solution.<\/p>\n
Perhaps the police curricula could be enriched with social
\nunderstanding geared toward such responses. Nowadays, maybe we
\nstill hear the rumor that police cadets fall asleep once class
\nbegins, exhausted after the morning physical exercise.<\/p>\n
Police cadets need simulation of social problems and a basic
\nunderstanding of, among others, geography, demography, politics,
\nanthropology, psychology and public relations.<\/p>\n
Graduates would then better understand that social unrest is
\nnot merely another crime. Such incidents are linked with
\nhistorical, sociological, anthropological and political aspects.
\nTo understand a particular social environment, policemen need
\neducation and training in what one writer dubs \"the learning
\ncommunity\". The existing police educational system, comprising
\namong others the State Police School (SPN), the Police Academy,
\nthe Police College (PTIK), the Training School for Commissioned
\nOfficers (Secapa) and the Police Leadership College (Sespimpol),
\nis certainly not sufficient.<\/p>\n
The learning community for the police means expanding their
\nlearning environment beyond the above formal education
\ninstitutions. This would help their cultural reform, something
\nthat until now has been considered very difficult to introduce.<\/p>",
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